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The essential objective of this study was to fill a bibliographic void of secondary source material concerning Russian California.

This was accomplished by combining available translations

and more specific studies on the subject into one extensive work.
Introductory chapters provide:

(l} a brief statement regarding

Russia's massive eastward expansion through Siberia, to Kamchatka
J

and Alaska; (2) an examination of the nature of the Russian-American Company; and (3) a detailed look at the programs instituted by
the Company to provision Alaska and Kamchatka. The establishment
of Fort Ross in 1811 is viewed as one of those programs. The
settlement's primary functCton throughout its existence was to send

2

foodstuffs to Russia's northern colonies.

The main body of the

paper describes fully the structure of the settlement and analyzes
the various activities, undertaken by the Russians at Fort Ross, in
order to provide grain to the Company.

Those activities were sea

otter hunting, manufacturing, and agriculture and animal husbandry.
In closing, the paper focuses on the Native Californians of Fort
Ross, detailing their culture and their relationship with imperialist powers in nineteenth-century California •

....

I

The industries of Fort Ross--hunting, manufacturing, and husbandry--met with failure.
quate or untimely:

Each endeavor proved to be either inade·

The harvesting of pelts was quickly curtailed by

the depletion of animal populations; a successful manufacturing en-

I.

terprise was interrupted by foreign competition; and lack of labor
and expertise hindered the Russians' effort to transfonn the Ross
Counter into the Company's "granary." The research conducted for
this study led to the conclusion that the Russians' decision to
abandon their California settlement was finalized when another
means to provision the northern colonies became available.
A Study of Fort Ross necessarily demands an international

his-

torical perspective. A consideration of the Spanish colonial enterprise in Mexico and California, the British activities in the Pacific
Northwest, and

th~

increasing strength of the United States on the

western coast of North America are essential in understanding the
failure of the Russians at Fort Ross and in Alaska.
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A number of published, primary source materials were used exhaustively to complete this study. A complete selected bibliography
l

I
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I
I

I .

I

I

is included. Several categories of material were of prime importance.

Briefly, they are:

(1) correspondence between the Chief Man-

ager of the Russian-American Company colonies in Alaska and the Company• s Main Office in St. Petersburg.

These documents are available

on microfilm in the National Archives and in Vneshniaia Politika
Rossii, Series I and II, edited by N. N. Bolkhovitinov.

(2) Journals,

kept by navigators who participated in Russian circumnavigations which
made calls in the Russian Anerica, are invaluable·saurces of infonnation on the circumstances of the colonies.
p~ny

(3)

Reports of Com-

employees, such as Kirill T. Klebnikov and Ferdinand P. Wrangell

provide important statistical information on agricultural production,
otter hunting, manufacturing, and the population of Russian California.

As mentioned, secondary sources on Russian California are

scarce.

However, James R. Gibson's work, Imperial Russia in Frontier

America, does offer a thorough treatment of Russian trade and husbandry in California.
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In a country which is blessed with so mild a climate as
where there is such plenty of wood and water, with
so many other means for the support of life, and several excel lent harbors, persons of enterprising spirits might, in a
few years, establish a very flourishing colony. With the
assistance of able mechanics who are to be found at Sitcha,
wind and water mills might soon be constructed, looms
established, and manufactories for burning brandy. Large and
small vessels, and granaries for corn, would then be built;
vast herds of cattle would be raised, and sea-otters in
abundance taken; thus, in time, Kamschatka and Eastern Asia
would be amply supplied from hence with all kinds of vegetable
and animal productions for the support of life.
California~
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Figure 1. Russian map of California, 1844.
printed from the Quarterly of the California .. 1s
torical Society, 12, No. 3 *
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Purpose of a Russian Settlement in California
From 1811 to 1841, the Russian-American Company, under the sponsorship of the imperial government, held the tiny settlement of Fort
Ross in Alta

.

California, eighty miles north of San Francisco.

l

The

settlement of Fort Ross represented the extent of Russian colonization in California.

Yet from this 75-acre settlement, the territory

of "Russian California" evolved, designating an area from Cape
Mendicino to Drake's Bay and three Spanish leagues inland (see Figure

2).2

Fort Ross had one essential purpose--the provisionment of

Russia's northern colonies in Alaska, Kamchatka, and Eastern Asia.
Several methods were employed to carry out this provisionment and thus
Fort Ross served several functions throughout the Russians' stay in
Ca 1i forni a.
At different stages in its development, Fort Ross was a station
for otter hunting, manufacturing, and agricultural production.

The

Russians first hunted sea otter off the California· coast in 1803 and

that harvest was facilitated with the founding of Fort Ross in 1811.

In

its early years, Fort Ross also served as a manufacturing center, producing articles attractive to the Spanish California market, such as
rowboats, wheels, tools, and bricks.

Russian manufacturies and pelts

were exchanged for Spanish agricultural goods, particularly grains,
which were produced abundantly at the missions during this period.
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Figure 2. Russian California. Adapted
from mao in V. M. Golovnin,· Around the
World on the Kamchatka, 1817-1819 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1979),
p. 136.
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Fort Ross was no longer used primarily as a hunting post after
1818 when the population of California sea otter had been greatly
diminished.

The period of Russian manufacturing also declined

abruptly in 1821 when Mexico assumed control of California, following the Mexican secession from Spain.

The Mexican government re-

versed the Spanish policy of restrictive trade and opened California's
ports to foreign vessels.

As a result, the Russians lost a large
3
Moreover,
part of their California market to foreign competition.
since the Russian-American Company held little Spanish currency, the
loss of pelts and manufactured goods as exchange media greatly
diminished the Russians' ability to purchase mission grain.

These

circumstances forced the Russians at Fort Ross to turn their resources
primarily to agricultural production in the 1820s and 1830s.

Their

farming venture, however, met with little success and never fully
satisfied

the provisionment needs of the Russian colonies.

Faced with the successive failures of hunting, manufacturing,
and agriculture, in conjunction with the political instability of the
California region, Company officials began to question the long-term
viability of a Russian California colony.

Consequently,

~ttention
.......

was turned to other means of provisioning the Company colonies.

In

1839, through an agreement negotiated between the Russian-American
Company and the Hudson's Bay Company, it appeared that the problem of
provisionment would finally be remedied.

In the ten-year contract,

the British agreed to provide the Alaskan colonies with essential
grains and foodstuffs in exchange for a lease on a ten-mile strip of
Alaskan coastline.

Confident that this contract would provide needed

agricultural goods, the Company relinquished the Ross settlement which

..,,

-~

...

6

had never realized its intended purpose.

Fort Ross was sold to

J. A. Sutter in December 1841 for $30,000, with two-thirds of that
price to be paid in wheat and other foodstuffs.
Two Centuries of Russian Eastward Expansion
The establishment of Fort Ross, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, was a final step in two-and-a-half centuries of
eastward expansion conducted by the Russian state. 4 Under the guise
of freedom of enterprise, Russia had expanded through and sparsely
colonized a vast territory, east of the Ural Mountains, which increased her empire by five million square miles and provided an
essential revenue of furs to the state.

This expansive phase began

in 1582 when a band of mercenary cossacks, fighting on hire to the
Stroganov family, crossed the Urals and defeated the Siberian Khanate.
From this point d'appui, the Russian empire expanded rapidly, as the
Russian promyshlenniki 5 utilized the vast network of rivers and portages, exploiting the rich supply of furs of the i~temperate taiga. 6
By 1652 the Russian promyshlenniki completed this initial phase of
expansion which extended Russia east from Europe, through the contiguous territories of Central Asia and Siberia, to the shore of the
Pacific Ocean.
Once reaching the Pacific shore, the movement east was held in
abeyance as the Russians readjusted their orientation from a mode of
river travel to the uncertainties of the North Pacific.

The Russian

government spearheaded the movement toward America by sponsoring two
expeditions of Vitus Bering in 1725-31 and 1733-43. 7 Peter I (16821725) conceived the expeditions and transformed Russia into a naval

7

power.

He no longer recognized the Pacific as a barrier to expansion.

With missions such as Bering's, Peter aspired to conquer northwestern

America on the pattern of Siberian expansion, increasing state
revenue from the harvest of furs and the exploitation of mineral re8
sources and native populations.
With the foundation laid by government direction, Russian
eastward expansion proceeded, true to form, after 1743:

Under strict

government regulation, merchants sponsored numerous voyages across
the Pacific, toward North America, at a pace slowed only by the introduction of antagonistic variables such as foreign competition and
geographic confinement (see Appendix A).

By 1799, the Russians

founded Novo-Arkhangel'sk which served as the administrative center of
their North American holdings until the time of the Company's dissolution in 1867. 9
Russian expansion to Alaska followed a course familiar to the
history of fur trapping:
hunting grounds. lO

expansion following the rapid depletion of

By 1804, hunting was banned by the Company's

directors in many of the North Pacific holdings, as the animal populations were dangerously low.

The traditional solution to the problem

of depletion of fur-bearing animals was the acquisition of new hunting
grounds; however, with the conquest of coastal Alaska, the Russians
exhausted their geographical

li~its.

Penetration into interior Alaska

was infeasible due to the difficulties of inland provisionment.

Ex-

pansion southward could only occur into lands already claimed by
other European colonial powers.

One such solution was the expansion

into the claimed yet unsettled territory of California, north of

8

San Francisco.

This area was bordered to the north by a British

colony, and to the south by Spanish colonial America.

To the east,

the emerging force of a new world power was felt, as United States'
imperialism transformed territories into statehood.
The Russians and Spanish America.

The Russian movement south-

ward from Alaska aroused a legitimate concern among the Spaniards:
that the boundary of northern California was in jeopardy--vulnerable
to redefinition, as Spain had claimed California in name only, not
possessing the resources necessary to colonize.
The Spaniards' ungrounded fear of a strong Russian presence on
mainland America resulted in a series of Spanish expeditionary
investigations along the Pacific coast and in the founding of new
11
settlements in the San Francisco District (see Figure 3).
By
intensifying the Spaniards' concern that Alta California was open to
foreign encroachment, Russian movement unintentially served as a
catalyst, prompting the Spanish development of California.

However,

Spanish colonial officials failed to realize that St. Petersburg,
like Madrid, was unable to direct resources to a colonizing effort in
California and unwilling to divert attention from the important
political matters in Europe and Asia, such as the Amur Basin, to the
concerns of the burdensome and unproductive American colonies.

What occurred in nineteenth-century California was the meeting
of two immense expansionist powers, veritably without more than
nominal support from their patron states.

With resources exhausted,

the Russian expansionist movement east and the Spanish west touched
in an extended reach that would serve as the breaking point of their
American colonial enterprises.

Maintaining a hold on California,

9
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Figure 3. Map illustrating the Spanish districts of Alta
California. Adapted from map in Robert W. Durrenberger,
Patterns of the Land: Geographical, Historical and Political Maps of California, 5th ed. (Northridge, Caltfornia:
Roberts Publishi-ng Company, 1976), p. 52.
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with the emergence of new world strength, proved an insurmountable
task to both Russia and Spain.

Thus they retreated, eventually to

their geographical confinement; Russia to the limits of the Asian
continent, Spain to the Iberian peninsula.

And the United States

advanced, in geographical righteousness, westward to the Pacific.
The Nature of the Russian-American Company
This is a study of the short-lived Russian tenure in California.
It attempts to reconstruct the events that brought the RussianAmeri can Company to California and those that led to its departure.
Therefore, one question of particular relevance to a study of Russian
expansion into California demands attention:

that is, the problem of

the political nature of the Russian-American Company.

This problem

requires consideration, as the Company's persuasion necessarily defines the stance of the imperial government in the course of RussianAmerican expansion.

Moreover, an understanding of the nature of the

Company assists in determining what forces--political and economic-were ultimately responsible for the attempt to expand Russia's
borders to include a possession in California.
The formation of the Russian-American Company in 1799 was a
reorganization of government control over the fur trade, rather than
a movement of the trade from the entreprenership of Russian
promyshlenniki to the rigid regulation of imperial bureaucrats as
the literature often suggests. 12 The visibility of this restructuring
process has been clouded by the description, in historical analyses,
of a private sector opposing the highly formalized and developed bureaucratic structure of eighteenth-century Russia.

The nature of the

11

Russian socio-economic system, however, warranted no such distinction
between individual and state enterprise. 13 A private sector had
not and could not flourish as monarchical Russia was not compromised
by the existence of a middle class--semi-feudal aristocracy ruled unchallenged and serfdom precluded a free labor pool.

The state not

only restricted individual movement, but it also owned the means of
the trade, including material and human resources.

To acquire access

to these means, an individual merchant needed to satisfy bureaucratic
requirements.

Petitions needed to be filed and approved in order to

complete virtually any phase of the voyage; for example, to build a
vessel, to buy provisions (firearms included), to hire
transport outside city limits.

hands, or to

Therefore, the reorganization of the

fur trade into the Russian-American Company, occurred perforce within
the confines of government association where it had resided iince its
placement under the Sibirskii Prikaz in 1693. 14 The Russian government, although circumscribed by slow communication, carefully
monitored this enterprise which brought such a handsome revenue to
the state.
The construction of a private segment of the Russian economy
has resulted in the consideration of historical problems debased of
legitimacy.

Specifically, two questions regarding the government and

the fur trade must be re-evaluated:

(1) What motivated the Russian

government, in 1799, to form a monopoly over the maritime fur trade?
and, concomitantly, (2) To what end did the government operate the
Russian-American Company?

Was the Company a governmental instrument

of expansion and colonization,

christianizing and civilizing?

Was

12

its formation somehow reflective of Russia's Orang nach Osten, the
processes of prisoedinenie and osvoenie, or the Russian manifest
destiny?
The question of goals which the Russian government hoped to
achieve, through control of the trade, acquires an air of ambiguity
in light of the claim that there was a governmentally-controlled
trade prior to the Company's formation.

As government control

existed prior to 1799, the ability to manipulate the fur trade to the
state's political, economic, and social advantage was not new.

The

government traditionally orchestrated the force of eastward movement
by regulating the degree of control it placed over individuals and
commerce.

Thus, with little governmental design yet optimal control,

the fur trade had served as a vehicle of expansion and colonization
for the Russian state.

And this expansion and colonization had, in

turn, complimented the commercial enterprise which fueled the bureaucracy and encouraged institutional growth and dependency.
To address the question regarding what motivated the government
to form a monopolistic Russian-American Company, it seems clear-considering the degree of imperial regulation--that the government
did not assume control of the trade in 1799; the organs of control had
been intact at least a century prior to the Company's formation:

The

movement of the trade was always subject to the scrutiny of the
imperial apparatus.

Thus, it is inappropriate to search for the

motive guiding the Russian government's attempt to commence domination
over the lucrative trade.

More appropriate, perhaps, would be a

determination of those agents which did force the rearrangement of

13

the bureaucratic

s~ructures

and, more essential to this study, the

degree of independence the Company experienced as it expanded into
America in the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The Agents of Change.

When the development of the Russian fur

trade is traced to the close of the eighteenth century, an enterprise
of limitless potential is found; an ostensibly endless eastern
frontier offered boundless success in terms of the volume of pelts
that could be harvested and peoples conquered.

The problem of the de-

pletion of the numbers of fur-bearing animals was perpetually avoided
by expansion into virgin territories to the east.

These hunting

grounds offered millions of animals, insuring a large profit despite
the inhospitability of the land.

The first half of the nineteenth

century, however, found the trade confined:

The restraints of re-

source (animal and human) depletion were not new, yet in conjunction
with geographical limitations and foreign competition, the trade was
deprived of its previous liberty to advance.

Hence, these three

factors were agents which forced the government-sponsored trade to
define a stronger position.

The monopolization of the fur trade,

through the formation of the Russian-American Company, was in part a
.response to these incessant problems which challenged the continued
success and existence of the trade.
Administrative Structure of the Russian-American Company.

The

administrative structure of the Russian-American Company (1799-1867)
was composed of the Main Office in St. Petersburg, the General
Assembly of Shareholders, the Coordinating Council, and the Chief
Manager of the Russian-American Colonies (see Figure 4).

The

Assembly's power was the most circumscribed of the four administrative

~

off fees

Chtef Manager of the
Russfan-Amerfcan Colonfes

~Branch

"atn Office
(Board of Dfrectors-4)

Department of Manufactures
and Foreign Trade

Htnfster of Finance

_rrr

Special Counctl
(3 lllelllbers)

I

General Assembly of
Shareholders of RAK*

Ruling sen•t•

Fiqyre 4. Administrative structure of the Russian-American Company (RossiiskoAmerikanskoi Kompanii, *RAK) under the Company's second charter, 1821-1841.
Based on information provided in Stephen A. Johnson's "Baron Wrangell and the
Russian-American Company, 1829-1849," Diss. University of Manitoba, 1978 and
Petr A. Tikhmenev, A H"stor of the Russian~American Com an , trans. and ed.
Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1978), pp. 54-60.

Mtnfster of
foretgn Affairs

__,
~
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divisions and this was due to strong government involvement in
Company affairs.

The shareholders' most important responsibility
15
was the selection of two of the three council members.
The remaining three branches of the Company administration unequally shared
power within the Company, yet all were ultimately responsible to the
Russian government and the emperor.
The Main Office was placed under the Department of Manufactures and Foreign Trade in 1819 and this Department was, in turn,
a division of the Ministry of Finance. 16 The five-member directorship,
comprised overwhelmingly of naval officers, had four basic responsibilities in addition to the supervision of the Company's branch
offices. 17 These responsibilities were: (l) the approval of business
transactions, (2) control of Company credit, (3) maintaining public
(shareholder) confidence, and (4) guarding the welfare of the Company
colonies.

The last of these responsibilities--the welfare of the

colonies--was charged to the Chief Manager of the Russian-American
Colonies who, by the terms of the second charter, was to serve a
minimum term of five years (see TABLE I).

The Chief Manager of the

American Colonies had six basic responsibilities.
with the supervision of:

He was charged

(1) Company employees, (2) Company office

and establishments, (3) the clergy and churches, (4) supplies and
provisions, (5) native subjects, and (6) the Company fleet. 18
Government Involvement in Company Affairs.

From its inception,

the administrative structure of the Russian-American Company assured
strict governmental guardianship over commercial as well as political
activities of the Company • Petr A. Tikhmenev (182?-1888),

16

TABLE I
CHIEF MANAGERS OF THE RUSSIANAMERICAN COMPANY COLONIES
Chief Manager

Term of Office

Alexander Andreevich Baranov

[?J 1790 to 11 January 1818

Leontit Andreanov1ch Hagemeister

11 January 1813 to 24 Octotrer 1818

Semen Ivanovtch Janovski1

24 October 1818 to 15 September 1820

~,.tvei

15 September 1820 to 14 October 1825

Ivanov1ch Hurav'ev

1~30

Peter Egorovich Chfstiakov

14 October 1825 to 1 June

Baron Ferdinand Nrangel

1 June 1830 .to 29 October 1835

Ivan Antonovich Kupreanov

29 October 1835 to 25 f1ay 1840

Adolf Karlovich Etholen

25 Hay 1840 to 9 July 1845

Mikhail Dmit'rtevfch Teben'kov

9 July.1845 to 15 October 1850

Nikolai Iakovlevich

15 October 1850 to 31 Hirch 1853

Ros~nberg

Alexander I1'1ch Rudakov

JJ f·1arch 1853 to 22 April 1854

Stephan Yasil'evich Yoevodsk11

22 April 1854 to 22 June 1859

Ivan Vas11'ev1ch Furuhjelm

22 June 1859 to 2 Oectl'lber 1863

Prince Dll1tr11 Petrovich Maksutov 2 Declfllber 1863 to 18 October 1867

Reprinted from Petr A. Tikhmenev's A History of the
Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard A.
Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1978), p. 507.
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historian of the Russian-American Company, reprinted an order issued
by the government on July 8, 1799--the year of the Company's formation, stating that the Company was obliged to report "everything concerning the affairs of the Company, its orders as well as achievements, directly to His Imperial Majesty. 1119 The government-company
link was initially embodied in the position of inspector or correspondent, a position created and filled by the emperor.

The first

occupant of this office (1799-1806) was Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov,
who was also a large shareholder.

Rezanov, using the influence of

this position, played a major role in the development of the RussianAmerican Company.

While in Novo-Arkhangel'sk in 1803, he called for a

major reorganization of the colonies' administration.

In addition,

Rezanov embarked on commercial-diplomatic missions in Japan and
Spanish California on the Company's behalf (see pp. 50-55).
As the Company developed, government control over its activities
was refined and strengthened.

Expansion led to dealings with other

European colonial powers and these political complications forced the
government to oversee the Company's colonial trade, the opening of
new hunting grounds, and founding of new settlements.

"As business

transactions expanded, so did the Company's relations with the various
governmental agencies become proportionately intricate ••• 1120 This
increasing intricacy was manifested in the establishment of a coordinating committee .which superceded the office of government in21
spector in 1807.
The committee was comprised of three members; two
were elected from the General Assembly of Shareholders and the third
was appointed by the emperor.

The committee was also known as the

18

Special Council of the Russian-American Company and it oversaw:
••• all matters which are important or which demand secrecy
in the way of political views, matters inseparable from the
extension of trade, navigation, and various ••• plans and the

determination of said matters, which may at times impede the
Directors [of the Main Office of the Russian-American Company]
or be found to be beyond their powers, is entrusted to the
attention and care of th2 Council jointly with the government
of the "Entire Company." 2
The primary reason for the Special Council was to deal with the
politically sensitive issues which arose from Russian contact with
Britons and Spaniards on the western coast of America.

The formation

of the Council coincided with the initiation of several Company
activities which presumed a high level of interaction with other
European political forces in the new world.
began in 1803 (see pp.

Russian global voyages

42-49) and consequently, the Russians estab-

lished relations in the Sandwich Islands where Britain and America
also presided (see pp. 56-58).

Through circumnavigation and other

independent Company actions, the Russians made contact in the
Californias and in the Pacific Northwest where the Spaniards and
British respectively had established dominance.

Additionally, the

United States exherted new strength in the Pacific and challenged
their right of access to the strategic and profitable waters off
Alaska and western North America.

The increasing complexity of for-

eign contacts created substantial Russian-American Company participation in the North Pacific and the Russian government, reaffirming its
control over Company affairs, established a complimentary agency-the Special Council--to oversee the planning and implementation of
affairs that involved other European powers.

The move to

California and the establishment of Fort Ross, specifically, created

19

problems of a political nature on a scale never before encountered
by the Company and hence the government required particularly close
surve1· 11 ance over

company

23
. . t.ies in
. th.is region.
.
ac t iv1
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I
1 The date for the establishment of Fort Ross can be accurately
placed at 1812, the time when the actual fort was erected in the
location where it stands today.

However, in late November 1811, the

Russians began construction of a post at Bodega Bay, which they renamed
Rumiantsev Bay.

In March 1812, the Russians decided that their original

site was inappropriate for a main settlement and moved eighteen miles
north.

There they built the walled structure which is referred to as

"Fort Ross" and which remained the administrative center of Russian
California until 1841.

.

Port Rumiantsev, however, also remained an

integral part of the Russian's settlement, as it served as the Russian
harbor in California (see pp. 79-80).

It is for this reason--that con-

struct ion at Port Rumi a.ntsev began in 1811 and that the Port remained a
vital part of Russian California throughout its existence--that the date
of Russian occupation in California and Fort

Ros~

in this work, is

placed at 1811 instead of 1812.
"Alta California" was used by the Spaniards to designate that area
which comprises the present state of California.

The name "California"

originally designated what is now known as Baja California, founded by
Cortes in the 1530s.

It was originally thought to be an island.

The

expedition of Francisco de Ulloa (1539-40) is credited with finding
that Baja California was actually a peninsula.

21

2 The area of Rumiantsev Bay, Fort Ross, and the Khlebnikov,
Kostromitinov and Chernykh Ranches were the only settlements the
Russians established during their thirty-year occupation of Alta
California.

The colonial population of adult Russian males in

California peaked at 41 in 1833.

Despite the insignificance of the

Russian colony, in terms of settled territory and inhabitants, Russian
California was considered to extend 250 miles north of the fort itself,
adjacent to the southern boundary of the Oregon Territory.

This notion

of "Russian California" which exaggerated the actual strength of the
Russians in California is peculiar to sources, Spanish and Russian,
dated at the time of the fort's sale.

In particular, the deed written

by Petr S. Kostromitinov, agent for the Russian-American Company stated
that the Russian-American Company ceded to John A. Sutter, founder of
the California colony of New Helvetia and the purchaser of the property of Fort Ross upon the Russian's departure:
the establishment embracing on the North the' land adjacent to
Cape Mendicino, and on the South the land adjacent to Punta de
los Reyes, or Cape Drake, and extending back from the shore
three Spanish leagues, and of which property the Russian American Fur Company has had and held possession from the year 1812
to the year 1841, •••
(The above text was found in Clarence DuFour's "The Russian Withdrawal
from California," Quarterly of the California Historical Society,
12, No. 3 (1933), 269.) Similarly, Mariano G. Vallejo, commander of
the San Francisco Presidio, informed California's Governor, Juan
Alvarado, that the "Russians are going [to evacuate California] at
last .•• Cape Mendicino will now truly be the northern boundary of the
Californias, for although the geography said so, our jurisdiction did
not pass American Creek."

(Reprinted in DuFour, p. 254.)

22
3 Correspondence informing Matvei Ivanovich Murav'iev, head of the
Russian-American

~ompany

had succeeded to Spain's

colonies in America (1820-1825), that Mexico
former. position in California and that Spanish

laws forbidding foreigners to trade in ports of North and South America
had thus been abolished is available in the "Records of the RussianAmerican Company," National Archives, Washington, D.C.
dated March 3 (15), April 28 (May 10), and July 18 (30).

Documents are
These sources

are listed in C. Alan Hutchinson's Frontier Settlement in Mexican
California:

The Hijar-Padres Colony, and its Origins, 1769-1835

(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 87, 101, 140.
4 Many historians have dealt with the phenomenon of Russia's
tremendous eastern expansion.
English are by:
(Berkeley:

The most notable considerations in

Raymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700

Univ. of California Press, 1943); Frank A. Golder, Russian

Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850:

An Account of the Earliest and

Later Expeditions Made by the Russians Along the Pacific Coast of Asia
and North America; Including some Related Expeditions to the Arctic
Regions

(Gloucester, Mass:

Urge to the Sea:

P. Smith, 1960); Robert J. Kerner, The

The Course of Russian History.

Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs

The Role of Rivers,

(Berkeley: Univ. of California

Press, 1946); George V. Lantseff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century:
A Study of the Colonial Administration

(Berkeley:

Univ. of California

Press, 1943); Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire:
Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750
(Montreal:

McGills-Queen's Univ. Press, 1973).

James R. Gibson,

geographer of Russian expansion, has produced many works, including
Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and
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the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1639-1856

(Madison:

Univ. of Wisconsin

Press, 1969) and Imperial Russian in Frontier America
Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).

(New York:

For an extensive bibliography of Russian

expansion see Basil Dmytryshyn's "Russian Expansion to the Pacific,
1580-1700:

A Historiographical Review," Slavic Studies

Univ.), No. 25 (1980).
5 The term promyshlenniki [plur~l of promyshlennik]:

(Hokkaido

translates

from the Russian with difficulty as there is no comparable term in
English.

Generally, promyshlenniki describes the individuals involved

in eastward expansion for profit, e.g., traders, trappers, and
deputized cossacks.

However, the participants in this Russian movement

are not equivalent to American frontiersmen, as Russian expansion
and trade were closely monitored by the imperial government and not
exercises in private enterprise.
Fisher provides a most

In his work, The Russian Fur Trade,

compreh~nsive

definition of the participants in

Russian eastward expansion.
It was·the [promyshlenniki] who obtained the furs at the
source, and for that reason participated actively and extensively in the conquest. The term promyshlenniks, ordinarily
referred to men who worked for themselves, exploiting natural
resources ••• They hunted and trapped fur-bearing animals, or got
them from the natives by trade, extortion, or as tribute. So
active were they in the fur trade in Siberia that in that
country the term "promyshlennik" became synonymous with fur
hunter or trapper. By the very nature of their occupation
they became explorers and conquerors (p. 30).
6
The taiga is the subarctic coniferous forest of Siberia, south
of the tundra

region~

The harsh climatic conditions of the taiga are

responsible for the luxuriant and valuable pelts of the region's furbearing animals.
7
See Raymond H. Fisher's Bering's Voyages:

Whither and Why
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(Seattle:

Univ. of Washington Press, 1977) for an historical re-

evaluation of the purposes behind these expeditions.

See also

Robert J. Kerner, Urge to the Sea.

8 Peter's motivation was not geographical in nature as is generally
accepted.

Raymond H. Fisher convincingly argues that the geographical

mystery, regarding the separation of the Asian and North American
continents, had been solved, in Peter's mind, by 1722.

By this time,

Peter had been presented with three maps which convinced him that the
continents were in fact separated by water (p. 62).

At the time of the

first voyage, Bering expected to reach America and reconnoiter its
coast.

When the course proved incorrect, Bering turned back.

On the

second voyage, Bering and his captain of both voyages, Aleksei Chirikov,
again headed for America; Bering on the St. Peter and Chirikov on the
St. Paul.

Although the vessels were permanently separated at mid-

voyage, both reached America between 55° and 59° North latitudes.
Chirikov returned to Kamchatka in October, but Bering died of scurvy
the following December on what is now Bering Island.
9
Novo-Arkhangel'sk is present-day Sitka, Alaska.
lO The Russianpractice of depleting an area's fur resources and
then moving on to a virgin area did not pose problems until the
Russians met with geographical limitations, as in Alaska.

Additionally,

in Alaska the sea otter was the primary fur-bearing animal hunted by
the Russians.
harvested.

In

~iberia,

the sable had been the most prized pelt

Though the sea otter pelt was worth 40 times that of the

sable (in 1817), the sea otter population also depleted five times
faster.

This was because the female sable averaged five offspring a

year to the sea otter's one pup annually.

Additionally, the pelt of
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the female sea otter was valued over the male pelt.

See James R.

Gibson's "Russian Expansion in Siberia and America:

Critical Con-

trasts, " The Wilson Center, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian
Studies Occasional Paper. No. 72 (1979), p. --2.

For further reading on

the causes of animal depletion, the rate of depletion, the absence of
conservation measures, and specifically, the relationship between
depletion and eastward advance, see Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade,
pp. 94-107.
11 See pp. 74-77 for a brief account of the most significant
Spanish expeditionary missions between 1774 to 1792.
12 Anatole G. Mazour evaluated the nature of the Russian-American
Company as "an agency of the crown rather than a free private enterprise" in "The Russian-American Company:

Private or Government Enter-

prise?" Pacific Historical Review, 13 (1944), pp. 168-73.

Mary E.

Wheeler considered this problem in "The Russian-American Company and the
Imperial Government," The Wilson Center, Kennan Institute for Advanced
Russian Studies Occasional Paper, No. 67 (1977), pp. 1-40.

Wheeler

concluded that "the company was established only to bring order of the
chaos brought about by merchant rivalry in Irkutsk following the death
of Shelikhov, and that the grant of privileges for twenty years was not
the conscious creation of a strong monopoly for imperialistic purposes
but and attempt to broaden--rather than limit--merchant participation in
the North Pacific fur trade."
13
See Dmytryshyn's "Russian Expansion to the Pacific," for the
first consideration of Russian eastward expansion, prior to 1799, as a
movement spurred by "an inseparable link between private and national
interests."

See also Mazour's "The Russian-American Company."

Mazour's
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consideration of the fur trade is one of a private enterprise prior to
the formation of the Russian-American Company.

He states that "private

initiative" was responsible for the expansion of Russia to the Pacific
and that the founding of the Company in 1799 allowed for the entrance of
government involvement in the trade.

While this author would agree

with Mazour's assessment that the Company was not a private organization, she also would assert, in disagreement with Mazour, that the trade
prior to 1799 was significantly controlled by the Russian government.
14 From 1615 the fur trade was administered by the Sibirskii
Prikaz (Siberian Department) which was a special division for Siberian
affairs in the Kazan Palace.

Until this time, the trade was adminis-

tered by the Posolskii Prikaz (Department of Ambassadors), until 1596,
the Novgorod Quarter or Novgorodskii Chet (1596-1599) and the Kazan
Palace (1599-1614).
the Kazan Palace.

By 1637 the Sibirskii Prikaz was independent of
The head of the Sibirskii Prikaz decided "all matters

relating to Siberia, except for the most important, which were referred
to the emperor.

In Siberia itself the conduct of the fur trade of the

state was one of the most important tasks of the officials and serving
men who the Siberian Department employed to carry on the conquest and
administration of the country.

The voevodas, guided by detailed

instructions from the Siberian Department, supervised and were responsible for the activities necessary to obtain furs for the state; the
serving men, often assisted by the promyshlenniks, carried them out.
Thus it was by means of a political rather than a commercial organization that the state acquired its furs."

Definition from Fisher, The

Russian Fur Trade, p. 4~
15
The emperor appointed the third member of the Coordinating
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Council.
16 Stephen M. Johnson, "Baron Wrangell and the Russian-American
Company, 1829-1849," Diss.

Univ. of Monitoba 1978; Mazour, The

Russian-American Company," p. 170.

17 See Glynn Barratt's Russia in Pacific Waters (Vancouver:
Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1981) for complete consideration of
Imperial naval participation in Company affairs.

See Johnson,

"Russia," p. 17 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A History of the RussianAmerican Company, trans. and ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S.
Donnelly (Seattle:

Univ. of Washington Press, 1978) pp. 53-56 for

accounts of the responsibilities of the Main Office of the RussianAmerican Company.
18 Johnson, "Russia," p. 17 ·and Tikhmenev, History, pp. 54-56.
19 Tikhmenev, History, p. 54.

Also reprinted in Mazour, "The

Russian-American Company," pp. 168-69.
20 Mazour, "The Russian-American Company," p. 169.
21 Johnson, "Russia," p. 17 and Mazour, "The Russian-American
Company," pp. 169-70.
22 Vneshniaia Politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka [VPR]
Dokumenty rossiiskogo ministerstva innostrannykh del.

Seriia vtoraia

1815-1839, Vol. 9 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), pp. 78.
23
The Company colonies in America needed a reliable fleet,
hence the Imperial Navy as well as other government agencies experienced significant involvement in Company affairs during the nineteenth century.

See Barratt's Russia.
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CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIANS IN ALASKA
The Russian movement to Alaska began in earnest only in 1743
with the emergence of a maritime hunt conducted by a number of individual fur-gathering and trading companies (see Appendix A).

These com-

panies, often organized for the duration of only one voyage, harvested
furs off the Northern Pacific Islands and this harvest partially compensated for tne diminishing Siberian hunting grounds.
hun~

This oceanic

brought Russian promyshlenniki from the coast of Kamchatka north-

ward to the Alaskan Ridge.

A chain of bases for Russian hunting oper-

ations was formed across the North Pacific:

The Kommander Islands of

Bering and Mednyi, the Near Aleutians of Attu and Agattu, the remaining
Aleutians, including the Rat Islands, the Andreianov Islands, and Umnak
Island, the Fox Islands of Unalaska and Unimak, and, to the north, the
Pribylov Islands of St. Paul and St. George each harbored Russian sites.
After 1760, the eastward movement of Russians continued along the
Alaskan Pehinsula, to the major islands of Kad'iak and Afognak, to the
regions of the Kenai Peninsula, bordered by the inlet of the same name,
along the Gulf of Alaska and the coastal regions of southeastern Alaska
(see Figure 5).
The Expense of Pacific Hunting Ventures
The distances involved in traveling to these remote islands from
Okhotsk or Kamchatka meant that only financially solvent merchants could

sustain the cost of such a voyage. Costly factors which had not been
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involved in the continental hunt, such as constructing a seaworthy vessel, outfitting that vessel, hiring an experienced crew, and provisioning

that crew for the length of the hunting season, were essential to the
maritime hunt. 24 A natural and often costly impediment to the development of the hunt was the poor condition of Okhotsk, the port of departure
from Asia to America. 25 Okhotsk was an unsatisfactory port, causing incessant delays and setbacks and limiting the growth of the Russian fur
industry.

It was not uncommon that vessels with their valuable cargos

and provisions were damaged, delayed, or lost through some fault of the
harbor.
A major difficulty at Okhotsk was ice, a familiar problem to
Russian navigation.

The area suffered from severe springtime flooding

when the ice of the Okhota River melted.

There were twenty such major
floodings recorded in the ninety-year period prior to 1813. 26 In

other months, it was not uncommon for a merchant vessel to postpone entry into the harbor until the floodtide reached sufficient height.
also presented a problem at Okhotsk.

Wind

When the tide was satisfactory, a

ship might wait a month or longer for sufficient wind to leave the harbor.

Ryl'sk merchant Gregorii Ivanovich Shelikhov conveyed the disad-

vantages of the port in 1794, complaining that half a ship's journey
~as spent leaving Okhotsk. 27 Yet, with all its drawbacks, Okhotsk remained the port of departure, as there was not a consensus regarding
its replacement on the Kamchatkan coast1ine.

It was the chief Siberian

port until 1845, when operations were moved to Aian, 300 miles south
on the Asian coast.
With navigation only possible three or four months of the year
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(generally June through September) a company could not absorb the financial loss caused by the inferior harbor.

Losing a vessel to flooding

or to dangerous sea route was devastating in a commercial venture where
many re11 to financial ruin.
its toll.

And the difficulty of ocean travel took

By the time the Russian-American Company was formed in 1799,

only the three companies of Golikov-Shelikhov, Lebedev"Lastochkin, and
Kiselev-Bocharov were succeeding in the Pacific hunt. 28
Gregorii Ivanovich Shelkihov:

Attempts to Monopolize the Fur Trade

Gregorii Ivanovich Shelikhov (1747-1795), owner of the most suecesful hunting company sought to use his fur-gathering operation to
further Russian colonization as well as to reap a handsome

persun~l

profit. 29 By establishing island outposts in the Aleutians, he aimed
to legitimize Russia's claim to the Pacific possessions and, concomitantly, to reduce the expense of returning to Okhotsk after eachvoyage
Assisting Shelikhov in this aim was the Governor-General of Irkutsk
from 1783 to 1789, Ivan Varfolomeevich Iakobii (1726-1803).

In 1787

he prepared a report on Pacific hunting, advocating Shelikhov~ position
for Empress Catherine II (1762-1796). 30 Iakobii documented the report
with detailed information--including maps of the Aleutians and construction plans for island ostrogi--gathered by Shelikhov during a 1786 voyaqe
to the Aleutians. 31 Iakobii's recommended means of consolidating control over the islands in the Pacific and the coastal territories of
North America and methods to govern the indigenous peep le and tQ i·mprove
their lives. 32 Two proposals to achieve these goals were suggested:
To change iasak to a voluntary assessment and to grant Shelikhov exclusive fur-gathering rights in those places discovered by his vessels. 33
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Concurrent to Iakobii's report was Shelikhov's personal petition to
Catherine, requesting assistance in estabiishing outposts throughout
the islands--a domain that would include an area from 49° to 60° and
North 53° to

63'

0

West.

To persuade Catherine in favor of Shel ikhov' s

interest, Iakobii expressed concern that the trading vessels of European
companies might settle where the Russians hunted in the North Pacific.
He also stressed that few merchants were able to gather furs in the remote parts of the Pacific where Shelikhov had been successful.

Other

companies suffered great monetary loss due to native interferencebrought
about, according to Shelikhov, by those Russians' inhumane treatment of
the islanders. 34
Intrigued by Iakobii's suggestions and Shelikhov's petition,
Catherine ordered an additional study to be conducted by the College of
Commerce. 35 The College's findings, like Iakobii's, suggested that the
best means of consolidation included granting exclusive rights to
Shel i khov in the regions he had settled and a 1oan of 200, 000 rubles to
improve those settlements. 36 The report cited incidents on the Fox
Islands in the 1770s and 1790s as incentive to Catherine for the granting of these privileges.

The Fox Islands had lost a large percentage

of their indigenous population to cruel abuse by Russian promyshlenniki.
Such actions violated the enlightened policies of Catherine's government, yet monopoly was apparently more objectionable, because in 1794
Cathertne rejected wholly the. Iakobi i and College of Commerce proposals. 37 The Empress further specified that financial and military
assistance could not be authorized, due to commitments in European
Russia; economic and military strengths were already overstrained by
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Russia's struggle against the Ottoman Empire (1768-1774).
Monopolization of the Fur Trade, 1799.

Without a monopoly, the

Pacific fur merchants were left in an awkward position.

Denied the

security of government protection--while subjected to its bureaucracy-and the freedoms of private enterprise, fur companies stood as the
vedette, advancing the empire territorially and financially at their
individual risk.

The trade remained in this state until Catherine's

death and the subsequent reversal of
Paul I (1769-1801).

man~

of her policies by her son,

The accession of this antagonistic heir paved the

way for the monopolization of the fur trade in the North Pacific.

Paul

granted a charter and exclusive hunting privileges to the Russian-American Company in 1799 and thus afforded, in theory, the long-sought financial and military protection of the imperial government over the fur
trade.

Further, the charter provided for the sanctioned expansion of

Russian possessions, authorizing the Company to ''make new discoveries
not only north of the fifty-fifth degree of north latitude, but farther
to the south, and to occupy these newly-discovered lands, as Russian
possessions, according to prescribed rules.,. 1138
Alaska, the Limit of Eastward Expansion
At the time of the Company's formation, the eastward movement of
Russian promyshlenniki was veritably complete.

Indeed, in 1799, the

Russians settled Baranov Island, the easternmost site of their possessions in North America.

Aleksandr Andreevich Baranov, the first manager

of the Russian American colonies (from 1799 to 1817), established Com·pany headquarters at Novo-Arkhangel'sk on that island in 1804, after
defeating the island's Kolash inhabitants. 39 Novo-Arkhangel'sk became
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the center of harvesting activities in Russian America, processing 75%
of the Company's catch. 40

The Decline of Fur-bearing Animals in Alaska.

The volume of fur-

bearing animals in Alaskan waters, however, followed the pattern familiar in the course of Russian expansion; the animal population was in
dramatic decline after 1804 (see Figure 6) and the traditional solution--expansion to new grounds--was no longer viable. The coastal

regio~

to the south of Novo-Arkhangel 'sk was occupied by the British and penetration into the interior of Alaska was infeasible because of the difficulty of provisionment and native hostility.

The wealth of furs in

Siberia and America, which served as the impetus of Russian expansion
across the Northern Pacific, had overridden concern for the cost of such
an extensive expansion of empire.

The difficulty of provisioning this

vast and barren expanse was outweighed by the enormous revenue in pelts-nearly eight million rubles from 1750 to 1800.

Early in the nineteenth

century, the harvest had dropped to one-twentieth of its pre-1800 figure.
The situation deteriorated, eventually leading to the temporal (18051815) extinction of many of southeastern Alaska's fur-bearing marine
animals. 41
The Company was geographically confined. Denied its previous
freedom to expand eastward, it was unable to compensate for the loss of
revenue.

Attempts were made to expand hunting into the waters off the

California coast, but expansion beyond Alaska involved encroachment
into foreign colonial territories, those of the Spaniards, British, and
Americans (see Chapter IV, Part

1)~

The Russians were never able to

maintain or colonize a region beyond Novo-Arkhangel 'sk with any sem-
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blance of success.

Novo-Arkhangel 'sk as such was the gee-political

limit of Russian expansion.

Expansion could not continue as geo-

graphically the available regions posed insurmountable provision~ent

problems and, politically, there was the certain complication

I

of foreign objection and interference.

THE PROBLEM OF PROVISIONMENT IN ALASKA
The primary hindrance to Russian success in Alaska was the inability to supply necessities to the colonial population!

Other dif-

ficulties encountered by the Russians in Alaska were subordinate to the
problem of provisionment.

Whether producing for their own needs or

attempting to import foods, the Russians were unable to find a viable
means of adequately and dependably sustaining the population in Alaska.
During their colonization of Alaska, the Russians proposed four
programs to solve the problem of provisionment and these met with varying degrees of success.

They were;

(1) Production in Alaska of food-

stuffs needed to sustain the colonial population; (2) circumnavigation,
to import needed supplies--particularly grains--from European Russia;
(3) establishing dependable commercial connections to import goods from
foreign territories; and (4) occupying lands outside the imperial domain
where foodstuffs could be produced and shipped to the northern colonies.

In addition to these attempts to provide for Russia's colonists
and native workers, the Russians continued to supplement their food

sup~

plies by means established early in the course ·of eastward expansion,
These included the circumscribed acceptance of natural diets, that is,
diets which utilized the proffered food resources of the particular
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region and the continued transport of provisions across Siberia.

The

latter practice quickly proved to be infeasible and unreliable.

Trans-

port routes from European Russia across Siberia had traditionally been
difficult, and the addition of overseas voyages proved costly and dangerous.
Because sufficient provisions could not be transported overland,
the.Russians found it necessary to accustom themselves to the foods
naturally available. 42 There were, of course, practical and cultural
limitations to the kind and degree of foods that could be introduced,
but native foods did constitute an essential supplement to the Russianst
diet. 43 For example, their diet, as that of their Aleut subjects,
depended hea vi 1y on various fish.

_-c

~

Herring, salmon, halibut,

blueback cod, turbot, pike, perch, and dog humpback contributed variably, according to availability, to the Russians' diet in Alaska.
Kirill Khlebnikov, employee of the Russian-American Company (18161832), reported that some 20,000 fish (l,150 barrels) were salted and
dried at the Novo-Arkhangel 'sk Redoubt in 1825. 44 And a very small

portion of this was intended for export.

Further, this figure does

not include fish prepared for the Aleuts, as they consumed only fresh
fish. 45
PROGRAMS TO PROVISION ALASKA
Russian officials invested considerable time trying to solve
the critical problem of undersupply.

While Baranov perhaps concen-

trated unduly on increasing the volume of furs harvested (as this
resource was in decline), he also focused attention on agricultural
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production in Alaska--an endeavor which met however with little success.
The failure of agriculture in Alaska provided the motivation for the

second program: circumnavigation, in which provisions were delivered
from European Russia.

Circumnavigation, in turn, unleashed a phase of

expansion in the Russian colonial world that led to the settlement of
the Sandwich Islands and California.

The potential productivity of

those regions, however, would not preserve the Russian-American colonial
empire, as the Russians met with foreign interference and they lacked
necessary skills and resources.
Agricultural Production in Alaska
Farming in Alaska accompanied the establishment of permanent
settlements.

In many remote Alaskan outposts, "kitchen gardens;'' sown

with grains and vegetables, were a common means of provisionment for
Company employees.

Shelikhov had initiated this practice by 1784,
establishing a garden at Three Saints Harbor. 46 In 1790, Shelikhov
reported optimistically, to the new General-Governor of Siberia, Ivan
A. Pil', the results of his company's initial agricultural endeavors. 47
Kad'iak Island was intended as the main site of agricultural production for the Russian-American Company in Alaska,
the site of two agricultural settlements:

The island was

one located immediately

north of Ugak Bay and another at Chiniatsk, south of St, Paul's Harbor
48
on Chiniak Bay.
The Kad'iak Office also included Spruce Island which
had an agricultural settlement at New Valaam and possibly a fourth
site at Kalsunsk on Afognak Island, 49 To varying degrees, however,
agriculture was present throughout Russian Alaska as well as in northern
Asia, as gardens were an intrinsic part of any settlement.

Therefore,
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production was present on Baranov Island, Atka and Unalaska Islands,
and the Kenai peninsula. 50 Despite Shelikhov's initial confidence,

agriculture in Alaska met with only negligible results.
Hindrances to the Development of Agriculture in Alaska.

The

causes for the unsatisfactory results in agriculture were the harsh
climatic and physical features of Alaska coupled with a deficiency of
resources--most importantly, the lack of persons experienced in agriculture.

Difficult farming conditions were faced by persons generally

ignorant of agriculture.

Morever, the Russian-American Company was

incessantly plagued by a chronic labor shortage.
acknowledged by all competent observers.

These problems were

Baron Ferdinand Wrangel, the

Company's sixth Chief Manager (from 1830 to 1835), simply stated that
except for knowledgeable farmers, •.. pro~yshlenniki arriving in

Ame~ica ... consist of all kinds of riffraff. 1151 Golovnin summarized
the effect of this incompetency on agriculture, when he noted that
11

a lack of experience, especially the lack of persistence and deter-

mination, 11 were the primary reasons for the failure of agriculture
in Alaska. 52
Physical conditions specific to Alaska proved to be the most
inhibitive factors to agriculture.

The growing season was of extremely

short duration, the moisture excessive, and the temperatures
ditions

detrimental to the proper maturation of plants.

skies assumed the constant presence of rain or fog.

low---con~

Overcast

Rain continued

throughout the winter and the temperatures averaged 3° Reamttr (4.75
Furthermore, Alaska was cursed with ''gravely, rocky and sandy
not the fertile chernozem of European Russia. 53

Celsius).
soil, 11
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Gardens in Russian Alaska were sown with the traditional crops
of European Russia:.--wheat, barley, rye, radishes, turnips, beets,
cabbage, carrots, peas, beans, and potatoes. 54 Warm-weathered plants
such as peas failed due to the shortness of the season. 55

Grains rarely
56
grew to maturity (barley yielded better than wheat or rye).
Tubers
and roots retained much excess moisture. 57 The potato was the most
successful crop grown in Russian Alaska.

In fact, potatoes were a

crucial supplement to the Russians' diet, primarily used to feed the
sick and school children. 58 As many as 150 barrels of potatoes were
produced each year to feed the Novo-Arkhangel 'sk Redoubt. 59
In overview, the Russians in Alaska could not provide for themselves.

The production of necessary grains proved virtually impossible

and vegetable production was limited to radishes, turnips, and potatoes.

These vegetables, in addition to fish, constituted the staples

of the Russians' diet.

The production of these relatively successful

crops continued throughout the Russians' stay in Alaska and this is
indicative of the tremendous need for supplies in this colony.

The

impracticality of proauction necessitated the importation of grain from
European Russia, over the traditional Asiatic route--a difficult task
yielding little success.

In time, the Russians would explore alter-

native means (around-the-world voyages) to satisfy their need for grain.
Animal Husbandry in Alaska,

Attempts at raising livestock in

Alaska met with the same unsatisfactory results as did food production.
Husbandry was compromised primarily by two factors:

(1) the. difficulty

in providing feed and (2) poor propagation rates, each related to the
severe Alaskan climate.

The processing.of hay was limited by rain and
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fog. 60 The high humidity rarely allowed the hay to dry so that it could
be cut.

And the hay that was cut would often mold in storage.

The

difficulty of drying, cutting, and storing hay resulted in an insuffi-

cient supply of feed to maintain any sizeable herd of cattle.
The excessive cold and frozen environment also reduced livestock's ability to propagate at sufficient rates.

Tikhmenev noted

that the wild goats, herded by the Russians on Kad'iak, would not
breed due to the cold.

That condition was applicable to other livestock in Alaska, namely cattle. 61 Animals that could reproduce
sufficiently, such as pigs and chickens, were given a daily feed
of fish but this gave their mean an unappetizing odor. 62 Therefore,
the meats produced domestically were either unacceptable in amount
or quality, leaving fish as the only reliable source of meat protein
in Russian Alaska.
In summary, the Russian-American settlements in Alaska were not
able to produce sufficient crops or meats to feed the colonial population.

This inability to produce or to .acquire adequate foodstuffs,

to the point of virtual starvation, forced the decision to organize
trans-global voyages in order to supplement provisions,

When this

proved inadequate, the Russians tried to establish an agricultural
settlement in Spanish California.

Hence, there is an certain correla-

tion between the failure of agriculture in Alaska and the establishment
of Fort Ross.

Originally, Fort Ross was intended to serve as a hunt-

ing base and shipping depot for essential grains purchased in Spanish
California,

The Ross Counter was converted to a settlement directed

primarily to the production of foodstuffs intended for Russia's northern
colonies.
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Circumnavigation
When the Russian-American Company was officially formed in 1799,
the need for a reliable method of provisionment was already evident.
There was little doubt that animal husbandry and agriculture in Alaska,
which had failed through nearly twenty years of experimentation, would
never supply more than a modicum of the colony's needs.

i
i

Shelikhov had

recognized the need for additional provisionment in Alaska some years
earlier and proposed the solution of dispatching vessels from the
Baltic to Russian Alaska. 63 Such voyages required trans-global travel,

\

but were more efficient than the arduous and expensive Siberian method
of transport (the cost of which averaged 400 silver rubles annually). 64

i
r
I

Nikolai P. Rezanov and the Introduction of Circumnavigation.

t
I

1

Shelikhov died in 1795, four years prior to the formation of the Russia1'-

1

American Company and his vision of circumnavigations, like many of his
projects, was not realized in his lifetime.

But his son-in-law, Nikolai

P. Rezanov (1764-1807), Company Councillor (Kammerger), pursued
circumnavigation as a solution to the problem of provisionment.

65

He

backed a proposal made in 1799 to Paul I by Captain-Lieutenant Ivan F.
Kruzenstern.

The young naval officer, just returning from service under

the British flag, submitted a plan for the first round-the-world expedition as a means to ease provisionment problems in Alaska and to train
naval personnel.

Kruzenstern's

plan was supported by Rezanov, Admirial

N. S. Mordvinov, head of the Naval Ministry, and by N. P, Rumiantsev,
head of the College of Commerce. 66 Rezanov further advised the newly-·
formed Board of the Russian-American Company to report to the new
emperor, Aleksandr I (1801-1825), of the advantages expected from such
\

I
I
~

\
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expeditions.

In 1802, the Board communicated the following report:

The provisionment of America, at once for several years
with all the necessities, would reduce transport from
the Okhotsk port, and in addition would lower the cost of

transport for which not only the treasury expends 400 sil-

ver rubles for Okhotsk and Kamchatka annually but also protects all of the Irkutsk Oblast from exhaustion, for which
her people endure the fiscal burden of transport, which im
pels the people, to go from year to year in great poverty. 67
Rezanov also convinced Nikolai Petrovich

Rumi~ntsev,

who was Min-

ister of Commerce from 1808 to 1814, to send a supportive petition
.

68

to the Emperor in March 1803.

The Emperor quickly endorsed Company participation in
voyages.

He

tra~~-globa1

was enthusiastic to join powers such as France and England

in undertaking these commercial and scientific navigations.

The rep-

utation of such foreign ventures had encouraged the adoption of circumnavigation as a remedy to Alaska's provisionment problem. 69 Circumnavigation was intended to provide more than a means of bringing
food to Alaska.

It was to permit the orchestration of diplomatic mis-

sions and regulate the trade of Company furs in Chinese markets, as
southern Chinese ports were accessible during the return voyage.
Futhermore, circumnavigation was made attractive

by

the opportunity it

afforded for the compilation of scientific information, especially
ethnographic and geographic, on little known colonial possessions
and their

peoples~

for Russian

and it also served as an excellent training ground

naval personnel.

The Voyages, 1803-1841.

Circumnavigation~

as a means of

provisio~

ing Company settlements in Alaska, included 16 voyages, spanning a 38year period from 1803 to 1841 (see Table II~, 70 The cargo of the vessels
varied little because of the constant need in the colonies of the basic
l
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TABLE II
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Khromchenko
Khromchenko
Teben'kov
Berens
Kadnikov

O.L. Zarent>o

S.V. Voevodskif

V.S.
V.A.
M.D.
£.A.
N.K.

H. I. Murav'ev

J.F. Kruzenstern
Ju.F. Lisianskii
L.A. Hagemeister
H.P. Laza rev
O.E. Kotzebue
L.A. Haqemeister
Z.I. Panafidin
V.H. Golovnin
Z.J. Panafidtn
P.A. Ookhturov
E.A. Klochkov
I .H. Kislakovskf f
H.P. Lazarev
P. I. Chfstiakov

COfmlclnder

1840

1828
1831
1836
1837
1839

1813
1815
1816
1816
1817
1819
1820
1821
1821
1822
1824

1816

1803
1803

Departure
from
Krondstadt

1841

1829
1832
1836
1838
1840

remained

1841

1830
1833
remained
1839

1826

1806
1A06
remained
1816
lfH8
1819
1818
1819
1821
1822
remained
Good Hope

Returned
to
Krondstadt

1804-1805
JR04-IR05
1809-lRlO
1814-1815
1816-1817
1817-1818
1817
1818
1820
1821
1823
sold at Cape of
1823-1824
1825

Stay
in
Colonies

122,580 (sflver r.)

458.276
467,505
350.000
400,000
500.002

426.566
184,385
2.800 puds of goods
798.927
441.215
142,741
89.674
?
462,004

?

2611.510
131.593
246,476

Value of
Carqo
(in Rubles)

Note. For detailed information regarding Russian global voyages from 1803, see
A.A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the~World Voyages, 1803-1849 (Kingston, Ontario:
The Limestone Press, 1980). Also see Appendix B.
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necessities:

ammunition and weapons, food, clothing, tools, tobacco,
and sea gear, for example, anchors and canvas. 71 The routes of
circumnavigations included many ports of call.

Generally, the route

included departure from the Baltic port of Krondstadt, passage around
Cape Horn (with probable calls in Hamburg, London, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil and Callao, Chile--where provisions could be purchased), and
travel across the Pacific to the northern colonies in Kamchatka, the
Aleutians, and Alaska.

The return voyage might involve calls in the

Sandwich Islands, southern China, and passage through the Sundra Strait
and around the Cape of Good Hope, returning to Krondstadt via the
Atlantic Ocean and English channel.

The voyage from Krondstadt to

Novo-Arkhangel'sk could be completed in about eight months.

The

additional length of the return voyage and the stay in the colonies,
brought the duration of a circumnavigation to approximately three
years.

This length of time constituted a large investment of re-

sources, in terms of the investment of men, provisions, and equipment.
The Significance of Circumnavigation:
World.

Understanding the Colonial

In addition to provisioning the Alaskan colonies, there were

a number of benefits garnered from circumnavigations.

From these

voyages, the Russians secured a wealth of geographic, political,
economic, navigational, and ethnographic information not only about
colonial America but also places they visited.

This newly-attained

information had an important influence on the direction of Company
policies.

Even from the first voyage, Company officials gained an

understanding of the grave limitations of the Spanish colonial empire
and the consequent ease with which the Company could extend into the

!.
~
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salubrious California region.

Acting as colonial inspector on that

voyage, Rezanov inspected California and was amazed by its productivity
and the inability of the Spaniards to defend the possession. 72 Rezanov
personally negotiated a one-time exchange of goods, with San Francisco
Commadant Jose Arguello, to provide grain for the starving Alaskan colony.

He received 2000 bushels of grains and five tons of flour in exchange for 11 ,174 rubles worth of Russian goods. 73 He further suggested
to the.Main Office that permanent commercial relations .be established
with the agriculturally productive Spaniards.
The second circumnavigation, commanded by Leontii Andreanovich
Hagemeiste~

who later became the Company's second Chief Manager, (from

January to October 1818), introduced the Russian-American Company to
the treasures of the Sandwich Islands. 74 Hagemeister surveyed the islands from the deck of the Neva in 1809 and received tara and sandlewood from the natives in exchange for furs.

The remaining Russian

voyages also proved fruitful and their participants preserved, in
Russian and European perceptions of the. nineteenth-century
American colonial world on the Pacific. 75
journal~

Circumnavigation and the Imperial Navy.

Circumnavigation forced

a change in the internal organization of the Russian-American Company,
perhaps to the Company's detriment.

In order to undertake global voy-

ages, the Company needed an able fleet and this opened an avenue for
naval involvement in Company affairs.
whelming and permanent.
1ized that the ability to
revenue.

This involvement proved over-

As early as 1803, the Company directors reafinance circumnavigation exceeded available

In order to initiate the programs, the directors petitioned
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Emperor Aleksandr I for a state loan as well as

permission to purchase
equipment and supplies from government warehouses. 76 This procedure was
not uncommon.

Government sponsorship was standard for the Company as

it had been for the individual merchant companies prior to 1799. However, this 1803 petition also included a hitherto unheard-of request:
that the vessels be staffed .by naval crews, including sailors and
officers.

This request was necessitated by the Company's lack of vessels

and experienced employees and provided an ostium for naval encroachment into the affairs and poiicymaking of the Russian-American colontes.
After the removal of Baranov from office in 1817, the position of Chief
Manager was invariably held by a naval officer on temporary leave from
service. 77
Initially, the Company benefitted financially from its close
association with the Imperial Navy.

The Navy not only substantially

bolstered the emaciated Company fleet, but also aided in routing furs
to market.

Thus the Navy allowed independence from the foreign traders

who previously came to Alaska and paid lower prices for furs than the
Russians received in Chinese markets.

However, the increased affilia-

tion forced officials to defend the Company's existence as a purely
commercial entity.

Naval interests in North American affairs, although

providing a commercially important service, were pursued for non-financial purposes as well.

Company power had been determined on economic

grounds, while the Navy sought consolidation of Russian America to
strengthen the empire strategically.
Circumnavigation, as the second attempted solution to the unsatisfactory conditions in colonial Alaska, strongly influenced the course
of development of the Russian-American Companr,

First, it provided the
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Navy with the opportunity to participate in Company affairs.

And

second, circumnavigation afforded the knowledge necessary to determine additional solutions to provisionment problems; that is,
the establishment of trade and settlements in California and the
Sandwich Islands.

Fort Ross was the first immediate consequence of

Russia's global experience.

The knowledge the Russians acquired

through circumnavigation provided insight to provisionment programs
through familiarity with the arrangement of the colonial American
world:

the strengths, and lack thereof, of European powers in the

remotest outposts of their empires.

Such recognition afforded

Rezanov with the grand scheme of exploiting California--a territory
dubiously claimed and protected by the Spanish Empire and the resources
of which seemed an alternative means to reverse the deprivation suffered
in the colonies of the Russian-American Company.
Provisioning colonial Alaska was the impetus and an advantage of
global voyages.

Naval infiltration into Company affairs was circum-

navigation's antagonistic by-product and scientific investigation its
enthusiastic and indivisible companion.

In Siberia, the import of

provisions was necessary, because the land was unproductive,

In North

America, it was also imperative, because the land was barren but, in
addition, failure to maintain stability in the colony, it was believed,
could tip the delicate balance of possession in favor of foreign powers.
Hence, circumnavigation functioned primarily as a reaction to the provisionment difficulties encountered in expansion.
capacity did it serve as a means to expand.

Only in an incidental

The Russian movement to

California and the Sandwich Islands could also be interpreted, like

-:
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circumnavigation and in concomitance to it, as a response to provisionment deficiency, rather than as the Russian conative expansion of the
.ii
l

centuries before .
Circumnavigation, as a means of provisioning the Alaskan colonies,
ceased in 1841, as did the Ross settlement, when a more effective method
was found.

This came in 1839 with the negotiation of a ten-year trade

agreement between the Russian-American Company and the Hudson's Bay
Company.

The agreement provided for the annual delivery of seven

essential foodstuffs (wheat, wheatflour, peas, groats, corned beef,
lard, and ham) to Novo-Arkhangel'sk at predetermined prices. 78 For the
first time, the Company ostensibly acquired security, as the agreement
assured that colonial needs would be met in full each year--a claim that
could not be made on behalf of agricultural production in Alaska or
c i rcumna vi_ga ti on

Therefore, the Company terminated its reliance on the

lengthy and inefficient circumnavigations which, in the long term, had
failed to be cost-effective. 79
Russian Commercial Relations with California and the Sandwich Islands
The third program undertaken by the Russians to solve Alaska's
provisionment problem was the establishment of commercial relations with
Spanish California and the Sandwich Islands.

This included the dispatch-

ing of voyages to California and the Sandwich Islands--a task which
proved difficult because the Company fleet was impoverished, in terms
of vessels and qualified personnel.

In order to compensate, the

Russians established trading posts in these regions, hoping that their
proximity would stimulate trade and they could thus acquire goods,
needed in Alaska and Kamchatka, with greater regularity.

But difficul-
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ties were encountered establishing these posts; Russian encroachment
into Spanish-claimed California and the British-held Islands did more
to arouse the suspicion and indignation of colonial rivals than to enhance commercial intercourse.
Rezanov and the Opening of Trade between Alaska and California.
Official contact between Russian Alaska and Spanish California was
initiated during the course of Russia's first circumnavigation (18031806) when Rezanov was prompted to seek relief for the critical situation of deprivation in the northern colonies.

Rezanov had arrived

in Novo-Arkhangel 'sk on board the Juno in August 1805 after calls at
Unalaska and Kad ia<
1

Islands~O He found a state of severe malnutrition

and disease throughout the settlements.

The Russians spent a difficult

fa 11 and winter in Novo-Arkange 1 sk during which two hundred men were
1

11

being rationed only a pound of bread per week, and even that could not
continue beyond October

l~
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. Tikhmenev described the severity of the

situation:
Fish were no longer being caught. The only food in New
Archangel consisted of iukola, sea lions, and occasional
seals. Through necessity they [Company employees] scorned
nothing: they ate eagles, crowsA cuttlefish, and, in general, anything they could find.BL
The lack of adequate food supplies had increased disease among the colon;

ists.

Scurvy was prevalent, reaching epidemic proportions during the

l

I1

winter of 1805-06.

George H. von Langsdorff, physician on board the

j

I

Juno, recounted the nature of the disease and its effect on colonial
life, especially the lives of Company laborers.
Many of these needy and diseased beings [Company employees],
were kept daily to very hard work, were unfortunately in debt
to the Company, and it not unfrequently happened, that when
wholly exhausted, and lying on a sick-bed, they were driven to

,,
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their work with blows. The consequence is obvious: they
sunk one after another wholly exhausted, a prey to the
scurvy, and all work was in danger of being stopped .....
In the month of February, out of a hundred and fifty of
the youngest and most healthy men that had been selected
from the different settlements and brought hither, eight
were already dead, and more than sixty were laid up in the
barracks with their strength wholly exhausted, and full of
scorbutic sores ...
The scurvy commonly shewed itself first by debility, .
listlessness, and melancholy; inflammatory spots, sometimes smaller, then appeared on the· legs from the knees
to the toes, which in a short time turned to sores.
Those who were thus afflicted were not required to work,
but were set to mount guard day and night in the cold
and wet: this was alleged to be necessary for the pub1ic security: for the love of their native country,
these poor wretches were doomed to die in misery. It
was a commonly received opinion that exercise was very
salutary in thescurvy; the weakest among the sick were
therefore dragged about by their comrades; and others,
who had still some little strength left, w93e made to
draw or carry heavy stones about the room.
By winter's end, the situation of disease and starvation was acute;
seventeen of the total population of 194 Russian males had perished. 84
Company work was at a standstill, as "scarcely any of the promyshlenniki
could be said to be free from disease ... •i 85 If the colony was to survive, drastic measures had to be taken; consequently, Rezanov organized
an expedition to procure a supply of fresh provisions.

San Francisco

was chosen as the destination because it was the most northerly of the
nearby Spanish possessions:
·~

"The Sandwich Islands rr.ight perhaps have

been preferred for the purpose in an economical point of view, but politcal reasons led to the choice of San Francisco."

86

On March 9, 1806,

Rezanov and the weakened crew of the Juno sailed southward, under the
command of N.A. Khvostov, reaching San Francisco a ~onth later. 87 The
Russians were received by Luis de Arguello, son of the Commandant of
the San Francisco Presidio, who was in charge during his father's ab-

~
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sence.

T
~

Arguello denied Rezanov permission to travel to Monterey to con-

fer with the governor; instead, Jose Joaquin de Arillaga, California

!

l

Governor (1800-1814), agreed to travel to San Francisco to meet with
the Russians.

When they met in April 1806, Rezanov proposed that the

Russians and Spaniards open regular commercial relations between their
colonies:
I shall tell you sincerely, that we need bread, which
we can get from Canton; but since California is closer
and has a surplus, which she cannot dispose of elsewhere,
I came here to talk to you, as chief of these regions, assuring you that we can establish some preliminary measures
and can forward them for ~avorable perusal and confirmation by our authorities.8
Rezanov was confident that commercial contacts between Alaska and
California were "predestined by nature itself ... to preserve forever
the friendship between the two states possessing such extensive territories.1189 Arillaga, however, was forced to refuse the request,
because of Madrid's fanatical insistence that colonial possessions
remain isolated from all foreign contact.
[Arillaga] did not consider himself as endowed with
sufficient powers to establish such an intercourse, although he perfectly concurred in considering it as a
thing advantageous to both parties. He said that even
the Viceroy of Mexico's powers were too much limited
for him to enter into any arrangement, but he promised
that the proposal should be submitted to the cabinet
of Madrid.90
To solve Alaska's immediate problem, Arillaga invited Rezanov to negotiate directly with Commandant Jose Davia Arguello and the fathers of the
San Francisco Mission. 91 Arillaga was willing to permit this illegality
because California suffered from a serious lack of material goods,
though agriculturally over-productive, and the Russians could provide
manufactured articles (see Chapter IV, Part 2);

Alta California was
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as removed from Madrid as Alaska was from St. Petersburg and suffered
from infrequent and irregular shipments of Spanish provisions.
(

I

i
!.

accepted Arillaga's proposal.

Rezanov

He and the officers of the Juno remained

in San Francisco as guests in the Arguello home, awaiting return of the
commandant.
Rezanov and Maria Concepcion.

During his stay from April to June

1806, Rezanov contemplated an additional means by which to strengthen
ties between Russian Alaska and Spanish California:

To arrange a mar-

riage between himself and Commandant Arguello's daughter, Maria de la
Concepcion.

"He had nearly come to a resolution to sacrifice himself

by this marriage to the welfare, as he hoped, of the two countries of
Spain and Russia. 1192

The 40-year-old Rezanov "courted the Spanish

beauty daily and the girl, then fifteen, soon agreed to the marriage.
11

Rezanov wrote the Minister of Commerce [Rumiantsev]:
Beautiful Concepcion increased her attentions to me from
day to day, and her various favors, meaning so much to one
in my situation, and her sincerity to which I hqd been indifferent for a long time, grad~~lly began imperceptibly to
fill the emptiness of my heart.
Initially, the Arguello family rejected the marriage proposal on religious
grounds; the Arguelles were Roman Catholic and Rezanov was RussianOrthodox.

But Rezanov was adamant.
He assured [Arguello], that, immediately on his return to
St. Petersburgh, he would go to Madrid as ambassador extraordinary from the Imperial Russian court, to obviate every
kind of misunderstanding between the two powers. From there
he would proceed to Vera-Cruz, or some Spanish harbour in
Mexico, and finally come on to St. Francisco to reclaim his
bride, and settle all matt94s relative to the commerce he
so much wished to promote.

In mid-May, the family and local church fathers conceded to Rezanov's
persistence, agreeing to the. marriage pending approval from Pope
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Pius VIII. 95 The engagement took place, the betrothal agreement was
signed, and Rezanov departed California, promising to return for his
financee in two-years time.

But he did not return and the marriage

contract was never completed because Rezanov died suddenly of fever
during his return to St. Petersburg, in Krasnoiarsk, on March 13,
1807. 96
Although the marriage plans were not fulfilled, the RezanovArgUello engagement had a positive influence on immediate relations
between Russian Alaska and Spanish California.

Arguello defied

Spanish law by providing the Russians with 4,300 puds of bread and
other provisions, the maximum amount that could be transported
aboard the Juno. 97 Rezanov was satisfied with the mission and
recorded with confidence the consequences he expected from trade
relations with California.
Our American territory will not suffer any shortages;
Kamchatka and Okhotsk will be supplied with bread and
other provisions; Iakuts, burdened at present by the
transport of bread, will be left in peace; the government will decrease the expenses allotted to the provisions for the military; there will be relief on
bread prices in Irkutsk ... customs will give new income to the Crown, Rus§~a•s internal industry will be
not~ceably encouraged.
This "initial experiment of commerce \'Jith California" proved very sue'!"
j

cessful and so attempts to maintain the trade were continued after

I

Rezanov s departure.

I

to the viceroy in Mexico, Jose de Iturrigaray, hoping to encourage the

I

establishment of permanent trade relations.

I
I

1

Rezanov himself sent a message from San Francisco

New California, which produces various grains and
cattle in abundance, can market her products in our
settlements; she will readily be assisted in filling
all needs through trade with our regions; the best
means for achie~ing thewell-being ~f her missions

~
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and for bringing the country to prosperity is
exchange of surplus production for goods which
do not have to be paid for in cash and the import of which is not beset with difficulties ...
In the same measure the proximity of the tran-

port will alleviate the existence in our settle-

ments in the North, which at present have to
bring from afar everything ~§at the severity
of the climate denies them.

Despite the apparent practicality of the Russian-Spanish trade,
commercial relations between the two colonies faltered in Rezanov's
absence.

Spanish California officials subsequently refused to trade

openly with the Russians, abiding Madrid's proscription against trade
with foreigners.

Negotiations also proceeded poorly, lacking a diplo-

mat of Rezanov's ability.

Russian-American Company officials attempted

to motivate discourse between St. Petersburg and Madrid, but results
were not forthcoming.

Prior to 1808, Russian government officials
approached authorities at the Madrid court. 100 Even the representative

of the Spanish Council of Regents in St. Petersburg (1812-1820),
Francisco Zea de Bermudez, petitioned his superiors at the Company's
urging.lOl

These attempts proved fruitless.

In 1810, the frustrated

Company directors, after having received little satisfaction through
proper channels, addressed the inhabitants of California directly,

They

proposed "to establish commercial intercourse and to determine a list
of goods for exchange. 11102
Company officials continued to pursue Rezanov's dream of establishing regular trade.

Even his suggestion that a warehouse be built near

Monterey to store goods, prior to their transport to Alaska and Kamchatk
was realized in the settlement at Fort Ross.

In the year after Rezanov's

mission to California, Company employee Ivan Kuskov (1765-1823) was sent
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by Baranov to reconnoiter the California coast:

''to survey and describ

the whole coast from Defuk Strait to California and set it up on the
map ... 103

Following two additional reconnaissance voyages by Kuskov,

a location suitable for a Russian settlement was chosen. Baranov's
motives for establishing this settlement were those of Rezanov, as
Baranov was a man who ... devoted his life to the improvement of the
trade in various forms. 11104 Indeed, he named Kuskov, the settle11

ment's first manager, "Administrator and Trade Advisor. 11105

Baranov

had first learned of California's fertile hunting grounds in 1803 and
was particularly interested in augmenting the volume of furs harvested (see Chapter IV, Part I).

The Company could then use these furs

to purchase badly-needed grain from the Spaniards in California.
The hunt, however, did not proceed as well as Baranov had anticipated.

The pelts of the Northern California Sea Otter were not of

the quality of those skins harvested in the frigid waters of the North
Pacific.

Furthermore, their numbers were in decline.

There was also

difficulty hunting in the protected waters of the Spanish colonial empi re (see Chapter IV, Part I,

p. 108).

As relations between Alaska

and California failed to improve, the Russians were forced to draw
their attention away from occupations which required Spanish involvement, such as hunting and trading.

The Russians initiated activities

that could be conducted with little interference.

Consequently,

agriculture became the Counter's dominant activity.
The Russians in the Sandwich Islands,

Russian contact with the

Sandwich Islands occurred in June 1804, during Russia's first
gl oba 1 voyage.

trans~

The crews of the Neva_, under Lieutenant Iuri i Fedoro-

vi ch Lisianskii, and the Nadezhda, under Lieutenant-Captain Ivan

o'I
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Fedorovich Kruzenstern, were amazed at the islands' wealth, especially tara arid sandlewood, and were eager to open trade.

The expedition

opened a dialogue between Baranov and the King of Hawaii, Kamehameha

I, who sent word to Alaska in 1806 of his interest in establishing
commercial ties. 106
~~bodchikov

In 1807, the Nikolai under the command of Pavel

also called in the islands en route from California to

Novo-Arkhangel'sk. Slobodchikov established a good rapport with
Kamehameha and exchanged furs for foodstuffs. 107
In November 1808 and April 1814, the Company dispatched vessels to
the Sandwich Islands in the wake of Russia's second circumnavigation.
Leontii A. Hagemeister commanded the ubiquitious Neva_ and an American,
James Bennett, commanded the Bering.

On Baranov's instructions,

Hagemeister and Bennett were to extend trade relations with the natives
of Oahu, Mauai, and Kauai Islands. Hagemeister's mission was successful;
Company furs were exchanged for badly-needed salt, tara, and sandlewood.

The Neva returned to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk in September 1809,

The

Bering, however, washed ashore at Waimea Bay, Kauai, in January 1815,
where its valuable cargo of furs was confiscated by Kaumualii, a lesser
rival of Kamehameha, positioned on Kauai Island.

The crew of the

Ber~n_g_

returned home safely aboard the American vessel, Albatross, in April.
Bennett's report of Kaumualii's actions angered Baranov and provoked him to send a third expedition to Kauai in 1816.

The purpose

of this expedition was to seek retribution for the loss of Russian
goods.

The mission to Kauai was charged to George A. Shaffer, a Bar-

varian physician who had been expelled from Russia's third circumnavigation of the Suvorov in 1814, but subsequently managed to establish a
cordial relationship with Baranov. 108 Shaffer had only been in Company
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service since 1813, but Baranov entrusted him to regain the seized
cargo of the Bering (or to accept restitution in precious sandlewood)
and to obtain trading privileges with the islanders for the RussianAmerican Company.

Shaffer far exceeded those initial instructions,

as he established settlements for agriculture and manufacturing on
Kauai.

It is unclear whether the intent to settle was Baranov's or.

if Shaffer acted independently.

Baranov may have

~iven.

Shaffer addi-

tional secret instruction or Shaffer, with his limited experience,
may have acted overzealously.
~resence

In either case, the short-lived Russian

in the Sandwich Islands witnessed the construction of three

outposts--Aleksandr, Barclay, and Elizabeta.

These ambitious projects

quickly failed as a result of Shaffer's ignorance of tropical farming
techniques and his inability to harness the native labor needed to
adequately farm and collect sandlewood for export. 109 The affair
managed only to arouse the contempt of island natives and British
merchants.

Shaffer was not able to accomplish even the objectives

openly stated by Baranov and the Russians were expelled from Kauai
only two years after their venture began,

The estimated loss to the

Company from the Shaffer affair totaled 300,000 rubles~llO

I
I
I
I
!
J

Conclusion
The history of Russia as a colonial power in Alaska is one of a
struggle for stabilization; to secure food for Alaska by insuring a
balanced exchange of furs for provisions,

From the colony's inception,

the Russians directed resources to achieve this balance.
factors inhibited stabilization:

But two

the number of fur-bearing animals

was incessantly in decline and provisions either required long
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transport or were halted by political difficulties,
also struggled for political stability.

Russian Alaska

But emerging European colonial

forces, collided in the North Pacific, and resources were too few for
all powers involved to achieve polyvalence.
Expansion beyond Alaska, to Fort Ross and the Sandwich Islands,
was part of the struggle for stability.

It was a calculated response

to the unending provisionment problems of the Alaskan colonies.

Fort

Ross, to be considered in some detail in the following chapters, was
one in a line of potential solutions.
and improvement of Alaska.

It was viewed as a continuation

Its individual value was'negligible, al-

though some nineteenth-century Russian visionaries viewed California
as the

point d'appui for Russian control of the North Pacific

(see Chapter VI, pp. 190~95).

Fort Ross met, as did each of these

approaches, with very limited success.

The gains were slight and

did not justify a prolonged retention of the settlement.

California

was not a viable extension of empire; considerably more practical gains
could be made in the Amur region.

Langsdorff, participant in Russia's

first circumnavigation, recognized the mistake of continued expansion,

i
I
I
j

I
I

as early as 1806, when· he

obs~rved:

The Russian-American Company has already sufficient
sources of wealth in its present possessions from the
extensive fur-trade it yields, ... Its settlements only
want a better administration to rise with fresh vigour
from its ruins; but to effect this, its strength must
be concentrated,. and it must abandon the mistaken policy of exte??ing them to such a degree as to weaken
every part.
Yet in that same passage, Langsdorff expressed, in apparent contradiction, the Company's need to open a post in California,
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If Russia would engage in an advantageous com~
merce with these parts [California], and procure
from them provisions for the supply of her northern settlements, the only means of doing it
planting a colony of her own in ~aliforniaJ) 1~

The additions of Fort Ross and the settlements in the Sandwich
Islands, therefore, should be ascribed to necessity, that is Alaska's
colonial sustenance, not merely to expansion of empire.
Thus, Fort Ross signified a new phase of expansion for the RussianAmerican Company.

As Langsdorff aptly perceived, this new phase was

one of expansion for commercial, rather than strictly territorial gain.
Formerly, imperialistic expansion occurred, as it did in seventeenthcentury Siberia, when obstacles were overwhelmingly compensated for by
the wealth of furs harvested: the ease of movement through and retention
of territory.

The Russian-American Company was not in a position to

undertake large-scale expansion when the extension into California was
perpetrated, early in the nineteenth century,
During the difficult early years of the Russian experience in
Alaska, knowledge of the territory of California was formalizing.
Through circumnavigation and hunting and trading ventures, the Russians
learned of the limited extent of Spanish occupation in California and
the inferable inability to defend that region.

Rezanov's design to

incorporate a California outpost into the colonial empire was influen-

I

I
I

I

ti al, but it did not mark the first consideration of a Russian settlement in California.

The great schemer of Russian-Pmerican expansion,

Gregorii Shelikhov, envisioned California as "the natural boundary 'of
the territory of Russian possession. 111113 But his plan was not
comparable to Rezanov's ambition of the early 1800sf the political
arrangement of the American colonial world had become increasingly
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intricate.

Whereas, Shelikhov had sought a continuation of Russia's

undaunted expansive enterprise in which political considerations were
subordinated to commercial advantage, the movement to California, in
the nineteenth century, presupposed a change in the Company's constitution:

its politcal nature demanded assertion on an equal basis with

its commercial identity.
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CHAPTER III
THE FOUNDING OF FORT ROSS
The Changing Borders of California
The "California" into which Shelikhov dreamed of expanding was
geographically, as well as politically, altered by 1800.

During the

second half of the eighteenth century, the Russians had known of
California as an ill-defined Spanish possession located directly south
of their Alaskan holdings.

The Spaniards, whose geographical knowledge

of northwest America was likewise poor, claimed a territory which extended north to the "Icy Sea" or to the 75th para 11e1 North.

The

boundaries of the region that became known as Alta or Upper California
underwent numerous changes since its first discovery by Europeans in
the 1540s.

The area of Bodega, which later formed the northern boundary

of Spanish Alta California, was originally claimed by Sir Francis Drake
in 1579.
I

I

But for the two centuries following the initial contact,

California remained unscathed by European colonists.

The Spaniards

searched the coast for a good harbor, finally discovering Monterey in

I
I

1603, but settlements were not erected for 150 years because of the
inaccessibility of Alta California and its limited value to seventeenth-

~

and eighteenth-century colonizing powers.

California was a land

I

difficult to reach by northward voyage and its coast was rocky and

j

dangerous.
features:

These dangers were ostensibly not recompensed by natural
California did not border the northwest passage as many

Europeans thought and it was apparently void of precious metals.
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Owing

to these disadvantages, the physical boundaries of California remained
114
nebulous for centuries.
In the eighteenth century, the desirability of Alta California
was redefined.

With the commencement of circumnavigation, the Pacific

coast of North America, once alienated from the colonial world, was
quickly becoming a location of convenience.

The Spaniards were the

first to settle coastal California as it was geographically adjacent to
their colony.

And the move to occupy California, came in direct re-

sponse to the Spaniard's poorly-perceived fear about the extent of Russian penetration into Alaska.

That false perception was largely based

on the misinformation generated by the Russians, in regard to the extent
of Russian expansion into America, especially during the reign of
Catherine II.
In less than a decade, the Spaniards founded many settlements,
ranging the coast of California as far north as San Francisco Bay:

the

most significant settlements, commercially and politically, were the
mission and presidio of San Diego (1769), the presidia of Monterey
(1770), and the San Francisco mission and presidia (1776).

By the turn

of the century, the Spanish empire could claim the occupation of the
California coast, south from San Francisco, with 19 missions, four
presidios, and three pueblos. 115
This flurry of settlement represented the extent of Spanish
colonization in California, although the Spaniards continued to claim
that New California extended north to the 75th parallel.

And this

boundary, for a time, was respected simply by virtue of the Spanish
colonial expanse in the Americas.

As Jean Francois de Galaup La Perouse
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logged in September 1786, during a French circumnavigation (17851788), "Northern California, of which the most northerly settlement
is San Francisco, in latitude 37°58', is bounded, according to the

opinion of the governor of Monterey, only by the limits of North
America. 11116

However, when other European colonial powers arrived on

the Pacific coast of America and witnessed Spain's inability to defend
her North American possessions, the northern boundary of Spanish
California was challenged--first by the Fort Astor post of the American
Fur Company, under John Jacob Astor (1763-1848), and then by the
117
Russians--and consequently changed.
Spanish Perceptions of Russian Strength in America
The Spaniards' misconception of Russian strength in the north,
which led to California's settlement in the 1770s, arose from incomplete information concerning the intention and extent of Russian
expeditions in the Northern Pacific.

Initially, the mystery surround-

ing the voyages of Vitus Bering in 1728 and 1741, which were publicly
billed as missions of geographical exploration--to determine the
association between the Asian and North American continents,
heightened Spanish fears that the Russians intended to encroach into
118
Spanish America.
The Spaniards were probably correct in their
assessment of Russian colonial designs, as Peter I (1672-1725) no
longer recognized the Pacific Ocean as a hindrance to Russia's eastward expansion.

Interested in increasing the treasury's income from

fur and mineral resources and the subordination of tribute-paying
peoples, Peter ordered Bering to locate North America and reconnoiter
the coast for the purpose of expansion (see pp. 6-7, p. 23 n. 7). 119
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It was not until the 1760s that the Spaniards learned of the
Russians' actual progress in their movement toward America.

In 1764,

the Visconde de la Herreria, Spanish ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Russian trappers had brought black fox pelts from islands
somewhere off the northwest coast. 120 The ambassador was probably
informed

of the voyage of the Iulian (1758-62), sponsored by Moscow

merchant Ivan Nikiforov, Tobol'sk merchant Il'ia Snigirev and· Irkutsk
merchant Nikifor Trapeznikov.

Captain Glotov brought back not only an

unprecedented cargo of foxes (1002 black foxes, 1100 cross foxes, 400
red foxes, and 58 blue foxes valued at 130,450 rubles), he also is
credited with the discovery of Unalaska. 121 In December 1767,
ambassador de la Herreria further reported that Russian forces had
reached the mainland at an unknown latitutde.

In fact, the merchant

company of Ivan Lopin and Vasilli Popov had succeeded in exploring
Kad'iak Island (1762-66), during the easternmost Russian voyage to
that time. 122
Spanish Expeditions to California.

Interpretations of reports

from St. Petersburg overestimated the strength of the Russian
penetration into Alaska, and this coupled with the ignorance regarding
northwest America in eighteenth-century geography, heightened Spanish
concern for the safety of northern California. 123 This concern
triggered a series of reconnaissance expeditions along the northwest
coast.

The first of these Spanish expeditions, called "the expedition

for Russia," was commanded by Juan Jose Perez Hernandez in 1774.
Hernandez succeeded in reaching the 56th parallel north, but found no
. d'ica t•ion of f ore1gn
.
in
ac t'iv1't y. 124

The findings of his mission, however, did little to quell the
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Spaniard's fear of Russian encroachment and thus the Mexican viceregal
government organized a second expedition in 1775.

Commander Bruno

de Hezeta was ordered to proceed north to the 6~parallel.

Although he

was only able to reach 58° North, like Hernandez before him, he found
no trace of Russian settlement.

According to tradition, de Hezeta

planted crosses to claim the lands he explored for the Spanish crown.
Concurrently, the· presidio and mission of San Francisco were founded to
reinforce the Spaniards' claim in Alta California.
European Voyages into the Spanish Colonial Sphere of Influence.
During the 1770s and 1780s, the Spaniards' fear of foreign encroachment
was heightened, as the British and the French commenced their great
trans-global voyages of scientific and geographic discovery.

Captain

James Cook (1728-1779) undertook a voyage in search of a passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans--either a northwest passage
around Canada and Alaska or a northeastern one around Siberia.

On

this voyage (1776-1779), that was to be his last, Cook commanded the
Resolution with a consort ship, the Discovery.
passage was unsuccessful.

The search for a usable

However, Cook's movements alarmed the

Spanish, because on March 7, 1778, Cook surveyed the coast of New
Albion.
Mexico responsed by organizing additional expeditions along the
Pacific coast.

Their reconnaissance of the coastline resumed in 1787,

with the expedition of Esteban Jose Martinez.

Martinez sailed as far

north as Nootka Sound where he encountered English merchant vessels.
Martinez demanded that the British vacate the area, asserting that the
Spanish crown held right to the coast north to the 75th parallel.

But

the British refused to recognize the Spaniards' claim, thus signaling
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what is known as the Nootka Sound Controversy.

Martinez was unable to

remove the British forcibly and so the incident resulted in the two
parties agreeing, in 1794, to leave the region unsettled. 125
At the time of the Martinez voyage, the French expedition of
La Perouse was following Cook's northern route.

In June 1786,

the Boussole, under La Perouse's command, tacked off the California
coast.

The French crew met disaster in 1788, but not before the

ship's interpreter had disembarked and reported about the Russian
activity in Kamchatka and Alaska. 126 The news of the Russian~ expansion found its way to the Madrid court and reconfirmed the Spanish fear
of the threat to California.

In the midst of the Nootka Sound Contro-

versy, the Spaniards dispatched the Perez-Martinez expedition (1792) in
direct response to the information gathered by the French.

In

addition, Alejandro Malaspina, who was en route to the Sandwich
Islands, in the course of a trans-global voyage, received orders to
change course in 1791 and sail to the 60th parallel of the northwest
coast. 127
The Spanish expeditionary voyages of the eighteenth century
finally did succeed in confirming the fact of foreign encroachment in
northern California.
intrusion:

They further emphasized the diversity of that

English merchants, Russian promyshlenniki, and American

settlers had found their way into what had been Spanish-claimed
territory and, by 1800, there was little hope that Spain could reassert
its supremacy over this region.

The incident at Nootka Sound was

perhaps the pivotal event in the colonization of North America, as it
redefined California's northern border at the 61st degree North.
importantly, the controversy exposed the vulnerability of the

More

77

over-extended Spanish colonial empire.

Spain's forfeiture of

California's border at Nootka Sound opened the way for the Russians,
in 1811, to found a settlement at Bodega, only 78 miles north of the
San Francisco Presidio.

Once more the Spaniards protested, but had

neither the men nor artillery to support their demand.
The Founding of the Port Rumiantsev Settlement and Fort Ross
Ivan Kuskov's First Mission to California, 1808.

The process of

establishing a Russian post in California was lengthly.

From 1808 to

1811, the Russians searched the coast for a suitable location, then
they transported men and supplies.

In the fall of 1808, while

Hagemeister departed for the Sandwich Islands aboard the Neva, Baranov
also dispatched an expedition to the California coast to seek a site
for settlement.

--

The schooner Nikolai and the brig Kad'iak, commanded

by Navigators Nikolai Bulygin and A. Petrov, respectively, carried

Kuskov, an Aleut hunting party led by T. Tarakanov, and several Aleut
128
women.
The Nikolai's assignment was to investigate the mouth and
lower reaches of the Columbia River, barter with local natives, and
identify any potential sites for Russian settlement.

The Nikolai was

then to proceed to Gray's Harbor where it would rendevous with the
Kad'iak.

Together the vessels would then continue on to California

and, once there, engage in hunting and trading ventures, and again
investigate a possible location for a Russian post.
The first leg of the mission met with disaster.

The Nikolai,

carrying Tarakanov and a hunting party, was destroyed by high winds
and strong currents off Destruction Island near the Olympic Peninsula.
Most of Bulygin's crew members were killed by the Makah Indians and
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at least four women were taken into slavery.

129

Bulygin, his wife,

two Russians, and four Aleuts reportedly died in slavery early in
1809. 130 In June 1808, a small number of crew members and women were
rescued by American Captain Brown, of the Boston-based Lydia, and were
returned to Novo-Arkhangel'sk.
Kuskov's assignment in California, in contrast, met with great
success.

He gained 1453 large, 406 medium, and 491 small otter pelts

that were harvested by Aleut hunters in the vicinity of the Little
Bodega Bay. 131 He also succeeded in locating an adequate place to
settle and reported that this site contained "a fairly good harbor,
excellent defensive positioning, [and] land suitable for cultivation."132

Kuskov likewise observed that the natives of the Little

Bodega Bay (see Chapter VII) were friendly and that several temporary
buildings were left behind.
Baranov was pleased with Kuskov's findings and submitted a
, report to the Company Board which requested the Board petition
Aleksandr I (1801-1825) for permission to erect a "southern outpost.11133
tection.

Aleksandr granted permission and assured imperial proThis assurance was given, at least in part, because the

Board was purposely vague in its description of the location of the
prospective settlement.

It was described as lying on the coast of New

Albion, which extended some 200 miles north of San Francisco.

The

report from the Main Office to Foreign Minister Nikolai Petrovich
Rumiantsev (1808-1814) was more exact regarding the details of the
first expedition.
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Baranov sent an expedition to the coast of New Albion in
search of a better spot for settlement than Kad'iak or Sitka,
and this expedition ••• did find one, near the California port
of San Francisco in Bodega Bay. However, settlement is being
postponed until a future time and orders; our traders ••. have
surreptitiously surveyed the local situation, and have been
directly across from the Spanish 1 !~rtress, but have not seen
any military or trade vessels •••
Kuskov Returns to California, January 1811.

Kuskov's second

voyage to the California coast was primarily a hunting expedition,
according to Kirill Khlebnikov (1776-1838), Russian-American Company
employee.
On January 22, 1811, Kuskov was sent to Albion on the
schooner Chirikov commanded by [Khristofor] Benzeman. They
reached Bodega on February 21, but they did not find such
an abundance of sea otters there as formerly; they therefor sent 22 baidarkas to San Francisco Bay. In that place
they found a band of Aleuts under the supervision of
Tarakanov, who had been left there by [William] Davis. They
had 48 baidarkas. There was also a party who had been with
Winship, under Losev's supervision, who had 68 baidarkas.
Altogether the three groups had 140 bairdarkas. Using the
22 baidarkas from Kuskov's group, in a three-month §5riod the
hunt took l, 160 prime sea otters and 78 yearlings. 1
The Spanish however interfered with the Russian hunting parties, demanding that they depart from the bay.

On June 22nd, the Russians

abided, sailing north, and arrived in Novo-Arkhangel'sk on July 28th.
Kuskov Again Sails to California, November 1811.

In late

November 1811, Kuskov once again returned to California on the
Chirikov.

On this voyage, he brought 25 Russian employees, 40

baidarkas of Aleuts, and the materials necessary to begin construction
136
of a settlement.
Early in 1812, building was complete at Bodega
Bay, renamed Rumiantsev Bay in honor of the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs.

A safe and convenient harbor was essential to the

Russian settlement.

The coastline north of Spanish California lacked

good harbors, and this was the "one serious drawback to making it a
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colony."

Port Rumiantsev (38°33' North, 123°151' South) was considered

to be the Russians' best option, as it was "protected from all winds
and is completely safe, but because of shallow water can be used by
on l y the s ma 11 est vessel s • " 13 7
Other requirements for a successful settlement, however, such as
farming.and defense, necessitated a more suitable site than the bay
area.

Kirill T. Khlebnikov, Baranov's chief assistant, thought that

Rumiantsev "was considered inadvisable for a settlement because the
surrounding area was completely devoid of forests ..• "
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Hence, the

Russians moved their primary settlement to a more suitable area for
fortification,eighteen miles north of Rumiantsev Bay.

The new site

was located on a "small plateau resembling a peninsula

[forming a

barely perceptible curve, and] on three sides it was surrounded by
steep banks." 139
The Geography of Russian California
The physical descriptions of California and the Ross settlement
during the first half of the nineteenth century are numerous.

Voyagers

and Company servicemen, such as I.F. Kruzenstern, Otto Kotzebue,
F.P. Lutke, V.M. Golovnin, K.T. Khlebnikov, F.P. Wrangel, and D.I.
Zavalishin, recorded the paradisal attraction to California.
California's allure was not surprising considering its stark contrast
to Russian Alaska.

One nineteenth-century Russian enthusiast spoke of

California as follows:
What a fairyland is California!--For eight months of the year
the skies are always clear; in the remaining months, starting
with late November, rain falls periodically. The temperature
in the shade does not go over 25 degrees by Reaumur.
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In January everything comes to life. Flowers are in full
bloom, rainbow colored humming birds shimmer and shine on
flowers or vibrate like precious jewels over the blossoms.
The virgin soil of California brings unbelievable harvests.
I have observed the harvest of wheat multiplying 150 fold,

and maize and frijoles 1, 150 fold, with very little cultivation. A crooked stout branch of a tree, sharpened at one
end into something like a blade, serves as a plow. After
scraping the ground to the depth of 3 inches, the plowman
starts sowing •••
If you pick a peach from a tree and throw away the peach
three ye,4 later you will find a full grown fruitbear1ng tree •••
ston~,

0

In the early years of settlement, another Russian visitor to California believed that the Fort Ross site would prove itself productive.
Ross is blest with an abundance of the finest wood for
building. The sea provides it with the most delicious fish,
the land with an inexhaustible quantity of the best kinds of
game; and, notwithstanding the want of a good harbour, the
northern settlements might easily find in t9!1 a plentiful
magazine for the supply of all their wants.
The Geographical Disadvantages of the Fort Ross Site.

Many

Russian visitors to California were overly optimistic regarding the
advantages of the site they had selected.
region of New Albion coast was not

The geography of this

condu~ive

to many of the activities

undertaken by the Russians, especially shipbuilding and agriculture
(see Chapters IV and V).

The coastal location of Fort Ross was swept

with strong northwesterly winds, an unusually low seasonal range of
temperature, prevalent cloudiness, frequent fog belts, and
drought.

142

During the summer months, the coast became especially

unproductive; the landscape was sered, as the vegetation browned
under the grey skies of the cold and raw atmosphere. 143
The littoral of northern California, moreover, was (and still
is) notorious for its perilous coast and lack of natural harbors. 144
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The cliffed,eroded coast, noted for its boldness and irregularity,
represented a succession of headlands and reentrants.

Island

residuals such as the Russian-occupied Farallon Islands, opposite
San Francisco Bay, were characteristic and the shores were shrewn
with great boulders.

The coast, from Cape Mendicino southward, rough-

ly parallels the structural axis which extends from the northwest to
the southeast.

This structure was also evident in the parallelism of

the coastal ranges, such as the Northern Coast Range east of Fort Ross,
and the San Andreas Fault which the fort straddles.

And finally,athe

western edge of the forest' surrounding Fort Ross, the trees were
often bent, flattened out, and stunted due to the intense prevailing
winds. 145 These winds which distinguish the coastline were strongest
during the months of May and June and were responsible for the
weather-beaten appearance of the wooden buildings and fences at Fort
Ross.
Description of Fort Ross
The Russians commenced construction of the walled settlement in
the spring of 1812 and completed it by September.
also named it Fort Ross.

At this time, they

In March 1832, a detailed description of

Fort Ross was given by an observer, calling himself only an "intelligent Bostonian."
Arrived at the Presidio [Fort Ross], we passed thro' an
assemblage of 60 or 70 men and children, who repectfully
doffed their caps on our entrance into the square. The
Presidio is formed by the houses fronting inwards, making a
large square, surrounded by a high fence. The Governor's
house stands at the head, and remainder of the square is formed by the chapel, magazine, and dwelling houses. The buildings are from 15 to 20 feet high, built of large timbers, and
have a weather-beaten appearance. The first room we entered
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was the armory, containing many muskets, ranged in neat
order; thence we passed into the chief room of the house,
which is used as a dining room, & in which all business
is transacted. It was comfortably, though not elegantly
furnished, and the walls were adorned with engravings of.

Nicholas I, Duke Constantine, _&c.

There are a number of work-

shops outside the walls, in which many different trades are
pursued; and in a small place near the sea are huts of the
Kodiacs. I should think there were about 300 inhabitants of
all descriptions. They cultivate about 400 acres of wheat and
raise many vegetables and some fruits ••. They have several
cannon, but all their b,~5eries are of wood, and not in very
defensible situation •••
As in Siberian ostrogs, the pallisade of Fort Ross (1204 feet in circumference, 14 feet high) formed a rectangle and contained a smaller
fence which divided the living quarters at the northern end of the
enclosure from the service buildings in the southern portion.

In the

northern section, which separated the manager's house and officers'
barracks, the flag of the Russian-American Company was flown.

Out-

side this internal enclosure was a chapel, some warehouses, and the
main kitchen (see Figures 7 and 8 and Appendix C).
The Living Quarters.

The main structure of the fort was the

manager's house, sometimes referred to as the "Old Commandant's
House."

It was built during the administration of Ivan Kuskov (1811-

1821).

It measured 56 by 42 feet, roofed with double beams, and contained six rooms, a corridor and a kitchen. 147 (There was a second
manager's house constructed during Aleksandr Rotchev's administration
(1836-1841). It was smaller, 56 by 28 feet, with six rooms and a
148
corridor.
Along the wall, to the northwest of the manager's
house, was the commissioned officers' housing.
building contained ten rooms and two corridors.

This 70 by 24.5 foot
The last living

quarter, within the wall itself, was the employee barracks.

It sat

p .202.

e t at

Fort Ross in 1828. Reprinted from E. O. fssig, "The Russian S~ttle
Ross, II Quarterly of the Cal ifor.nia Hisfor1ca Society, 12, No .3 \1933),

~i~ure 7.
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along the western wall and measured 77 by 28 feet.
Service Buildings at Fort Ross.

The outer wall, at the south-

ern end of the fort, surrounded five buildings, none of these were
living spaces.

Along the western wall were two warehouses.

The older

warehouse was two-stories high and measured 56 feet long by 28 feet
wide.

It had an open gallery supported by pillars.

south of this warehouse was another building.

Directly to the

It was constructed of

thicker planks and was smaller, measuring 49 by 28 feet.
On the southern edge of the wall were three buildings.

From

west to east, there was a kitchen, a third warehouse, and the Russian
Orthodox church.

The kitchen (28 x 24.5') was one of.the fourteen

cooking buildings constructed in the immediate vicinity of the fort.
Other kitchens and sheds used to prepare foods stood to the south of
the fort between the wall and the cliff.

The warehouse (42 x 21')

was built of thick planks and reportedly served a dual purpose; a
storage facility

and a

prison.~-·,,.-~

l "'i ~ *

~

Perhaps the most familiar

structure at Fort Ross was and still is, in its reconstructed state,
the Orthodox church.

The church, with cupolas and belfry, stood in

the southeastern corner of the wall and measured 42 by 28 feet.

It

was not one of the original buildings of the settlement; the buildings
listed as complete by 1814 were the "dwelling for the administrators,
the barracks, warehouse, storehouse, stable, kitchen, workshops,
bathhouse, tannery, mill, barn and other service buildings .•• 11149
The church was completed before 1825 when the Main Office sent icons
to adorn it. lSO The property also included a drinking well, 17.5
feet deep. 151
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Russian Property Outside the Walled Settlement.

The property

enclosed by the redwood pallisade comprised only a small portion of
the land occupied by the Russians in Alta California.

There were

reportedly 40 buildings within the immediate vicinity (3,500
feet) of the fort at the time of sale in 1841. 152 Included among
these were a main kitchen (35 x 21'), ten smaller kitchens and a
bakeshop.

There were also two wooden-planked houses with glass

windows and wooden floors.

Their inhabitants are unknown.

Adjacent

to Fort Ross was 75 acres of fenced, cultivated land, a corral
which measured 196 by 140 feet, and two cattle barns constructed of
thick planks.

At the foot of the hill, north of the enclosure,

there was a landing used by baidarkas and small boats.

Near the

landing were a blacksmith shop (38.5 x 21 ')with forge and anvil, a
cooper's shop (70 x 35'), a bathhouse, a boathouse on rafters, and a
tannery with a "machine to compress tanned hides. 11153
Russian Ranches in California, post-1830.

In addition to the

property at Port Rumiantsev and Fort Ross, there was a large amount
of real estate added to the Russian properties in the 1830s.

These

establishments were the ranches of Khlebnikov, Kostromitinov, and
Chernykh.

They comprised the largest area of Russian California

and they were established primarily to increase agricultural production.

The Russian ranches were patterned after the Spanish

rancheros which became so numerous after secularization in 1834.
The exact locations of the ranches, as can be seen from Figures 9
and 10, are uncertain.

Petr Kostromitinov, Fort Ross' Manager from

1830 to 1836, supervised the establishment of two ranches.

The first
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was the 70-acre Khlebnikov Ranch built in 1833.

It was located on

a plain in the interior, five miles east· of Port Rumiantsev and two
154
miles north of the Avacha River.
The Khlebnikov Ranch (sometimes
referred to as the Vasilii or Basil Ranch) incorporated nine structures:

an abode house -0f three chambers roofed with lapped boards,

complete with sun dial; barracks with three divisions; a wooden-floor
warehouse; a kitchen with bread oven and forge; a large bathhouse;
and four houses of various sizes and purposes--one for food supplies,
two .
~ Indian dwe 11 i ngs, and one'~~ for tobacco storage. 155
!!' _,,_.

Additionally, the ranch had a large wooden-planked floor (84 feet in
diameter) probably for. threshing wheat, a corral, and a mill worked
by horses.

The mill had only one stone and thus could grind approximately four fanegas. 156
The second ranch was the Kostromitinov Ranch. It is of unknown
acreage and was

also established in 1833.

The ranch was situated

halfway between Port Rumiantsev and Fort Ross on the confluence of
the Rotchev and Russian Rivers.

The ranch was strategically located

to provide communication between the port and fort.

There were six

buildings at the Kostromitinov Ranch at the time 9f an inventory taken
early in 1841.

These were barracks (roofed with planks, containing

three rooms and two corridors,individually roofed), a supervisor's
house, a planked Indian dwelling, a wooden warehouse for storing
wheat, a kitchen with two ovens, and a roofed bathhouse. 157 In
addition to these structures, the Kostromitinov Ranch had a corral,
two th res hi ng floors, and a "floor for winnowing wheat."
In 1838, the last manager of Fort Ross, Aleksandr G. Rotchev,
established the interior ranch named for the Russian agronomist,
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Igor Chernykh, who came to Fort Ross in 1836.

The Chernykh Ranch

was located fifteen miles east of Port Rumiantsev on the Schmidt
or Khlebnikov Plain (see Figure 11).

It was a small ranch, covering

approximately 20 acres of enclosed land for the cultivation of
wheat.

Within its confines were six buildings, including a six-room

barracks, a kitchen, a bathhouse, and three supply houses.

The

Chernykh was also the only ranch at which fruit was grown--including
a "remarkable" vineyard of 2000 plants--and it had a winnowing floor
and two hotbeads.
The Farallon Artel.

The Ross Counter included the Farallon

Artel which provided abundant numbers of sea otter pelts, seal meat,
158
and bird eggs during the early years of Russian occupation.
"Los
Farallones de los Frayles, 11

"little peaks of the friars" was the

name given to these islands by the Spaniards and sustained by their
Russian successors.

The Farallones are a broken string of small,

rocky islands 50 miles west of the San Francisco Presidio.

In

aggregate, the islands extend for ten miles and 211 acres.

Ordinar-

ily, there were only two Russians and several more Aleut hunters
stationed on the Farallones, because the climate was inhospitable
and the life difficult.

The islands are generally shrouded in

coastal fog, buffeted by high winds, and washed by the frigid Pacific
waters.

Nevertheless, the Aleuts hunted the Stellar Sea Lion (weigh-

ing up to 2,200 lbs. ~~-~cow, 600 lbs.), the smaller and more
plentiful California Sea Lion, the harbor seal which was a yearround resident of the islands, although in numbers the least significant, and finally sea birds which were a common food supply for
the Russians.
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(Archive NAF. AN S.~R.)
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Figure 11. The Chernykh Ranch. Reprinted from K~rill T. Klebnil4ov, Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P.
Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.
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The Natives of Fort Ross
An accurate and meaningful reconstruction of Russian California
requires consideration of the native peoples with whom the Russians
established relations--economic and political.

Due to the multi-

cultural nature of the Fort Ross site, a consideration of Russian
activity, movements, and policy is only a part of the complete historical picture.

Native Californians, especially the Southwestern

Pomo and, to a lesser extent, the Coast Miwok, and displaced Aleuts
provided invaluable assistance to the Russians at Fort Ross, veritably creating the supply of labor.

Indeed the Russian venture in

California, as the entire experience of eastward expansion, was made
159
possible only through native skill and service.
Native Labor at Fort Ross.

The most crucial relationship

between natives and Russians at Fort Ross was economic in nature, as
native labor constituted a majority of the labor force.

In 1833,

there were 45 adult Russian males at Fort Ross in proportion to 174
native peoples. Of that later figure, 72 were Pomo, 67 Aleut, and
35creole. 160 The quantity and skill of the labor force was decisive
in the success of agricultural production at Fort Ross.

The labor

force was stratified culturally--Russians acted as administrators,
the Aleuts, transplanted from the Alaskan colony, served as hunters,
and the Southwestern Pomo as craftsmen and farmers.

The pattern of

Russian administration ordinate to a native manual labor force was
'\"

familiar in Russia's eastward expansive movement.
From Fort Ross' inception, the Southwestern Pomo and the

Russians retained cordial relations.

"The inhabitants of Ross,"

«
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reported Russian Captain Kotzebue, "live in the greatest accord with
the Indians. 11161 This idea was consistently documented in Russian
sources and contradicting materials are unavailable.

In Tikhmenev's

trenchant determination, relations between the Russians and natives
were friendly due to two factors:

First, the Russians served as a

buffer between free natives and the Spanish mission.

Second, a large

portion of the settlement's composition was itself native, i.e., of
those company employees assigned to Fort Ross from the Alaskan colony,
60% were ~leut while only 40% were Russian. 162
Fraternity between the Aleuts and the Pomo quickly promoted the
Russian's position in California.

Intermarriage between the Pomo and

Aleut occurred not infrequently after the establishment of Fort
Ross. 163
They willingly give their daughters in marriage to
Russians and Aleutians; and from these unions ties of relationship have ari16~ which strengthen the good understanding between them.
These marriages expedited contact between the Pomo and Russians;
the former quickly became an important element of the social and
economic structure of Russian California.

Many Pomo emigrated_to the

Aleut quarter of Fort Ross which (in 1817) consisted of fourteen
wooden yurts, located "outside the pallisade," 200 feet to the
south. 165
The native economic component of Fort Ross facilitated the
establishment of social bonds between natives and Russtans.

Much

to the amazement of their European chroniclers, the Pomo initially
came to Fort Ross "voluntarily to help the Aleuts in their work. 11166
Kuskov, feeling a need to sanction their work that it might continue,
"tried constantly to reward them with various gifts. 11167

Later, the
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Pomo natives worked in considerable numbers as day laborers "for
wages. 11168 However, as the Ross settlement diversified to include
an unproportionate emphasis on agriculture, the need for native labor
at Fort Ross increased.

Pomo natives were no longer afforded the

opportunity to work voluntarily, because the Russians came to depend
on their efforts.

Natives were forced into the service of the

Russian-American Company, and the Russians were able to provide less
and less compensation as the settlement's financial predicament
worsened each year.

Yet even the mild success of agriculture at Fort

Ross, "was wrought largely by Pomo Indian laborers, they with some
Aleuts did most of the farmwork. 11169 "Without their assistance it
would not [have been] at all possible to reap and to have the wheat
[hauled] from the plowland to the threshing floors. 1117
Considering

°

their eventual loss of freedom and homeland, it is perhaps the Pomo
who suffered most from the failure of Fort Ross and its sale to the
Americans

(se~

Chapter VII for a comprehensive consideration of Fort

Ross' native population).

Although, at the time, it seemed most

important that the Spaniards were losing hold of a valuable colonial
possession.
Spanish-Russian Relations after the Founding of Fort Ross
At the time the Russians moved into Alta California, the
politics of Spain, Mexico, and California were in disarray.

The

Spanish monarchy was dismantled by Napoleon Bonaparte, who forced
the abdication of Charles IV in March 1808, and installed his brother.
Joseph Bonaparte, as Spain's figurehead. 171 In Mexico, certain
factions struggled for independence from Spain, and this was finally
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achieved in 1821.

In California itself, the well-established, pro-

Californian Governor, Jose Joaquin Arrillaga, died in 1816.

He was

replaced by Pablo Vincente de Sola (1815-1822), a staunch advocate
of the Mexican viceregal government, who carried out the dictated
isolationist policy, even to the detriment of California and Russian
America.
The restoration of the Spanish monarchy in March 1814 was a
pivotal event in Spanish-Russian relations in California.

Ferdinand

VII, son of Charles IV, dissolved the liberal Cortes and annuled the
Constitution of 1812.

Thus Madrid reverted to many of the policies--

including colonial isolationism--of Charlestonian Spain.

Especially

after 1816, the atmosphere created by Arrillaga, which tolerated and
at times even welcomed the Russian presence in California, abruptly
changed.

That tolerance is evident in a March 1817 meeting between

the Spanish Minister of State, Jose Garcia de Leon y Pizarro, and the
Russian ambassador in Madrid (1821-1822), Dmitrii Pavlovich Tatishchev
(1767-1845).

"Mr. Pizarro spoke in a very light-hearted manner with

Tatishchev·about the Russian factories on the northwest coast of
America. 11172 At this time, the only apparent ramification of Russian
encroachment into Spanish territory was to be a directive "with
precise instructions indicating how far east and south the Russian
settlements may go. 11

Concurrently, Frederick Lutke, participant of

the Russian circumnavigation of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819, reported
that "Spanish authorities in California only allow Russians to settle
no closer than Fort Ross. 11173 The Spaniards apparently recognized
the trade advantage created by the Russian presence and, in any case,
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their inability to defend California north of San Francisco.

It

appeared that Madrid, though concerned, was willing to negotiate a
common Russian-Spanish border in California, allowing a Russian post
in what had been exclusively Spanish territory.
Only a month following the Tatishchev-Pizarro meeting, Madrid's
attitude toward Russian activity in California measurably worsened.
On April 15, 1817, the Spanish consul in St. Petersburg, Zea de
Bermudez, registered a bitter complaint on behalf of the Spanish
·government.

He reproached the "permanent" settling of Russians on

the California coast.

As not to betray the Russian-Spanish alliance,

Bermudez expressed his country's conviction that the settlement resulted from the rash actions of traders and did not reflect any
. . l governmen t po l.icy. 174
off icia

In addition, Bermudez warned that

Spanish authorities would have exerted military force if these traders
and hunters patronized any country other than Russia. 175 This
obviously was an empty threat as the condition of the military forces
in New Spain was desparate.
The Spaniards were partially correct in their assessment of the
situation as resulting from the ambitions of overzealous traders of
the Russian-American Company.

Although Aleksandr I had granted per-

mission to settle in California, the project had been planned and
manipulated by Baranov and the Company's Main Office.

The emperor

was too involved in European affairs to contemplate aggressive territorial acquisitions in America.

It is not surprising, therefore,

that the Main Office of the Company, and not a government official,
replied to Bermudez's protest regarding Russian encroachment into
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Spanish California.

The emperor wanted the economic benefits, not

the political complications, of activities in Russian America.

The

Company Directors, admittedly responsible for the settlement, rebutted that California was essential for the provisionment of
Russia's northern colonies, because efforts to open trade with
Spanish California had failed.
Instead of stimulating commercial activity, Fort Ross was interfering with the opening of trade, thus the flow of provisionments
north--the very wound it had intended to heal.

In the fall of 1817,

the Main Office was informed that attempts to obtain commerical
privileges were underway, but that the settlement at Bodega was an
impediment to these attempts.

Realizing the adverse influence of

Fort Ross and hoping to create a situation of economic stability,
rather than to secure Alta California as an imperial territory, the
directors candidly explained their priorities.
Although the considerable amount of capital used to
establish this settlement Ross has not given the company the
expected return, owing to the short period and the fact that
the company still lacks men to settle there permanently with
their families ••• the Spanish government of New California
nevertheless continually demands the destruction of this
settlement and the removal of Russian subjects, considering
the land that they occupy, and even the entire cost of New
Albion, a possession of the Spanish crown by reason of
Columbus' discovery of America, and perhaps to this day they
would resort to the use of force, if they were in a position
to do so.
Under these circumstances, the Russian-American Company
would willingly destroy this settlement, which rouses the
Spaniards to envy and fear, and would never again consider
seeking another place on the Albion coast, if the loss of
this settlement could be exchanged for regular trade with
New California, to which foreigners are not admitted both by
colonial law and by the fear of revealing
remarkable
insecurity and weakness of the government.

196
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In summary, Spanish-Russian colonial relations during the
period of Spanish domination were characterized by unsuccessful
attempts, on the part of the Russians, to establish trade between

California and Alaska.

Spain, on the other hand, continued to pro-

tect her mare nostrum, isolating the ports of Monterey, San Diego,
and San Francisco from foreign traffic.

To foreigners, including

Russians, the Spanish interdiction seemed unreasonable because the
excessive restraints stifled California's wealth of resources for
inhabitants and foreigners alike. ·During the circumnavigation of
1803-1807, which preceded Charles IV's removal from the throne,
George von Langsdorff recorded:
The Spanish government is well known to be extremely
suspicious, and properly speaking, does not allow the
ve~sels of other nations to run l97o any of her ports in
either North or South America ..•
A decade later, after the restoration of the Spanish monarchy,
the commercial isolationism in Spanish California endured.
noted his impressions, similar to those of Langsdorff

Lutke

as well as

American and British observers, of Spanish commercial policy and its
effect on the colonial economy.
What a pity that the richest countries in all parts of
the world would fall into the hands of such stagnant
people, people with such insignificant political leaders
as the Spaniards, •.•
California does not trade with anyone, but actually, it
is prevented from having any trade. This prosperous
country could have a considerable trade with all kinds of
grain, forest, even wine, grapes grow here very well in
some of the missions, and they would grow everywhere very
well if some effort were taken to plant them. Sea otters
alone could bring great profit. A multitude of them are
along its shores, but from the very time that California
had belonged to the Spaniards, not one Spanish ship has
been used to hunt them. They are denying the boats of
other nations to hunt, although some American ships and
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and our American company have agreed to pay them substantial
sums to do it. The Spanish government's attitude seems
that it is afraid that California
some way would bring
some sort of advantage to someone. 8

19

Spanish colonial policy under Ferdinand continued as it had under
Charles; foreigners were forbidden to trade in Spanish colonial
ports or to hunt in Spanish waters.

As a result, the Spanish colo-

nists, who were not equipped to hunt or manufacture, existed in a
state of material deprivation.

With the founding of Fort Ross, the

Russians were able to satisfy a part of California's manufacturing
needs.

In return, the Russians received a small but significant

amount of agricultural produce.
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CHAPTER IV
HUNTING AND MANUFACTURING AT FORT ROSS
The Purpose of Hunting
Hunting sea otters off the California coast was an important
Russian industry prior to the establishment of Fort Ross and in
the early years of the settlement's existence.

In the early nine-

teenth century, the pelt remained the Company's most accessible
medium with which to purchase colonial provisions, although currency
replaced furs and manufactured goods as these later items became
scarce.

Spanish piasters were the most acceptable exchange media

in California, but their availability to the Company was limited.
In the 1820s and 1830s, the Company's reserves of furs and bills
fluctuated.

As late as 1828, the Company directors urged Chief

Manager Peter Igorovich Chistiakov to continue to hunt otters,
in agreement with the Californians, so that grain could be purchased for the colonies. 179 At that time, the cashier at NovoArkhangel'sk had 7,591 piasters to be used for purchasing grain
when ''it is not possible to get wheat in California in exchange
for goods. 11180 By 1833 currency had superceded the use of pelts.
Khlebnikov reported that provisions were purchased ''formerly for
fur seals and otter furs and lately for bills of exchange. 11181
In the late twenties and the early thirties, the availability
of furs in Alaska was poor as the result of foreign encroachment
and the depletion of the area's fur-bearing animal population--
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historically, a constant concern to the Company.

The exploration of

new hunting grounds was crucial, especially by the turn of the century,
because past exploration in North American, Eastern Siberia, and the
Kurile Islands had continued unmonitored and resulted in the near

-··- -~

~tlcln)f many animals.

, .-"'"' r:-,

By~he condition was so severe that
the di~ctors banned hunting in these regions. 182 New hunting opera-

tions off the California coast served to compensate partially for the
loss of those grounds.
Russian Hunting Operations off the California Coast
Russian hunting operations in California were also hampered by animal depletion, in addition to a problem which had continually beset
Russian commerce in California; the Spanish prohibition against foreign
activity within the colonial empire.

The spectrum of Spanish suspicion

included trading in California's ports as well as hunting for otters in
Under Spanish law, foreigners were not permitted

colonial waters.

to hunt in waters for 30

leagues off the California coast.

After 1821

certain Mexican administrations continued to reinforce this prohibition,
The Russians were, however, able to engage in hunting expeditions
in California.

This was accomplished in three ways.

From 1803 to 1812,

Baranov contracted with Boston captains to hunt jointly in Spanish
California waters.

Secondly, the Russians engaged in independent

hunting ventures beginning in 1809 with Kuskov's first expedition south
in search of a suitable location for Russian settlement.

After the

establishment of Fort Ross in 1812, a permanent hunting party was
sent to the Farallon Islands and various expeditions were dispatched
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along the coast, from Cape Mendicino to San Francisco Bay.

Both joint

Russian-Bostonian and independent Russian hunting ventures were accomplished in defience of Spanish colonial law.
took a third, legal practice to procure pelts:

The Russians also under-

From 1823 to 1828, the

Company contracted with California authorities to participate in joint
Russian-Spanish hunting ventures. 183
The Contract System:

Joint Russian-Bostonian Hunting Ventures

From 1803 to 1812, Chief Manager Baranov contracted with Boston
merchants 13

times to hunt California sea otters off the California
184
Before the contract system had been estacoast (see Appendix F).
blished, the Boston captains relied on bartering with California natives
for pelts, as they did not have access to skilled hunters.

Bartering

for pelts was not only risky, but less profitable than hunting for pelts.
Likewise, the Russians had not been able to participate in the California
hunt, because they lacked the vessels and experience
make the journey from Alaska to California.

cre~nnen

needed to

The contract system, there-

fore, allowed for an excellent combination of resources:

Boston ves-

sels and crews, coupled with Russian Aleut hunters and baidarkas, permitted both parties to hunt profitably in California waters. 185
The first contract between Russian and Boston merchants was signed
on Kad'iak Island in October 1803.

Joseph O'Cain, an experienced IrishAmerican navigator, had made four voyages from Boston to California. 186
He had become frustrated with the limited profitability of procuring
pelts through barter with the local natives.

O'Cain approached Baranov

in 1803 with the practical plan of combining resources for a joint hunt:
O'Cain would supply transportation to California's hunting grounds on

I

11 0

the O'Cain, a vessel owned and operated by the Winship family of Boston.

Baranov would supply 40 Aleut hunters and 20 baidarkas.

pelts harvested would be divided equally.

The

O'Cain assured Baranov that

the venture would result in considerable profits, claiming that he knew
of untapped hunting grounds off California. 187
Baranov was intrigued with O'Cain's proposition; it would allow the
Russians to compete with the Anglo-Americans in the northwest hunt.
And the ability to compete was of urgent concern, because Baranov feared
the Russians were losing influence in the Alaskan hunting grounds to the
Anglo-Americans. 188 Once settled in Alaska, the Russians had been unable to significantly extend their hunting operations.

Not only was

the Company fleet emaciated, but the Russians had to contend with the
hostile Kolash, who had destroyed the settlement at Novo-Arkhangel 'sk
in 1802. 189 Baranov, therefore, agreed to contract with the Bostonian
and thus afforded the Russians the opportunity to enter the California
hunt and, a decade later, to dominate that hunt by establishing a
settlement in California at Fort Ross.
The O'Cain left Kad'iak in November 1803 with Russian provisions
and Aleut hunters, under the command of the Russian Shvetsov.

Captain

O'Cain gave Baranov 12,000 rubles of merchandise as collateral for
the Company's· investment. 190 The O'Cain arrived in San Diego on December 4, but the Spaniards refused entry into the harbor for fresh
supplies.

On December 8, the ves.sel continued southward to San Quintin.

There, Commander Jose Manuel Ruiz permitted entrance to port.

And once

O'Cain gained entrance into San Quintin Bay, he refused repeated orders
from Ruiz and Governor Arrillaga to depart. 191 The O'Cain remained at
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San Quintin from December 13, until March 26, 1804, harvesting otters
and piling their pelts on the beach.

The catch was protected from

the Spaniards by Aleut guards with five cannons.

When O'Cain finally

left Lower California, the Spaniards denied him the firewood and water
he needed for the remainder of the hunt. 192 He returned to Kad'iak in
June 1804 and delivered to Baranov 550 pelts--one-half of the total
harvest. 193
The venture proved successful for both Baranov and O'Cain, therefore new contracts with Bostonians quickly followed,
in 1806.

Three were arranged

They were between Baranov and Oliver Kimball of the Peacock,

Captain O'Cain, this time in charge of the Eclipse, and Jonathan Winship, Jr. of the O'Cain. 194 Winship contracted with Baranov in April
1806.

Confident of the mission's success, Baranov sent fifty

baidar~

kas,12 native women, and 100 Aleut hunters under the command
~

of the Russi an Sy soi Sl obodchi kov.

Provisions for the hunt inc 1uded

tk.
\95 ~p'+e ,,
pounds of ,~kola
and 1,000 pounds of whale meat.(..%
tJ
'y'tli(t:J.L.A ... Pk~J5.~ F-~.S~ S'r6?.ti."t.£' /r.N.':lf1J.\) ·
r,; t );~'Winship hunted 1 n Trinidad Bay for two weeks in June 180 and then

15,400

1

sailed directly to the Lower California coast,

There, Winship stationed

the Aleuts on various islands and kept the O'Cain harbored away from
the hunting grounds
Quintin. 196

in the mainland ports of Todos Santos and San

In August 1806, Winship departed from Lower California but

left the Aleuts stationed on the islands to continue the hunt.

Winship

sailed to the Sandwich Islands to sell the harvest, then called at NovoArkhangel 'skin January 1807 for 50

more Aleut hunters,

These hunt-

ers were used to supplement the initial hunting parties and were also
newly-stationed around Catalina and nearby islands.

"

~
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... the O'Cain had now from seventy to eighty baidarkas,
carrying about a hundred and fifty Kod'iak Indian hunters,
fitted out and hunting sea otter among the Islands of
Guadalupe, Natividad, Cerros and Redondo, while other
parties wef9 stationed on some of the islands to take
fur seals. 7
There were, however, problems on the hunt; apparently, conflict arose
between Winship and Slobodchikov.

Slobodchikov left the party early

in 1807 and purchased a small schooner with 150 otter pelts.

He sailed

the vessel, which he named Eclipse, to the Sandwich Islands and purchased provisions for the Alaskan colonies. Slobodchikov returned to
Novo-Arkhangel'sk on August 22, 1807, 198 Winship returned to NovoArkhangel 'skin September with a hefty catch of 3,006 prime skins,
1,264 yearlings, and 549 pups. 199
Joseph O'Cain· contracted with Baranov, for a second time, early
in 1806.

In command of the Eclipse, O'Cain sailed along the Californias
I

and, as on the first voyage, experience Spanish opposition.

O'Cain

anchored the Eclipse just beyond range ~f the San Diego Presidio on
June 25 and requested permission to enter port for fresh provisions,
but Comisionado Rodrigues refused, 200 O'Cain sailed on to Todos Santos
Bay on June 29 and hunted there until July 8,
hunting in San. Quintin Bay,

Two days were then spent

Rodriguez, however, pursued O'Cain by dis-

patching five men to wait for the party at likely hunting grounds.
After several confrontations, five of the Eclipse~s crew were captured
on July 18 in Sandel Caba Bay, 201 O'Cain was forced to return to
Novo-Arkhangel'sk in August 1806. without securing the return of those
crew members,

The Ecliose proceeded to Canton and Kamchatka, but was

lost in September 1807. 202
In October 1806, Oliver Kimball of the brig Peacock formed a hunt-
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ing contract with the Russians.

Baranov agreed to provide 12

baidarkas and twice as many Aleuts.

The hunters were supervised

by Vasili Petrovich Tarakanov who had assisted Shvetsov on the first
Russian-Bostonian hunt.

From March to May 1807, Kimball anchored
203
in Bodega Bay and erected temporary quarters along the coast.

The Aleuts hunted in Bodega and even San Francisco Bay.

In May,

the Peacock sailed to Lower California,. to San Quintin Bay, where
pelts were harvested through June.

In August, Kimball returned

to Novo-Arkhangel'sk and delivered to Baranov

on~lf

'of 753 prime otters, 258 yearlings, and 250 pups. 204

of the catch

r

Little is known about the fifth hunting agreement contracted
between Baranov and Benjamin Swift who represented the Boston merchants of Perkins, Lyman. and Sturgis,

The 300-ton Derby was operat-

ing along the California coastline in 1807, at the same time as were
the Peacock and the O'Cain, with a hunting crew of 50 Aleuts and
25 baidarkas.

The Derby returned to

Novo~Arkhangel

'sk sometime in

1808 and then sailed for Canton, where it anchored on March 23, 1809,
and finally reached Boston on August 18, 1809. 205
Joint hunting ventures decreased between 1808 and 1810 when the
Winship vessels--the Peacock and
west via China and Boston.

~C~i!!_--were

returning to. the north-.

Only Captain George Washington Eayrs of the

145-ton Mercury contracted with the Russians in May 1808.

Eayrs who

had been extremely successful bartering with California natives for
pelts, represented the Boston merchant Benjamin Lamb. 206
From December 1808 until May 1809, Eayrs hunted with 50 Aleuts and
25 baidarkas in San Francisco, Todos, Trinidad, and Bodega Bays, 207
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In May, the Comisionado of Los Angeles, Francisco Javier Alvarado, sent
word for Eayrs to leave San Juan Capistrano where the crew had been
hunting since April.

Eayrs complied with the order and returned to
208
Novo-Arkhangel'sk shortly afterward with a cargo of 2,117 pelts.
By the fall of 1810, joint hunting efforts had been renewed;

three more contracted vessels--the O'Cain,

and Albatross-were operating just north of San Francisco at Drake's Bay. 209
Isabell~,

Jonathan Winship, Jr., who had returned to the Northwest on the O'Cain
in December 1809, contracted with Baranov to receive 50 baidarkas and
the necessary Aleuts to hunt. 210 The hunt began in November of the
following year in Drake's Bay.

From there, Winship sailed south to San

Quintin Bay and hunted through December.

By May 1811, the O'Cain was

back at Drake's· Bay and then sailed to the Sandwich Islands and Canton
to sell the harvest of 3,952 otter skins, 211
In June 1810, Captain William Davis of Boardman and Pipe of
Boston, contracted with the Russians.

Baranov was to supply Aleuts

and 48 baidarkas, and Davis the transportation to California on the
209-ton Isabella, 212 The Isabella made Bodega Bay its base from
the fall of 1810 until February 1811,

The Aleuts, supervised by

Tarakanov, hunted in the Farallones, Drake's Bay, and San Francisco
Bay.

In September and October, 12.Aleut hunters were captured
by Spaniards and imprisoned in the San Francisco Presidio. 213
Despite such conflicts with the Spaniards, the hunt was a success,
bringing in 2,976 otter skins. 214
In 1810, the Winship Family of Boston sent a third vessel to
participate in the joint Russian expeditions, the 165-ton Albatross,
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commanded by Nathan Winship,

In November 1810, Winship contracted

with Baranov for

50 Aleuts to be supervised by the Russian Lasseff
and 30 baidarkas. 215 Winship covered the California hunting grounds
thoroughly.

Parties hunted in the Farallon Islands in December 1810

and May and June 1811, in San Quintin Bay in December 1810, in Drake's
Bay from January until March 1811, and at San Luis Obispo at an underdetermined date. Winship harvested a total of 1,190 pelts. 216
During the month of November 1810, the Albatross, Isabella, and
the O'Cain were using Drake's Bay as their base of hunting operations.
BaiJ;darkas took provisions to hunters stationed on the Farallon Islands
and returned with furs.

(The Russian-American Company vessel, Chirikov,

was also anchored at Bodega Bay during this time, under the command of
Ivan Kuskov, see pp.78-9.).

The Bostonians harvested 8,118 skins but,
in Ba ranov 1 s words, 11 di d not return without a sma 11 1oss of men. 11217
While the Albatross, Isabella, and the O'Cain sailed for the
Canton market in 1812, Baranov negotiated the three final hunting
contracts to be made between Russians and Bostonians.

In November 1811,

Baranov contracted with William Blanchard of the 145-ton Katherine and
Thomas Meek of the 270-ton Amethyst.

Blanchard was given 50 baidarkas
and half as many Aleuts and Meek received 52 bairdarkas. 218 Blanchard

and Meek hunted in San Quintin Bay in June and July, harvesting 1 ,516
and 1,442 pelts, respectively. 219 Upon returning to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk
in the fall of 1811, Meek sold his vessel to the Russians. 220
The final hunting contract was made with Isaac Whittemore of the
Clarion, in 1812,
son of Boston.

Whittemore represented the merchant Patrick Jack-

Late in 1812, the Clarion sailed south to California,

leaving a hunting party of Aleuts on the Farallon Islands while con-
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tinuing on to San Quintin Bay,

Whittemore harvested 1,792 otter skins
which he sold in the Sandwich Islands in July 1813. 221 According to
Tikhmenev, the joint expeditions, operating off the California coast
in 1811, 1812, and 1S13, under Captains B1anchard, Meek, and Whittemore,
brought the Company 270,000 paper rubles. 222
Summary.

Both Bostonians and Russians alike profitt.ed from the

joint-contract system of hunting sea otters.

The Bostonians could

not have participated in the California hunt, without Russian help, in
the face of Spanish law enforcement and lack of hunting equipment.

The

Aleut hunter made it possible for Bostonians to establish a line of
hunting bases, removed from occupied areas.

Such bases included Bodega

Bay, Drake's Bay, the Farallon Islands, the Santa Barbara Channel Islands,
San Quintin Bay, Todos Santos Island, and Cerros Island, 223 The Boston
vessels were able to maintain a safe distance from the Spaniards who
had no means of sea travel.
To the Russians, the contract system meant the ability to participate in the hunt along the California coast at a time when they lacked
able vessels and finding new hunting grounds was essential.

Nikolai

Rezanov, who had arrived in Alaska to inspect the colonies after the
contract system was already in use, lent his approval to the joint expeditions.

It ensured the extension of hunting grounds and prevented

the Anglo-American monopolization of old and new grounds ... .-two conditions
which Rezanov viewed as necessary to the Company's survivai, 224 As
Langsdorff wrote, ''Thus did the Russi ans endeavour to supply their want
of ships and men, and to extend, by new means, the circle of their
valuable fishery for sea-otters. 11225
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Independent Russian Hunting Ventures in Californja
While the Russians entered the California otter hunt in 1803 with
assistance from Bostonians, Baranov also was determined to establish
an independent Russian hunting network and ''not to divide the profits
of this business with anybody. 11226 Independence required a permanent
Russian California hunting base, because of (1) the Spaniards' refusal to allow foreigners to enter their harbors for fresh provisions
and water and (2) the lack of sufficient and adequate vessels. 227
Ivan Kuskov was charged by Baranov to lead two Russian expeditions to
California to hunt sea otter and to find a suitable location for a
Russian settlement.

In October 1808, the first expedition was dis-

patched when Kuskov commanded two vessels southward (see also pp.
9).

77~

The Nikolai wrecked near the Columbia River, but the Kad'iak,

under Navigator A. Petrov, and a crew of
hunters, and 20

40 Russians, 130 Aleut

Aleut women sailed to Bodega Bay.

They remained

there for eight months, returning to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk on October
4, 1809 with 2,350 otter skins. 228
The second voyage was undertaken by Kuskov on the schooner
Chirikov.

Again, Bodega Bay served as the Russians' base while

Aleuts hunted in nearby San Francisco Bay,

These hunters, in

addition to those of the Albatross, Isabella, and , · g'Cain,
stationed in Drake's Bay at the time, alarmed California officials.
Soldiers reportedly were positioned at wells and springs, prohibiting the Aleuts from obtaining water until ''the party was compelled to
go away. 11229 Consequently, the Aleuts were sent to the Farallones
to hunt and gather a fresh supply of sea-lion meat.

They returned
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with 1,160 prime pelts and 78 yearlings. 230 The Chiriko~ left Bodega
on June 20 and reached Novo-Arkhangel 'sk on July 28, 1811.
By the time of Kuskov's third voyage in November 1811, Baranov had decided that Bodega--a hunting base much used by Bostonians
and Russians since 1808--was the appropriate site for a permanent
Russian settlement.

With 86 Aleut

hunters.~40

baidarkas, Kuskov

and his crew sailed to Bodega and began construction of Fort Ross
in the spring of 1812. 231 Shortly after construction begun, hunting
expeditions recommenced.

Whenever the Aleuts could be spared, they

were sent to hunt, going as far north as Cape Mendicino but rarely
further south than Drake's Bay due to Spanish resistance.

232

Sometime in the spring, Kuskov dispatched the 40 baidarkas to

un~

known hunting grounds.
The Farallon Artel,

The number of fur-bearing animals in the

waters north of San Francisco was relatively small; the richest
grounds were those under Spanish jurisdiction. 233 To compensate, in
1812, Kuskov dispatched a permanent party of hunters to the Farallon

Islands. 234 These islands, which had served as Aleut hunting grounds
under Bostonian supervision since at least February 1807, were located
15 miles southwest of Drake's Head.

The Farallones were barren and

provided a harsh existence for the Aleuts,
They are treeless and have only a bit of grass; the
largest of them is no more than three miles in circumference. They were created by volcanic action,
which is obvious from their characteristic barren~
ness, and the lack of minerals. Persons who live
there say that during storms the islands shake, and
one can hear a kind of moaning noise against the
breaking waves. The islands have no fresh water
or driftwood, consequently persons who stay there
have a very hard time sustaining themselves.235
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The number of animals taken from the artel was at first plentiful,
1 ,350 pelts annually until 1815. 236 But soon the otter population
diminished.

"Over the period of 6 years during the Kuskov administra-

tion, 8,427 fur seals were taken there [in the Farallones] ...

Later

this gradually decreased, and in recent years, not more than 200 to
300 pelts are taken there each year.''

By the early 1830s, only six

to ten Aleuts and one Russian remained stationed on the Farallones. 237
Russian-Mexican Hunting Expeditions
The Capture of Tarakanov's Hunting Party.

Although the Russians

were successful harvesting otters at the Farallon outpost, they found
that hunting along the Spanish coast could not continue on an independent basis.
because of

Attempts to extend hunting operations after 1813 failed
constant surveillance by Spanish officials.

was exemplified by the experiences of the Ilmen,

This problem

fo 1814. The Ilmen

sailed from Novo-Arkhangel 'sk to Fort Ross with provisions and 50 Aleut
hunters, supervised by Vasili Tarakanov. 238 Hunting north of San
Francisco had been unsuccessful because of native hostility, so the
party hunted for two days around the Farallon Islands.
were then ordered to enter San Francisco Bay.

The Aleuts

As Tarakanov recounts:

The Aleuts ... hunted all day, killing about 100 sea
otter, but when we went to the beach on the south
side [of San Francisco Bay] to camp for the night we
found soldiers stationed at all the springs who would
not allow anyone to any water. At this the Aleuts became frightened and started back toward the ship which
had remained outside [the Bay]. It was dar~ and some
wind was blowing and two baidarkas were capsized and
the men being tired with their 2~9s work, could not
save themselves [from capture].
The Ilmen continued southward to hunt, gathering 150 sea otters and
fur seals from the Santa Barbara Channel Islands. 240
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Spanish interference did not end with the
Wadsworth ordered 11

~'s

voyage.

In San Pedro,

Aleuts and

Tarakanov ashore to gather provisions
and there they were captured by Spanish soldiers. 241 The men were held

at the Santa Barbara Mission for two years before being released in 1816.
The Ilmen then returned to Fort Ross with a small catch of 392 pelts. 242
Ilmen again set sail in June 1815 and again met with Spanish resistance.

The commander of the expedition, Boris Tasarov, and 24 men were

arrested in San Pedro by Comisionado, Guillermo Cota. These men were
imprisoned in Los Angeles. 243 In September, the supercargo, John
Elliot d'Castro, four Russians, one American, and one Aleut were captured at Refugio.

Tarakanov was freed in November 1816 and returned

to Fort Ross aboard the Rurik, \vhile Elliot and Tarasov were freed
only after being taken to Mexico.

..
l

Other captives remained in custody
two to three years before release. 244
Failed Attempts to Negotiate with Spanish California,

Despite

Spanish opposition, the hunt remained profitable for the Russians.
Ludovik Charis reported in 1816 that the Russians harvested nearly
2,000 pelts annually which were generally sold to Americans. 245 Moreover, in 1818, over 120 additional Aleuts were sent to hunt along the
Northern California coast. 246 To improve their catch significantly,
however, the Russians needed unrestricted hunting privileges in Spanish
waters.
The Russians sought negotiations with the California government,
requesting hunting rights south of Drake's Bay,

The Russians proposed

to give the Spaniards one-half of their catch in return for harassmentfree access to Spanish waters.

In 1817, the Russians twice approached
/

California's new governor, Pablo Vincente de Sola (1815-1822), with
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this proposal.

Lieutenant Iakov Paduskin was received cordially by de
Sola sometime in the spring, but no concessions were granted. 247 While
in San Francisco in October, Lieutenant Leontii Hagemeister also contacted de Sola, outlining specifically a contract for joint hunting

expeditions.

According to Adele Ogden, historian of the California

hunt, Hagemeister offered:
"to furnish for the army at the very lowest prices
such things for which they may have need, 11 under the
following conditions. Aleutian hunters were to be
allowed to enter San Francisco Bay, All expenses of
hunting would be bourne by the Russian company.
Skins were to be divided equally between the Russians
and the Spaniards. The Spanish share of furs was to
be exchanged at contract prices for Russian goods.
Hagemeister reminded Sola that California Indians
were not skilled in sea otter hunting and that
neither skins nor goods could ever be obtained by the
Spaniards "with such convenience and with such small
expense. 248
11

De Sola

ag~in

refused the proposition, as he had received word from

Madrid in 1814 to limit manufactured and agricultural trade with the
Apparently de Sola interpreted these orders to include
denying the Russians permission to harvest 11 Spanish 11 pe1ts. 249
Russians.

Although Paduskin and Hagemeister failed to reach an agreement with
Governor de Sola, their negotiations established a precedent:

Sub-

sequently, a policy was implemented by Chief Manager Murav'ev calling
for all trade... missions to San Francisco to solicit permission to hunt
in Spain's California waters. 250 Semen Ivanovich Ianovskii, appointed
Chief Manager of the Alaskan colonies in 1818, continued this policy.
He sent Kirill Khlebnikov, with gifts and instructions to persuade de
Sola to form a commercial agreement.

The Governor received the Russian

and returned gifts, but his reply was standard:

it was not within his
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authority to grant foreigners permission to hunt. 251
Attempts to Negotiate Hunting Rights through Madrid.

Company

officials also sought resolution to their dilemma in Europe.

Hagemeister

presented the Company's circumstance to the Russian envoy in Madrid,
stating the need of "obtaining permission from the high Court of Spain
to hunt furs on the coast of California in company with His Catholic
Majesty's subjects on equal shares. 11252 Company officials further
petitioned Karl V. Nesselrode, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1815-1822),
in 1820, to secure the right from the Spanish government to hunt and
trade in California.

They even pledged to abandon the settlement at
253
Fort Ross in exchange for these privileges from the Spaniards.
~ere

were, however,

no

concessions from Madrid and the Russians' sit-

uation did not change while de Sola remained in power in California.
In a February 1824 instruction from the Main Office Murav'ev was encouraged to continue to hunt otter even

though negotiations for a
mutual agreement with the Mexicans had been unsuccessful. 254
Luis Arguello and Joint

Russian~Californian

Hunting Expeditions.

The governorship of Luis Arguello (1822-1825) resulted in a change in
California policy that favored the Russian-American Company.

Arguello,

a native Californian, shared the concern of his father for the welfare
of California, even if this countered official Mexican policy.

In

December 1823, he concluded an agreement by which the Russians were
permitted to hunt in San Francisco Bay. 255 The hunt was to continue
for three months--through
for that year.

March-~but

could be and was renewed quarterly

As a result of this contract, the volume of Company

fur catch increased substantially (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Sea otter catch off the California coast, 1812-1834. Based on computer analysis
of figures given in Kirill Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian America, 1817-1832, trans. and ann.
Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan {Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976),
pp. 108, 110-12 and Petr A. Tikhmenev, A Histor of the Russian-American Com an , trans. and
ed. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1978),
p. 227.
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Under the terms of this nine-point agreement, the Russians
were allowed to hunt with· 25

baidarkas in Spanish waters and all

profits and costs were to be divided equally between the RussianAmerican Company and the California government.

The Russians, how-

ever, were responsible for providing the hunters, supervisors,
vessels, and crew. 256 Even with these contractual obligations, the
joint hunting expeditions proved advantageous to the Russians.
catch, during this period, was higher than in other years.

Their

The

Company Board was pleased with the Mexican-Russian cooperation and
e .pressed hope that the expeditions would continue. 257 Similar
1

agreements were executed between the Russians and Jose Herre in
1825 and 1828. 258 These later hunts, however, proved less successful, as no baidarkas had been sent from Novo-Arkhangel 'sk and
the Ross settlement could provide only two. 259
Summary,

Even the relative success of the Mexican-Russian

hunting ventures, in addition to the productive hunt of the Farallon Artel, could not overcome the Company's interminable problem,
the steady depletion of hunting grounds,

The receding grounds had

been the continual nemisis of the Company, and California proved to
be no exception.

Within a period of ten years, the catch in the

Farallones had decreased dramatically and the decline in other

Cali~

fornia waters was just as visible--a 300 percent decline from
1812-1818 (see Figure 12). By 1835, the hunt in California had ceased
completely. 260 And by 1838, all Aleut hunters who lived at Fort
Ross had been re-transferred to Kad'iak Island, because the hunters
could be used more effectively in the northern settlements.

261
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In spite of its eventual failure, the hunt was the motivating
factor behind Baranov's decision to settle in Alta California, ·After
all, it was with more Aleuts than Russians that Baranov founded the
settlement. 262 And the one professed skill of the Aleuts was hunting
otter.
The intention of forming this settlement was to
pursue the chase of the sea-otter on the coast
of California, where the animal was then numerous, as it had become ext~6~ely scarce in the
northern establishments. L
Hunting could not remain the primary or only purpose of the Ross settlement, because:

(1) the decreasing value of pelts as an exchange cur-

rency; (2) the toll of the restricted hunt in California; and (3) the
number of fur-bearing animals off the California coast was, at least,
arratic and temporarily in decline.

These three factors were respon-

sible for the eventual elimination of Russian hunting operations in
California.
MANUFACTURING AT FORT ROSS
The Purpose of

Manufactur~

With the founding of Fort Ross, Russia succeeded in ''planting a
colony of her own" which would allow for the procurement of "provisions for supply of her northern settlements."

However, one obstacle

required rectification to assure that plan's fundamental feasibility.
The Russians' lacked sufficient Spanish currency or other acceptable
, exchange medium to procure food.

Trade in Novo-Arkhangel 'sk had been

conducted ''formerly for fur seals and other furs and lately for bills
of exchange [Spanish piasters and Russian rubles] payable by the MainAd-

rninistration.11264 Because of the diminishi~g supply of furs after
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1810, purchasing goods in Spanish California was instead ''done with
Spanish piasters and sometimes by barter for goods of Russian manufacture.11265

The precedent of exchanging Russian goods for California

foodstuffs was established by Rezanov, during his mission to Monterey,
in May 1806.

Langsdorff offered a description of this arrangement .

... [Governor ArgUello] dispatched messengers to all
the surrounding missions, desiring them to send corn,
flour, meat, salt, and other objects that we wanted,
permitting us, as we had not the means of paying for
them in money, to furnish an equivalent in the objects
of merchandise that we ·had to dispose of.266
This barter of Russian goods for grain between the missions and the
Russians remained the standard after the establishMent of Fort Ross.
An authoritative report by Khlebnikov, in the 1820s, re-enforced this
procedure with these words:
We re~eived supplies from [the missions] in payment
for all of this construction [of boats]; sometimes
these were loaded aboard ships which had come from
Sitka, and sometimes on those en route to Fort Ross. 267
The Economy of Spanish California and Manufacturing at Fort Ross
The Poor Production of Manufactured Goods in Spanish California.
The exchange of Californian grain for Russian manufactures was a transaction equally advantageous to the Russians and Spaniards.

Spanish

California was materially improverished, because it was denied trade
with foreign nations.

Simliarly, the Russian-American Company had

failed to provision adequately its Alaskan colonies with agricultural
goods.

The California missions were notorious for their inability to

manufacture.

For their own use, the missions managed to produce

"coarse woolen blankets, crude shoes, the leather parts of saddles,
soaps, candles and coarse pottery. 11

Generally, though, the Spaniards
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preferred to export raw

materials-~hides

and tallow, for

and purchase ready-made goods from foreigners.

instance~

Unable to process

tallow for soap and candles, the mission farthers. purchased these
goods in Peru and Chile.

Likewise, California leather was made into goods in New England. 268
The mission's inability to manufacture adequately was due to
the combination of native laborers' ignorance of European manufacturing
techniques and the inexperience of Spanish supervisors.

Vasilii

Mikhailovich Golovnin (1776-1831), participant in the circumnavigation
of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819, spoke to this issue in defense of native
competency:

11

if [the natives] could be taught by good craftsmen, they

probably would be the equal of Europeans. 11269
Lack of Currency in Spanish California.

The Spaniards further

benefitted from the barter with the Russians, because it was easier
to exchange grain--rather than currency--for badly-needed
goods.

manufa~tured

Tikhmenev explained the poor financial condition of the Spanish

colonies, particularly in the troubled times of the early nineteenth
century, in the following terms:
There was almost no money in circulation, aside from
a small quantity of coin which had been issued by the
insurgents and was supported by the Spanish government
until better times. It should be observed that only
the crown property in California was a herd of livestock which had been recently imported. Although the
missions, who used the labor of natives gathered under the pretext of converting them to Christianity,
had enough grain, most of it went to support these
natives or the soldiers stationed in the presidios.
Payment for the soldiers' food was also made in bills
of exchange drawn on Guadaljara. Thus little of the
food produced could be sold to passing ships.270
After the declaration of Mexican independence, the situation of the
currency became eve more desp,erate, " .. ,with the cessation of subsidies

128
from Spain everyone on salary was immediately impoverished. 11271
With the exception of agricultural goods, the Californians were in
great want and there was little currency with which to purchase
necessities.

It was this dire need in California for goods and the

increasing unavailability of currency that sealed the Californians'
association with Fort Ross from the settlement's inception.

''The

missions ... had constant intercourse with Fort Ross,,,. there were
uninterrupted relations. 11272
Agricultrual Production in Spanish California,

California's poor

econimic state of manufacturing was countered by a very successful
agricultural production. Golovnin wrote favorably of the missions'
ability to produce agriculturally in contrast to his report on
manufacturing.
The Spaniards had developed irrigated agriculture
to the point of producing a remarkable variety of
grains, 73getables, and fruits, and some wine and
brandy.2
In 1814, the governing board of the Company reported to Foreign Minister
Rumiantsev of California's agricultural wastefulness:

Grain produced at

the missions was going to waste and ten to 30 thousand head of cattle
were slaughtered annually due to overbreeding. 274 The Company wanted
to divert these unused foodstuffs to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk· and the
Spaniards' need for manufactured goods provided the opportunity.

The

mission fathers' lack of funds restricted them to purchase ''only iron
275
and simple tools worth. only 2,500 piasters annually."
Hence the
Russians were a most suitable trading partner.

Their grave need for

agricultural goods provided a convenient way for the Spaniards to ease
their own material dilemma.

California grain, a commodity available
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in surplusJcould be exchanged for Russian manufactures at Fort Ross.
Manufacturing for Spanish Needs.

The Russians manufactured

articles at the Ross factory that were well suited to the market of
Spanish California.

The greatest proportion of manufactures were

products pre-ordered by the Californian~ 276 Manufactured goods were
also shipped to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk, as the Russian colonies were also
in great want of goods, manufactured as well as agricultural.

Com-

pared to the missions' small industry, the Russians at Fort Ross
manufactured prolifically.
There was scarcely any article of wood, iron,
or leather which the mechanics of Ross could not
make of a quality sufficiently good for the California market and to the last they rece~ved frequent application from the Spaniards.27
The articles needed by the Spaniards were many, such as longboats,
wheels, leather products, cookware, construction materials (especially
lumber), tar and bricks. 278 Landsdorff reported in 1806:
The wants of New California consist of manufactured
goods, sugar, chocolate, wine, brandy, tobacco, iron
and iron tools, etc., and of these the Russian settlements [in the north] are no less in want, perhaps even
more, than the Spanish.279
Kotzebue's comments illustrate that the situation was fundamentally
unchanged nearly two decades later; in 1825.
The Spaniards often find Ross very serviceable to
them. For instance, there is no such thing as a
smith in all California; consequently the making
and repairing of all manner of iron implements here
is a great accommodation to them 5nd affords lucrative employment to the Russians. 28
The proximity of Fort Ross to the Spanish settlements made trade
convenient and it was valuable because the Spaniards obtained

badly~

needed manufactured goods and the Russians purchased agricultural
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produce.
Resources for Manufacturing in California

A comparison between Russian and Spanish manufacturing, in early
nineteeth-century California, illustrates that the Russians at Fort
Ross better utilized the abundant resources of Alta California than
did their Spanish counterparts.

Russian technology was more sophis-

ticated than that of the missions.

There is record of the Spaniards'

awe of Fort Ross' windmill "which found no imitators. 11281

.! .

As men-

tioned, the missions did produce some rather crude manufactured

l

articles, but attention was primarily directed to agricultural production which proved to be their vocation.

The articles produced at

the missions were only for Spanish use but, in quantity, fell far
short of satisfying even mission needs.
Earthen Resources for Manufacturing,

The land surrounding Fort

Ross provided the materials necessary for a number of manufactures,
high quality clay was used
and bricks.

by

A

the Russians to· make cooking dishes, tiles,

These bricks were shipped, in sizeable quantity. to Novo-

Arkhangel 'sk and were sold locally.
as materials for manufacturing.
suitable for making barrels,
(see pp, 131-33),

Redwood, pine and oak also served

Redwood was soft and malleable and thus·

Pine and oak were used in shipbuilding

The materials . of the Russtan River and the coastal

mountains were also used for manufacturing at Fort Ross.

These included

minerals such as granite, syenite, iron ore, obsidian, serpentine,
hornstone, and sandstone.

Varieties of sandstone were used to manu-

facture grindstones and whetstones. 282
Animal Resources for Manufacturing.

Animal products were also
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used in manufacturing to a greater degree by the Russians than by the
Spaniards.

Hides were tanned and dressed into good quality apparel--

shoes were especially well-crafted.
deer, and elk.

Suede was processed from goats,

This too was used to manufacture garments.

283

The

Aleuts used the intestine of sea lions to produce working garments,
that is, waterproof clothing for the hunt. Tallow from animals was
used to produce lard. and candles. 284

Ni~htlamps were fueled by

sea lion fat sent from the Farallon Artel. 285
Shipbuilding.

During the early years of Fort Ross (1817-1824),

the California oak and pine were used in the construction of Company
vessels.

At Port Rumiantsev, ''Kuskov built ... a shipyard where boats

[were] built. 11

Brigs constructed at Fort Ross were for Company use,

but rowboats or longboats were also manufactured and used in trade
with the Spaniards.

Baranov and Kuskov believed that the American

oak was ''excellent building timber'' for the construction of vessels. 286
Generally, the decks were constructed of pine, and sometimes the
skeleton of fur, but the keel and sternpost always of oak, 287 The
shipwright at Fort Ross was an "ordinary" prornyshl enni k, Vasili i
Grudinin, who learned the trade of shipbuilding in Novo-Arkangel 'sk
from the American, Lincoln. 288 Unfamiliar with the qualities of
the oak timber, Grudinin failed to water process the wood properly
and it quickly rotted,
.... [The] trees were cut and the lumber was used while
still unseasoned. During the construction period in this
mild climate, the moisture caused the wood to rot and the
ship was launched just when the rot set in. After three
or four years the changes of climate, of heat and moisture, caused the rot to increase in all the vital parts
of the 8~ip and there was no way to replace it by usual
means. 2
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Four Company vessels were constructed before the deficiency was detected,
the Rumiantsev, Buldakov, Volga, and Kiakhta.

290

When experience proved
291
the vessels faulty, construction was discontinued.
TABLE III
SHIPBUILDING AT FORT ROSS
Year
Constructed

Ship
Name

Type

Tonnage

Constructfon
Cost

Declared Unseaworthy due to rot

1818

Rumiantsev

brig

160 tons

20.212.63 r.

1823

1820

Buldakov

brig

200 tons

59.404.75 r.

1826

1822

Volga

brig

160 tons

36.186.54 r.

1827

1824

Kial<hta

brig

200 tons

35,248.36 r.

by 1833

Despite the failure of shipbuilding at Fort Ross, the experience, as remarked by Khlebnikov had one advantage:

It brought "a certain amount of

esteem among our inactive neighbors in Spanish California.

The Spaniards

were astonished at the activity, seeing the construction of four ships,
one after another.,. 1'
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Prior to the Russian's arrival in Alta Cali-

fornia, the missions in the San Francisco District were completely without vessels,

Langsdorff recorded his amazement in

1806~

Although the three missions of St. Francisco, Santa
Clara, and St. Joseph, all lie near the south-eastern
part of the Bay of St. Francisco, and a communication
by water, from one to the other, would be of the utmost utility, it se~ms almost incredible, that, in
not one of them, no, not even in the Presidency of
St. Francisco, is there a vessel or boat of any kind,,,
This total want of vessels, which are, as it were,
the keys to all southern and eastern possessions, is
a strong proof of the great negligence of the government, It was because they h~d not a boat themselvest
that, on the day of out arrival, they were obliged
to remain so long upon the shore, and were precluded
all c~~~unication with us tfll we sent our boat to
them.

133

In the 1820s, after the construction of the missions of San Rafael
(1819) and San Francisco Solano (1824), "the missionaries needed
sailing vessels for transport along the coast of San Francisco
Bay and came to ask [the Russians] to build ships for them. 11294
The Russians at Fort Ross again filled a gap in California manufacturing, constructing vessels-- rowboats or

longboats-~which

the

missionaries used to travel across San Francisco Bay. 295
The Mexican Confederacy, 1821-1836
In April of 1822, the Russian-American Company Board of Directors
inf~rmed

Chief Manager Murav'ev that Spain had relinquished control of

Mexico and California.

The founding of the Mexican Confederacy, which

had actually occurred in September 1821, invoked different reactions
from Company officials, on the one hand, and the Russian Imperial
government, on the other,

Company officials saw,as they had in 1808,,

the possiblity of opening free and regular trade between Monterey and
Novo-Arkhangel'sk.

Contrarily, Nicholas I was fundamentally opposed

to egalitarian·movements in any form.

He consistently refused Company

requests to consider recognition of the Confederacy, even though that
action was detrimental to the welfare of his colonies in North
America. 296 The Russian-American Company's unvoiced departure from
official Russian policy stemmed from the Company's confidence that
Mexico's secession from Spain would favorably impact trade relations
in North America, especially between California and Alaska,

The

board surmised that an independent Mexico would relinguish the
California territories of the Spanish interdiction on foreign trade,
because under Spain, California had been denied adequate provision-
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ment.
The belief of Company officials that the end of Spanish control over
Mexico would produce conditions conducive to the cultivation of trade
relations, between California and Alaska, appeared provident, as in
1821 foreigners were welcomed in California ports,

The first con-

stitution of the Mexican republic (1824) legally confirmed this
action, relaxing the stringent prohibtion on foreign trade in Cali~
fornia. 297 However, the Company's anticipated increase in the quantity
of supplies shipped to Alaska from California did not occur.

The

difficulty of obtaining supplies from California remained and, perhaps,
increased.

Fort Ross' proximity to the Spaniards and the ability to

trade using land routes had been advantageous to the Russians, because
Europeans did not have easy access to California,
ports, this advantage was negated,

With the opening of

In Tikhmenev's determination,

"The acquistion of food supplies in San Francisco and other neighboring
ports had become even more burdensome because of the newly arisen
competition. 11298
Mexican Independence and Manufacturing at Fort Ross
The period of Mexican control over California, in apparent paradox,
increasingly harmed the Russian sale of manufactured goods to California:
The opening of trade with California had been feverishly anticipated by
the Company as a means of satisfying their colonies' victual needs.
However, once the Spanish prohibition against foreign trade was lifted,
the Russians were forced to compete for the California market.

The

opening of ports allowed California a more extensive choice of goods,
it was no longer bound to the covert trade which had formerly been con-
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ducted with Americans, Britons, and Russians,

Vessels, traveling

from Europe, carried goods that could be sold more cheaply than those
manufactured at Fort Ross.

Thus Russian goods, once used to barter

for grain, decreased in value once trade was open.

Spanish requisi-

tions from Fort Ross decreased, as foreigners were able to undersell
the Russians with products of greater diversity, larger quantity,
and better quality:
... foreigners controlling the trade in California
have brought all the possible needs of the inhabi~
tants and supply them at such low prices that it
is no~ ~ossible for us [Russians] to compete with
them. 9
Khlebnikov's Proposal to Revitalize Manufacturing,

In his sur-

vey of Fort Ross in the 1820s, Khlebnikov suggested improvements and
additions to manufacturing that would allow Fort Ross to participate
once again in the expanding California market. 300 He believed that
the manufacture of goods to serve a local population would require only
minimal cost and effort.

Most significant was to be the addition of

woolen products.

Heretofore, woolen blank~ets had been exclusively
a mission commodity. 301 Khlebnikov proposed that the Russians assume
and refine this production.

The cost would be small, in Khlebnikov's

estimation, only 1000 sheep could provide a sufficient amount of wool
for this new industry.

Not only could blankets be manufactured, but

hats, coverlets, and harnesses could provide a handsome revenue from
California, exchangeable for grain. 302 The Ross settlement, however,
could not afford the manpower necessary to implement Khlebnikov's
proposals.

In the twenties, the Russians at Fort Ross started to di·

rect their labor resources toward agricultural production, to insure a
supply of food

no longer provided by the California trade.
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The Russians Turn to Agriculture,

The Russians lost much of a

valuable supply of grain with the opening of California's ports.

The

colonies could not do without this grain supply, even though it had
never fully met provisionment needs.

To solve this problem, the

Russians turned to agricultural production at Fort Ross.

The produc-

tion of grain, which had undergone only random experimentation under
Kuskov, was to be the settlement's primary focus after 1821.

Karl

Schmidt, whose managership concurred with the opening of ports, led
the Company away from manufacturing for the Spanish market; instead,
he was concerned with internalizing the market.

Husbandry and ship-

building became the dominant activities at Fort Ross, intending to
serve only the dorr.estic economy of Russian America.
Manufacturing did continue after 1821,
extensive.

It was, however, 1ess

The benefits of manufacturing remained satisfactory, al-

though the profits would never again reach the 6000 ruble mark as in
the past years~ The need for Russian manufactures in California per-

3

sisted.

This was exemplified in 1833, when Governor Jose Figueroa sent

Alfredes Vallejo to Fort Ross to buy arms, munitions, and clothing for
his soldiers. 304 It is likely, however, that these goods were not
manufactured at Fort Ross or even of Russian make, but purchased by
the Russians from foreigners. 305
Secularization of the Missions and the Decline of Manufacturing
The opening of California's ports to foreign trading vessels in
1821 was not the only decision of the newly-established Mexican government that dramatically altered the economic composition of Alta
California.

A high priority of the Mexico government was to destroy

the refuge of Spanish theocracy:

The mission, which was also the
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economic base of California--virtually the only producer of agricultural and manufactured goods--was targeted for secularization.
With its disintegration in the 1830s, manufacturing veritably disappeared.

Even the rudimentary products of the mission were lost

to secularization and the consequent disbursement of the mission's
communal, conscripted native labor force.

"Even such ordinary

articles as brooms had to be imported. 11306 The mission's tremendous agricultural production also declined.
The Mexican Cosmopolitan Company and Russian Manufacturing,
The Mexican government realized the economic importance of the mission
and thus created the Cosmopolitan Company to compensate for the projected loss.

The mission was not only a hated remnant of Spanish

imperialism, but also the locus of California's economic stability.
The Cosmopolitan Company was an attempt to reorganize and decentralize
the economic structure of California without losing the vital services
the mission had provided.

The Mexican government even hoped that the

Company would accelerate development in California,

The ·project, de-

vised in 1828, was similar in tone to Khlebnikov's plan of

establish~

ing a commercially viable manufacturing center in Russian California. 307
The Company would provide manifold services, for example, improvement
of trMnsportation, administration of farms, and establishment of trading
stations. 308 The Company's primary objectives were to increase domestic
agriculture and mining production, and concomitantly, to market these
products to foreigners and Californians.
In regard to manufacturing, the Company hoped to utilize efficiently
California's raw materials and sell these products through a central
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trading station.

ManufacturiTig was to be organized, as it had been

in the days of the missions, so that secularization could occur with
little change in California industry.

A director, assigned to a

specific factory was to administer, maintain, and supervise the labor
force, formerly the task of mission fathers.

In short, the Cosmo-

politan Company was to assume the functions of the missions so
that secularization could occur with little agitation to California's delicate economic situation.
However, the Cosmopo)itan Company was short-lived and failed to
fulfill its intended purpose.

Secularization did occur in 1834

and,as anticipated, the economic structure of Mexican California
fell into ruins.

More political upheaval followed and, in 1836,

California declared autonomy from Mexico.

A series of petit revolu-

tions occurred, attempting but never achieving, political stability.
As power ricocheted from one ranchero leader to another, the neglected
economy worsened.

The Spaniards' irrigated system of agriculture,

which sometimes yielded 40-fold and produced a 11 remarkable variety of
grains, vegetables, and fruits, ... disappeared with secularization. 11309
The Russian-American Company was rapidly losing the mission as a oncevalued trading partner and, in addition, the need to maintain a post
in California.

The Californians still could not produce the man-

ufactured goods that had opened a market to

th~

Russians, but neither

could they produce the agricultural goods which were the objective
gain of manufacturing at Fort Ross.

139

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
179 VPR, Ser. II, 7, Doc. no. 349, 122-23.

In this Correspondence

of the Main Office to Petr Chistiakov, the directors stated that even
though the Ross settlement is at present useless, it should be left as

is for the time being in case Russia recognizes Mexico.
180 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 210.
181 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 83. Rubles, used for transtions in Novo-Arkhangel 'sk, were first issued to the Company in 1817
in the amount of 12,000 r·ubles. In 1822, rubles (30,000) were again
i·ssued to the Russian-American Company administration.
182 Tikhmenev, History, p. 152.
183 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 110; and Adele Ogden, California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848

(Berkeley:

Univ. of California

Press, 1941), pp. 63-5.
184 Ogden describes the contract system in detail in Sea Otter
Trade, pp. 45-57. See also Appendix F.
185 Baidarkas are native canoes, made of seal skins sewn together.
They have one, two, or three round openings for oarsmen.
186 Ibid., p. 45.
187 Ibid., p. 46.
188 Baranov dreamed of creating a great Russian commercial empire
in the North Pacific.

See John Wm. Stanton, "The Foundations of Russian

Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1847-1875, 11 Diss. Univ. of California

140
(1932), p. 485.
189 For accounts of Kolosh hostility, see Tikhmenev, History,
pp. 65-6.
19 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," III, Pt. 3, 12; Tikhmenev,

°

History, p. 68; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 46.
191 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 47; and Arrill~gato Iturrigaray,
Loreta, Californias, (March 2, 1804), Vol.. 50, No. 8.
192 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 47.
193 Loe. cit.

--

194 Oliver Kimball and Joseph O'Cain were brothers-in-law.
195 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 60; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 46-48;
and William Dane Phelps, "Solid Men of Boston in the Northwest," pp. 4,
15; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 110.
196 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 49.
197 Ibid., p. 51; and Phelps, "Solid Men," pp. 21-22.
198 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 60; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 51; and
Tikhmenev, History, p. 110-11, 121.
199 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 52.
200 Arrillaga to Luis Antonia Arguello, Santa Barbara Provincial

I
I
I
~

I
I

I

Records, 12 (February 14, 1807), 269. In Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 49.
201 Rodriguez to Arrillaga, San· Diego, Provincial State Papers, 19,
(June 23, 1806), pp. 136-68; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 50.
202 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 50; see also Appendix F.
203 l..bid.., p. 50.
204 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. )4; Ogden, Sea Otter
Trade, p. 50; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 112-13.

-;

141
205 See Appendix F for the portsvisited by the vessels hunting
operations.
206 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 52.
207 Ibid., p. 52-53.
208 Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," pp. 14-15.
209 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.
21 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Khlebnikov, "Letters on

°

Amer i ca , 11 p. 15 .
211 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 53-4
212 John Ebbets to John Jacob Astor, Macao, John Jacob Astor
Collection; (January 11, 1811), Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 53.
213 Arrillaga to Francisco Javier de Venegas, Monterey, Provincial
Records, 9 (October 20, 1810), 125; Luis Antonia Arguello to Arrillaga,
San Francisco, Provincial State Papers, 19 (November 26, 1810), 28081.

214 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.
215 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; Khlebnikov, "Letters on America, 11
p. 15; Phelps, "Solid Men, p. 52; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, 53-4.
216 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 54.
11

217 Aleksander Baranov to Astor, Sitka, Astor Collection (August
13/15, 1811); and Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 129.

The Albatross had

harvested an additional 74,562 otter skins while not under contract
with the Russians.
218 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 56-7.
219 Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Khlebnikov, "Letters on
America,

11

p. 15.

142
220
221

Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 57.
Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 84; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 57,

i64.

222

p. 113.
223

Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 272; and Tikhmenev, History,

A complete identification of

~own California

hunting grounds

can be found in Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, Chapter IV.
224
Bolkhovitinov, Beginnings, p. 272. Lutke stated that

11

of some

assistance in this pursuit [of extending hunting grounds because of
decreasing animal numbers in Alaska] were the California sea otters,"
"Diary," p. 36.

References to the policies of Rezanov, directed toward

checking encroachments of foreigners in the North Pacific can be found
in Bancroft, History of Alaska, p .. 481; Kenneth W. Porter, John Jacob
Astor (Cambridge:

Harvard, 1931), I, 171-72, 180; and Tikhmenev,

Hi story, p. 91.
225
226

227
228

Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 221.
Lutke, ·11 Diary, 11 p. 36.
Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 57.
Khlebnikov, Baranov, p. 70; Khlebnikov, "Letters on America, 11

p. 16, 204; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 58; and Tikhmenev, History,
p. 133.

229

Khlebnikov, "Letters on America," p. 205; and Ogden, Sea

Otter Trade, p. 51.
230
231
232

Ibid., p. 59
See Chapter III, "The Founding of Ross," pp. 72-74.
According to Khlebnikov, the Aleuts also surreptitiously hunted

in San Francisco Bay when Russian boats were allowed to enter for trade
of food and merchandise, Colonial Russian, p. 105-07.

143
233 Sec fl_gure ·12 which indicates that the number of sea otters

caught was minimal except during a period from 1823 to 1826 when the
Russians contracted with the Spaniards and before the animal popula-

tforn had been completely depleted. Golovnin stated that, in 1818,
Aleuts were sent for otters "which are found between [Cape Mendicino]
and Trinity Bay [Trinidad] though not in great numbers," Voyages,
p. 162.

In California, the slaughter of fur-bearing animals began in

mid-October when the animal's pelt reached its full thickness and
length. See Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.
234 Khlebnikov~ Colonial Russian,_ p. 123.
235 _Qf_.
L

Cl"t •

236 _Qf_.
L

Cl"t •

237 _.Q.£.
L
"t
£]__.

238 Tikhmenev, History, p. 135.
239 Frojll Vasili Tarakanov's "Statement," reprinted in Ogden, Sea
Otter Trade_, p. 60.
240 See Appendix F; and Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, p. 61.
241 Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 87-8; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade,
pp. 60-1, 165.
242 _Q£.
L
"t
g_.
243 Bancroft, History of Alaska, pp. 493-4; Ogden, Sea Otter Trade,

p. 198.
244 Ibid., p. 62.
245 Ludovik Charis, Voyage pittoresgue autour du monde, (Paris,

1922) . Pt. 3, p. 8.
246 Golovnin, Voyages, p. 162.
247 Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 64, 168.

144
248 I,...,.

•t

~· ~.

249 Jose. Luyando to Calleja, Madrid, (February 4, 1814), 52-6-6-9.
25 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 110.
251

°

Ogden, Sea Otter Trade, pp. 64-5.

252 Ibid., p. 65.
253 Company officials in St. Petersbur~ however, were unaware that
an agreement had finally been concluded, three months earlier, between
Murav'ev and the Californian.
254

Khlebnikov, "Survey," p. 8.

255 Jose Arguello was Governor of California in 1814.
256 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 110-12.
257 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
258

VPR, Ser. II, 7, Doc. no. 349, 122-23.

259

Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 113.

260

llllil. ' pp.

8' l 08' 123.

261 Blomkvist,"Russian Scientific 11 p. 164 n .. 29.
262

Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 107.

263 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 121; Golovnin, yoyages, p. 166, and Lutke,
"Diary", p. 35.
264 Khlebnikov·, "Survey," p. 8.
265 Ib"d
_1_.' p.. 7 .
266

Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 718.

267 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
268 Bean, California, p. 70.
269 Golovnin, Voyage, p. 150.
270
271

lkhmenev, History, p. 141.
Zavalishin, "California in 1824," p. 386.

145

272 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, pp. 115, 131, 134.
273 Bean, California, p. 70.
274 VPR,

seriia pervaia, tom sedmoi, ·

Doc. no. 280, pp. 695-97; trans. Basi Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. CrownhartVaughan.
275 Tikhmenev, History, p. 141.
276 Ibid., p. 227.
277 Smith, Janice Christine, "Pomo and Promyshlenniki:

Time and

Trade at Fort Ross, M.A. thesis, UCLA, (1974), p. 27.
278 Bean, California, p. 647; and Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 123.
·279 Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 184.
280 Kotzebue, Voyage, p. 123.
281 Ibid. p. 126 and Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.
282 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 126.
283

Ibid., p. 122.

284 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
28 5 l.b..i.d... , p. 123.
286

Golovnin, Voyages, p. 166.

Arkhangle'sk.

There was also a shipyard at Novo-

The wood of spruce, larch, and cedar were used in the

construction of both Company vessels and rowboats.
287

l.b..i.d..., pp. 166, 170, n~

7.

288 l.b..i.d... ' p. 166; Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116; Lutke,
11

Diary p. 31.
289 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
290 Golovnin, Voyages, p. 166; Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian,
11

,

p. 116-117; and Lutke, "Diary", pp. 6, 31.

146

291 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 117.
292

lnr

~.

•

Clt.

293 Langsdorff, Voyages, pp. 187-188.

294 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 116.
295 Gibson, "Russia in America," p. 210; Khlebnikov, Colonial
Russian, p. 137; and Tikhmenev, History, p. 141.
296 Under Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, the decision for free
trade in California ports was finalized.

It was proposed that

open trade would bring prosperity to the heretofore neglected colony,
but would further make California appealing to hispanic emmigrants
and thus promote colonization. See Hutchinson, California, p. 87.
297 Gibson, "Russia in California," p. 210; and Tikhmenev,
History, p. 121-123.
298 Bancroft, California, p. 16.
299 Smith, Pomo, p. 28.
3 oo Kh1ebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 127.

301 Golovnin reported that Kuskov intended to manufacture woolen
products but, perhaps, this never came to be. Golovnin, Voyage, p. 166.
302 Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian, p. 128.
303 Loe. cit.
304 Bean, California, p. 70.
305 Loe. cit.

306 Loe. cit.
3o7 Hutchinson, Frontier, p. 198.
308 Ibid., p. 201.
309 Bean, California, p. 70.

CHAPTER V
HUSBANDRY AT FORT ROSS
AGRICULTURE
Russia's two-and-a-half centuries of eastward expansion was completed with the acquisition of coastal Alaska.

The mercurial growth

of the empire slowed, as gee-political contraints appeared, and generally abeyed as expansion perforce assumed qualities of predesign and
calulation.

The Company's primary concern turned from the extension

to the stabilization of its possessions.

The addition to Company

holdings of Alta California and the Sandwich Islands signified this
new phase of planned expansion.

Their annexation was a response to

the difficulties encountered in the process of stabilization or
co 1oni za t ion

of previously claimed territories.

California and the

Sandwich Islands were viewed as panacean territories, possessing the
resources necessary to maintain the Company's North American holdings.
Both regions were loci of

nineteenth~century

commerce and, perhaps less

critical at the time of acquistion, they were salubrious environments
conducive to abundant agricultural and animal husbandry. 310
The Purpose of Agriculture
Resolute agricultural endeavors were slow to be introduced at Fort
Ross for a variety of reasons.

Initially, the Russians were concerned

with the construction of the settlement and the continuation of sea
otter hunting off the California coast.

By 1813, agriculture (or, more
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appropriately, gardening) had commenced, 311

Yet this effort did not

reflect an attempt to produce on a large scale for the northern colonies,
as would be undertaken in later years.

Rather it was domestic agri-

culture, intended to enhance the quantity and variety of food available
to the inhabitants of Fort Ross.

Not until 1818 was there a sizeable

effort directed towards the production of agricultural surplus.

In

that year, the Russians increased the amount of seed planted andJconcomitantly, the amount of acreage farmed and diversified to include
the sowing of barley in addition to wheat. 3) 2 From this point on,
large-scale agriculture production became the dominant concern of the
Ross Counter.
Factors Hindering Agricultural Production at Fort Ross
Agriculture at Fort Ross had several unique problems as well as
those common to the overall Russian colonizing effort in North America.
Production was especially hampered by labor

shortages~-in

terms of skill

and number--a problem encountered at other Russian American settlements.
Specific to Fort Ross was the difficulty of producing in the unfamiliar
and inhibitive climatic conditions of coastal California,
Initial Priorities at Fort Ross.

Initially, the Fort Ross site

was to have several functions, agriculture not being of the highest
priority.

It has been suggested that the site was chosen primarily

for its defensive features which proffered protection against Spanish
and native resistence. 313 It is also clear that proximity to harvesting grounds was of major concern to Kuskov, the person ultimately
responsible for the selection of the site,

The Russians' choice of

locale was somewhat limited due to the possession of the coastal lands
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to the north and south by the English and Spaniards, respectively.
But the area of Fort Ross did present the oppotunity to establish
a Russian foothold close to San Francisc·o, an increasingly important
commercial port of nineteenth-century colonial trade.
The fact that the Fort Ross site was chosen for purposes other
then agriculture resulted in serious problems for the Russians when
they decided to primarily focus on raising crops and livestock.
The farm sites at Fort Ross were characterized by physical and climatic
conditions! conducive to no more than irregular agricultural success,
especially considering the inexperience of those who worked the land.
Farm sites situated close to the sea were subjected to the thick fog
which blanketed the coast in the summer months. 314 Farming inland was
conducted in the mountainous regions of the North Coast Range and these
mountainous settings provided little accessible land
negatively influenced grain production.

and~

thus,

One of the Company's influential

employees, Khlebnikov, described Fort Ross various farmlands as follows:
"There are mountain slopes near Fort Ross, sometimes level areas, and
sometimes hills and meadows ... Obviously the flat meadow areas are the
best for agriculture, and the further from the sea they are, the better
they are hidden from the fog. 11315 Wrangel, Chief Manager of the RussianAmerican colonies, who inspected the Counter in 1832, at a time when
much of the farming was done inland {on the eastern slopes of the coastal
mountains) in an attempt to avoid the devastating fog belt, described
Fort Ross' farmlands as:
... very few and ... small patches on the slopes of. hight
steep hills accessible only on foot or on horseback, so
that, having overcome cultivation of t~i6 steeply mountainous plowland with no little labor.
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To remedy the problem of farming these lands, with no access for conventional plows, the Russians ''employ[ed] Indians to break up the
earth with spades. 11317 Igor Chernykh, an agronomist stationed at
Fort Ross (1836-1838), described the impracticality of Fort Ross
as an agricutlural settlement in an 1836 letter to a former

teache~

r·Pavlov1 at the Moscow School of Agriculture:
A few words about the unfavorable location of Ross
for the pursuit of agriculture. The purpose of Ross
was initially the hunting of otters and the building
of ships. Ever since the sea otters were depeleted
and the timber was found to be unsound for ships, the
original object of the settlement has changed. Now
they pay attention to it in terms of agriculture;
but the site does not answer this purpose so much:
the closeness of the sea, and from this the heavy fogs,
which produce the plant disease called rust are almost every year the cause.of the meager harvest. The
high mountains, covered with huge trees and cut by
deep, steep ravines, leave a very limited amount of
land for agriculture.318
Farm Sites at Fort Ross,

The Russians farmed near the fort andat

eral ranches in California.

se~

The inventory attached to John Sutter's bill
of sale in 1839 described four areas at which farming occurred. 319
(1) Garden sites located within 3500 feet of the fort itself claimed
70 acres of arable land suitable for the production of·grains, two
orchards with a combined total of 554 fruit trees, and a vegetable
garden, 490 x 140 feet.

(2) The Khlebnikov Ranch possibly located

near the present-day town of Bodega Corners, had "sufficient" farmland, suitable for the production of "beans, corn, tobacco, etc.,"
but apparently no land suitable for.the production of grain. 320
(3) The Kostromitinov Ranch, located midway between Rumiantsev Bay and
Fort Ross on the coastal trail near the portage of the Russian River,
had "about 100 acres of cultivated land" suitable for the production of
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of wheat.

(4) The Chernykh Ranch, located on the Klebnikov Plain, had

20 acres of cultivated land, but the "larger part of the land is suitable for corn, beans, onions, chili, etc. 11 and not grains.
Problems of Native Labor.

In addition to mediocre natural resources,

human resources for agriculture were also limited.

It had been often

recorded that the agricultural labor force--primarily Southwestern
Pomo natives--was insufficiently experiencect. 321 While it is true that
the Pomo were not farmers--their sustenance relied on the foods proffered
by the immediate environment (they harvested foods from the sea and wild
grains further inland)s-native ignorance of European agricultural techniques was less an inhibitive factor to agricultural success at Fort
Ross than were the conditions under which the natives labored and the
inexperience of their supervisory personnel.
Initially, the natives living near Fort Ross came voluntarily to
work for the Russians with little compensation. 322 As time passed,
however, this relationship changed, because of the extension of farming at Fort Ross without a correlative increase in resources.

The

Russians needed more labor to meet the agricultural goals of provisioning the northern colonies set by the Company,

This was unlike the early

years, when there had only beena modest amount of farm work to be done
and Kuskov "cultivated only a small area,'' because of a shortage of
"the labor necessary'' to farm. 323 From 1813 to 1817, only 42 puds of
grain were planted and 87 harvested, a task manageable by the available native laborers, employing nineteenth-century farming techniques. 324
Whereas, from 1823 to 1827, 233 puds were planted and 4093 puds from
1818 to 1822.

The increase in agricultural production required more

farmhands or more time from the existing laborers.

And since additional
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laborers were not available, the Russians demanded much more from their
Pomo workers. 325 Wrangel described the difficult work required from
workers after cultivation was moved (in 1821) to the slopes of the
coasta1 mountains:
... after harvesting there remains the extremely
difficult and slow work of hauling the sheaves on
shoulders to the threshing floor or to such places
whence they can be conveyed by horses.326
Russian Forced Labor System.

The Russians had instilled in the

Pomo a new understanding of labor value--labor in exchange for wages.
When the Pomo first came to Fort Ross and worked voluntarily with the
Aleuts, Kuskov was compelled to reward their labor in kind. 327 These
gifts increased the natives'
the Russians.

~pect~tions

of their labor

relation~ ~ith

But the Russians were unable to compensate the natives

in accordance with the increased demand for labor.

In the 1820s, the

Russians resorted to forceful conscription of native labor, introducing
a system of restitution which veritably tied the natives to the settlement by penalizing them for unsuccessful harvests. 328 Natives were
denied their freedom if a crop failed and were forced to atone that
loss by providing additional labor for the Russians.

In concurrence with

the increase demand for laborers, there was a decrease in the number of
natives choosing to participate in Russian farming.

The increase in

native resistance is not surprising considering the institutionalization
of this forced-labor system,

This developed resistance on the part of

native workers) was more an impediment to successful agriculture than
was native ignorance of agriculture.

Wrangel reported his concern, in

1833, of the conditions under which the natives labored.

He encouraged

Russian "humanity" to remedy this OOijust method of labor recruitment.
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... [Because] of the bad food and negligible pay the
Indians have stopped coming to the settlement for work,
from which the Factory found itself forced to seek them
in the tundra~ attack by surprise, tie their hands, and
drive them to the settlement like cattle to work: such
a party of 75 men, wives, and children was brought to
the settlement during my presence from a distance of
about 65 verstas [43 milesJ·from here, where they had
to leave their belongings without any attention for
two months. It goes without saying what consequences
there must be in due course from such actions with the
Indians, and will we make them our friends?329
Russian Supervisory and Agricultural Inexperience.

The inexperience

of Russians, who served principally as supervisors, was more a hindrance
to agricultural development than the inefficiency of native workers.

The

supervisory personnel, that is the Russians, determined the type of crops
to be planted, the acreage to be used, the time planting and harvesting
would occur, and the methods that would be employed to that end.

In

1833, Wrangel spoke to the fact that the managership of Fort Ross did
not necessary presume agricultural knowhow:
... the Manager of the Factory himself, who supervises
agriculture here, has never had any experience whatsoever in these matters: consequently, in all fairness
should it be surprising that with great local difficulties and without the benefit of practical experience
agriculture has been reduced to the mediocre condition
in which it is now found.330
Russian Company employees had little agricultural experience, but also
promyshlenniki arriving
in America, ... consist of all kinds of riffraff. 11331 John Sutter re-

limited enthusiasm.

As Wrangel commented,

11

•••

called the response of Russian officials to his request to retain
Company employees as his own:
I wanted some'of the Russians to remain with me as hired
men, but the officers told me I could do nothing with them,
that they could hardly manage them and that they were sure
I could not be severe enough.332
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Since the availability and skill of labor was important to the

reali~

zation of agricultural goals, the inadequate labor supply should have
been a consideration at the decision-making level.

But this level, and

detrimentally so, was infused with an ignornace of agriculture as well
as management.
Russian Unfamiliarity with California s Growing Conditions.
1

Agriculture developed poorly, because of the paucity and obstinancy of
native and Russian

worker~

supervisory work force.

coupled with the incompetence of the

The agricultural ignorance of Russian super-

visors was intensified by the Russians' unfamiliarity with the particular growing conditions of Alta California.

Khlebnikov reported that

because of 1ack of experience, cultivation was fi"rst begun on the hill sides close to the sea where the fog caused considerable crop damage. 333
11

11

Igor Chernykh, a Moscow-trained agronomist, reverently noted his
astonishment at the dissimilarity between climatic conditions of Alta
California and his native Russia.
Moving from the winter and the blizzard of my homeland
to a country of eternal summer, I was astonished at first
by the unusual change of climate; in late October [early
Novemberj when in much of Russia the entire plant kingdom dies; here, on the contrary, everything comes to life;
it arises from the rains, which begin at this time and
signify winter. The rain mostly continued until the month
of March. April, May and June--these months can be called
blossoming ones: at this time all fields and mountains are
adorned with luxuriant flowers and form an inimitable picture. Especially at this time is the heart imbued with a
reverent feeling toward the Perpertrator of Life!334
1 ,

Exhaustion of the Soil in Russian California,

Despite the

natural productivity of northern California, Russian agriculture developed poorly.

The limited land, poorly managed, quickly lost its

ability to produce effectively.

In the 1820s, Khlebnikov reported,
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in some places the soil is good chernozem, in other places it is

sandy but it is equally fertile everywhere. 11335 However, by 1833,
the nutrient value of the land was apparently already greatly diminished.

Chernykh reported in 1836 that future prospects for

agriculture were poor due to the condition of the soil.

Wrangel

speculated that poor farming techniques in Fort Ross' early years
were responsible for the exhausted condition of the land.
Perhaps with the introduction of intercropping and
other auxilliary means the fields would not have depleted so quickly, and with the improvement of threshing ~nd winnowing they would not have lost so much as
now.336
Chernykh reported in 1836 that future prospects for agriculture were
poor due to the condition of the soil.
The Land that could be cultivated [at Fort Ross] has
for long been continously sown with wheat, and despite
this yields are sometimes extraordinary; I think that
the reason for this is that here slime forms from the
chernozem year round, except for 2.. 3 month.s. But the
exhaustion of the soil is already noticeable.
The exhausted, abondoned land goes to weeds, and it
is impossible to replace it with new land as well as to
destroy the weeds because of the shortage of hands for
plowing at the time when they could be destroyed,--all
this together greatly worries me.337
The possiblity of Fort Ross serving as the Company's food producer, its
11

granary, 11 seemed bleak and this was the outlook after two-and ... a-half

decades of additions and improvements.

GRAIN PRODUCTION AT FORT ROSS
The production of grain was the most important agricultural pursuit
at Fort Ross.

This is measured by the emphasis afforded its improve-

ment and development.

Grain was a basic necessity for survival in the

Russian-American Company colonies,

It was difficult to purchase or to

transport from Europe and, hence the most indespensible crop to be pro-
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duced at Fort

~oss.

The amount of wheat and barley--the principal

grains of Fort Ross produced, quantified and charted:-visibly breaks
into six distinct periods (see Figure 13).

These periods of grain

production at Fort Ross vary from three to five years and each is
characterized by a short-term trend, generally definable by circumstances particular to Fort Ross at the time.

Overall, the first

three periods of production at Fort Ross constitute a trend of
long-term growth, but periods four and five show production in decline.

The information available for the final period is scanty,

but it is apparent that production increased from the preceding,
unproductive period.

From 1813 to 1825 (oeriods I to III), the

rate of growth is 82%; whereas, from 1826 to 1835 (periods IV and
V), there is a negative growth rate of approximately 6.7%.

The

trend of the final years was positive, increasing 50% through 1841.
It should be noted that the increase in absolute production numbers
did not necessarily constitute agricultural development inasmuch as
yields were subject to large fluctuations throughout the years at
Fort Ross (Compare Figures 13 and 14).
Period I:

Production at Fort Ross, from Founding to 1817

Minimal Agricultural Production.
'

'

The minimal amount of grain

production at Fort Ross through 1817 accurately reflected the limited
resources the Russians directed toward agriculture at that time.
Farming existed only on a small scale:

in total, 42 puds of wheat

were planted before 1818 on acreage within 3500 feet of the fort
proper.

The increase in production of wheat was high, 25.9%, but

this was due to the annual increase in the amounts sown.

Actually,
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the yields were meager, averaging 2.16-fold annually.

The total
production of wheat during this period was only 90 puds. 338
Factors Limiting Agricultural Production.

Before 1818, the

Russians were less interested in converting Fort Ross to a large-scale
grain producer than continuing to harvest sea otters which, "during
the Kuskov administration, accounted for 1200 to 1500 pelts annually.11339

Early in 1818, Golovnin ranked the importance of hunting

over agriculture and manufacturing, remarking that Kuskov does not
11

lose sight of his main business--sending out hunting parties for
otter. 11340 Morever, Golovnin referred to grain cultivation as an
activity of low priority.
As an experiment, Mr. Kuskov tried some grain cultivation,
but for lack of workers and necessary equipment, and possibly du~ to in~~~erience, the yield did not live up to
expectations ...
Hence, agriculture had several detractors in the early years.

The

Russians, not initially intending to create an agricultural settlement,
expended resources on several productions.

Manufacturing and hunting

drained the already deficient supply of native labor.

Thes~

pro-

ductions assured a dependable profit in Spanish California; pelts and
manufactured goods could be exchanged for mission grain, whereas
agricultural prospects at Fort Ross were, at most,

uncertain~

Prior to

1818, it was unreasonable to risk directing full attention to agriculture, with only modest resources of knowledge, labor, and equipment
and perforce averting attention from profitable industries.
The ability of the Russians to undertake large-scale agriculture
may also have been hampered by the effects of disease which struck the
native populations, reaching epidemic proportions between 1815 and
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1822. 342

Included in the destructive rage of the disease, possibly

measles, were the Southeastern Pomo who served as Fort Ross• principal
farmers.
It is difficult to assess what impact if any the outcome of
agricultural pursuits, during this period, had for future policy at
Fort Ross.

Russian efforts and results were minimal, reflecting

the dearth of resources.

Clearly, agriculture was attempted only

as a sideline; gardening was an integral part of the settlement,
but large-scale agricultural production was not a primary focus of
Company labor.

In the early years, it seemed that the expectation

of Fort Ross as a granary was non-existent.

The introduction of

farming followed a general pattern, discernible in the early Alaskan
and Asian

colonies~

Gardening

b~gan

in conjunction with the

settlement; a predictable correlation as there existed no reliable
source of provisionment in such remote outposts~ 343

It may be that

instituting agricultural production on a scale sufficiently large
to supply the Russian colonies was a goal originally slated for the
Ross settlement.

However, it was not its foremost purpose as

agriculture was subordinated to the needs of hunting and manufacturing, which provided the easier means to obtain grain from the
Spaniards.
Period II, 1818-1821
The Promise of Agricultural Development.
sitional

iri

The year 1818 was

Fort Ross' agricultural development.

tran~

There was a per-

ceptible change in attitude as agriculture assumed a greater importance among the activities of Fort Ross.

Its development was no longer
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subordinated to the interests of hunting and manufacturing.

This

change in attitude is discernible both in communications from Company
officials and in actions undertaken by the Russians at Fort Ross.

Foreshadowing a trend toward stabilization of the colonies through
regulation of provisions, Baranov, in 1817, ordered Kuskov to
"increase grain cultivation" covertly,, without arousing suspicion from
the Spaniards. 344 Kuskov acted accordingly, introducing barley
of which 12.7 puds were planted.

Additionally, he doubled the amount

of wheat sown, from the previous year, to 46.7 puds.

Consequent to the

larger amounts of seed sown, the amount of acreage cultivated was increased substantially.
Factors Limiting Agricultural Development,
this second period were justly rewarded.

Russian efforts during

Although the rate of produc-

tion slowed to 18%, the yields doubled to an average of 4.05 per year. Yet
these improved

results were hardly sufficient to justify Fort Ross'

conversion to an agricultural settlement alone.

Though the number of

fur-bearing animals was in decline, hunting continued to be a profitable
industry.

Manufacturing for the illegal California market also remained
an important concern, providing a dependable income of grain. 345
Throughout this period, therefore, hunting, manufacturing, and shipbuilding continued to siphon resources away from agriculture.
In addition to hunting and manufacturing, shipbuilding was
especially significant, making its appearance in 1818.

The Company

decided that the Fort Ross site was convenient for the construction
of vessels for the Company fleet.

Four vessels were built in the

seven years from 1817 to 1824 and this was a considerable drain on the
available labor force (see Chapter IV, pp.

131-32)~
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The Russians' inability to produce in sizeable quantities resulted
from several factors other than diversification of activities. 346 First,
an epidemic which struck California natives in 1815 continued until
1822 and cfrcumscriOOd the available work force.

tance was the fact that the
near the ocean.

~ussians

Also of great impor-

continued to cultivate farmland

The coastal farmlands were subject to heavy fogs, high

winds, and low temperatures.
tion significantly:

These elements diminished grain produc-

Fog frequently resulted in stem rust, which at

times destroyed an entire crop. Low temperatures and high winds reduced the rate of plant growth.
Despite these inhibitive factors, the production trend of this
period was positive.

Although it did not result in a large production

of grain, it indicated to Company officials that there existed potential for Fort Ross to serve as the colonies' granary.

This pro-

gress prefigured the growth of the third production period (1822-1825)
in which this trend would continue, only more dramatically due to the
decline in hunting and manufacturing and the impending disappearance of
shipbuilding.
Period III, 1822-1825
Agricultural Prosperity at Fort Ross.

The period from 1822 to 1825

constituted the most successful period of agriculture at Fort Ross.
This was in large part due to the transfer of leadership from Kuskov to
Karl

Schmid~,

management.

in 1821, who effected a number of changes in agricultural
The trend of improvement, initiated

by

Kuskov, continued

under Schmidt (1821~1824), but tmprovements were considerably more
radical.

In 1821 Schmidt Schmidt introduced private fanntng and moved
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Company farm operations inland. 347 These were

the principal factors

creating this period of prosperity in which wheat production increased,
in absolute figures, at the phenomenal rate of 62.9%.
were supplemented by natural forces.·

These factors

In 1B22)the rage of disease which

had killed countless natives. subsided.

This enabled the Russians to

have access to a larger and healthier supply of native laborers.

For

this reason, it was a practical time for the Russians to turn their
full attention to improving agriculture.
Factors Facilitating Agricultural Production.

The cultivation of

mountain lands, removed from the restrictive farming conditions of the
coast, proved a provident decision by Schmidt.

Yields immediately in-

creased, averaging 7.85-fold and were recorded as high as nine-fold.
Farming the sloped east of the North Coast Range, while hampered by
limited accessibility, avoided several of the aforementioned problems
related to coastal farming, namely thick and prevalent fogs, strong
northerly winds, and low temperatures.
crease the acreage sown each year:

Schmdit also managed to in-

42 additional acres in 1821,

315 in 1823, and 679 in 1825.
In addition to increasing Company farm holdings, Schmidt introduced private farming among Company employees (see Figure 14).

He

encourage Aleuts and Russians to produce on land which was leased
to them by the Company. 348 Such private farming accounted substantially for the tremendous jump in production during this period.

On their

private land, the inhabitants of Fort Ross duplicated the less-than-satisfactory results of.Company agriculture.

The Company 1 s average yield

was 5.543-fold, whereas the private sector produced, on an average,
5.547-fold.

But the aggregation alone, of private and Company farming,
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in 18J1.)

12

u

14

15
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doubled the amount of grain harvested annually.
The changes implemented by officials at Fort Ross after 1821
evidenced that agriculture had assumed a position of relative importance
to the Company.

It had become the object of long-range planning. Such

concentration on agriculture was perhaps necessitated by the failure of
other productions at Fort Ross.

First, the market for, and thus the

production of, manufactured goods virtually disappeared after the openinj of California's ports.
1824.

In addition, shipbuilding was terminated in

These failures freed resources for agriculture.

The change in

manufacturing, however, may have been more concomitant than cause of
the intense agricultural expansion after 1821.

The true motivation

may have been the changing political atmosphere in California, outside the Russian possessions.

More precisely, 1821 saw an end to

Spanish sovereignty over California and the Russians had the chance,
to the dismay of the United States, Britain, and Spain, to expand
their holdings and establish agricultural settlements in the midst
of the ensuing political confusion and instability.
Period IV, 1826-1830
Agriculture in Decline at Fort Ross.

The agricultural prosperity

brought about by Schmidt's innovations--inland and private farming-continued throughout his tenure as manager and is undoubtably his
most notable contribution to the settlement and the Company.

Unfortu-

nately, after his departure, the innovations and improvements waned
and the healthy trend he helped install continued for- only the first
year of the following administration.

Although the absolute harvest

figures continued to increase in 1826 and 1827, the yields actually
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decreased by one-half,

And this occurred even though the acreage was

doubled from 1825 to 1830.

From 1828, this negative change was apparent

in the reversal of grain production.

The absolute figures declined

28% in ·a three-year period (1828-1830), a loss of 1,667 puds per year.
The decline is even more drastic than the absolute figures indicate,
because the amount of seed planted was increased substantially throughout the period.

In 1826, the seed planted doubled, from the previous

year, to 203 puds.

And each year, during the period, the seed sow

was increased considerably, a total increaseof 43% from 1825 to 1829.
The quantity of barley sown remained fairly constant.

Despite the in-

crease in the quantity of seed planted, the wheat harvest increased only
once, to 5.3-fold in 1827.

Subsequently, the yield decline one-fold

per year. 349
Factors Responsible for the Decline in Agriculture,

Searching for

explanations for the sudden halt of the prosperous trend in wheat production is frustrating.

Manufacturing was already greatly reduced in

1821 and this should have freed labor to agricultural pursuits.
Additionally, in 1826, there was a startling decline in the number of
fur-bearing animals taken by Aleuts hunters.

In 1825, 1 ,550 pelts were

harvested, but this number fell to 755 in 1826, and 302 in 1827, and
35
one in 1828.
From 1829 on, the catch stabilized at 200 to 300

°

pelts annually.

Agriculture was apparently the most important occupa-

tion of the Ross Counter.

Since this sudden and temporary change in

production was comprised of only four years, its causes maybe
able.

und~tect

However, violation of the land, coupled with agricultural mis-

management, may provide a defensible explanation for the failed production.
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Physical factors should certainly be considered when seeking
explanations for the decline in production.

The depletion of the

soil at Fort Ross' farm sites, due to inferior farming techniques,
is well-documented. 351 The scarcity of arable land led to the annua1
sowing of any available lands.
the land of nutrients.

Yearly cultivation quickly drained

In the early 1830s, the condition had become

desparate and Wrangel reported to the Main Office that the plowland
"does not return to seed, and should be abandoned, 11 because the soil
"has now already lost its strength. 11352

Chernykh, who introduced a

two-field system of agriculture, described how agricultural mismanagement had led to the current condition of Fort Ross' plowland:

11 The

land that could be cultivated has for long been continuously sown
with wheat, ... the exhaustion of the soil is already noticeable. 11353

A climatic impediment, which intensified the damage caused by the
poor soil, was stem

rust~-a

problem common to coastal farming (see

p. 149).

The poor yields in 1826 and 1830 can be partially attributed to this phenomenon. 354
The Failure of Manaaement.

The mismanagement of agriculture during

this period was the failure to remove agriculture from the rust-prone
coastal mountain tracts, within the confines of the Ross Counter, which
had returned so unfavorably.

While it is true that farming at these

sites had continued for only a short time, perhaps nihe years, the
fact that no ulterior lands were cultivated during the administration
of Paul I.

Shelekhov (1825-1829) may explain the diminished production.

Under the last two managers of Fort Ross, Petr S, Kostromtttnov Ll8301836) and Aleksandr G. Rotchev (1836-1841), the virgin lands east of
Russian California, were cultivated and yields correspondingly tripled
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from three.- to nine-fold.
The failure to expand agriculture during this crucial period was
more a function of the onerous Company bureaucracy than simply the
mismanagement of Shelekhov.

In fact, Shelekhov was well aware of

the need for additional plowland.

He reported in 1822 that land was

scarce because of the small size of the settlement and its dual use
for agriculture and animal husbandry.

He did expand agriculture as

much as possible within the confines of the settlement.
amount of grain planted was increased.
wheat sown was doubled to 860 puds.
acreage.

Each year the

From the 1826 to 1829, the

Inferabl~

there was an increase in

By 1828, the Main Gffice was aware of the soil exhaustion

and the need for more farmlands at Fort Ross.
not result in a corrective action.

But this cognizance did

No additional land was cultivated

outside the fort until 1830 when Ferdinand Wrangel became Chief Manager
of the Russian-American Company colonies and the like-minded Petr
Kostromitinov was appointed Manager of fort Ross.

Together they in-

troduced the necessary improvements to rejuvenate Fort Ross' agricultural
production.
Period V, 1831-1834
The Wrangel Period.

Ferdinand Wrangel, "one of the best governors

[Chief Managers] of the colonies,'' was important to the reascendance
of agrtculture in the early 1830s.

He had come to govern the colonies

for five years--taking leave from the Imperial Navy--and was determined
to "adjust" and correct the economy of
11

view, was

11

11

Ru~sian

America which, in his

the most neglected in the colonial administration~ 355

Wrangel apparently felt that agriculture at the Ross Counter was not

l
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producing at its potential and,following an inspection in 1832, he
\

suggested that expert help from the Moscow School of Agriculture could

\:.

help Fort Ross meet its goals.

!.

. .. It is best to ask the Moscow [Agricultural] Society
for sensible advice in order not to incur expenses in
vain and uselessly lose time besides.356
The Society obliged vJrangel, dispatching Igor Chernykh, a graduate of

.,,
\

that institution, to Fort Ross in 1836.

1~

•
~

Petr Kostromitinovfrthe Chief Manager Wrangel demonstrated a willingness and an ability to implement measures needed to rejuvenate
Fort Ross' sagging agricultural development.

Soon after his arrival

at Fort Ross, Kostromitinov opened new lands for cultivation.

He

began to farm uninhabited river valleys such as those of the
the easternmost border of Russian California, the Avancha, and the
Rotchev Rivers. 357
Factors Facilitating the Improvement of Productior.

The deterio-

rating political situation in California allowed the Russian to cultivate lands outside the immediate vicinity of the fort.

Kostromitinov

founded two ranches, the Khlebnikov and Kostromitinov, as was the trend
in California's overall land reorganization.

The ranches were founded

at a time when hundreds of ranches were being established by Spanish
settlers on land recently unlocked by secularization of the missions.
It is probable that Wrangel and Kostromitinov decided to avoid arousing
Mexican suspicion by creating these private ranches, minimizing their
association v1ith the Russian-American Company.
The argument that the decline in agricultural production during the
Shelekhov administration was caused by the cultivation of overused lands
close to the fort is bolstered by the immediate change in the fifth

'
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period.

Utilizing new lands away from Fort Ross, which constituted

only one-half of the previous acreage, resulted in a dramatic jump
in yield and absolute production figures.

The Ross Counter even

increased production in 1831 and 1833 despite an epidemic of disease
which killed many nearby Indians and incapacitated Russian Company
employees, and thereby limited the amount of available labor.

The

yield was nearly ten-fo1d in 1832 and nine- and eight-fold in the
succeeding years, an anomalous showing for agriculture at Fort Ross.

358

Phase VI, 1835-1840
Final Attempts to Increase Agricultural Production.

From 1832

to 1834, the absolute production rate climbed nearly 6% and the yields
were also high.

There was no indication that the subsequent years,

from 1835 to 1837, would show the poorest yields of grain since Fort
Ross' founding.

Each year the crop failed.

There were corresponding

crop failures in California in 1835, 1836, and 1837.

In 1835, pro-

duction at Fort Ross fell sharply, 53% from the previous year.
1836, another 14% reduction occurred.

In

Finally, in 1837, the harvest

began to show signs of rejuvenation and, in fact, it continued to
improve for the next few years.

It is possible that as much as 5500
puds of grain were produced at Fort Ross from 1833 to 1841. 359
Production would, however, never again approach the pre-1835 figures.
Igor Chernykh Attempts to Improve Aariculture at Fort Ross.

The

early 1830s had seen considerable improvements to agriculture, but
these proved ,ineffective as well as costly.

In 1836, the Company

received the assistance of agronomist Igor Chernykh, who surveyed Fort
Ross' farm sites and made further improvements.

His most valuable
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addition to agriculture was the introduction of a ''mobile Scottish"
threshing machine; an improvement suggested by Wrangel in his 1833
report. 360 Heretofore, threshing was done by horses as described by
Wrangel:
... 30 or more [horses] are mobilized in an enclosure covered
with sheaves, from which the kernels are disloged by the running hooves. By this method th~6 thresh 900 sheaves per day
with 40 horses under 8 drivers. 1
Chernykh admitted some quirks in his device ... -"owing to the stubbornness of the workers in the face of this innovation and the
unfamiliarity of the horses with circling. 11362

Not completely

satisfied with the initial product, Chernykh hoped to correct
the machine to adequately serve Fort Ross' needs.
The machine built by me is entirely wooden, except the
coaks the bearings, which are rr.ade from iron; the cams on
all wheels, as well as the teats on the gears, are of hard
laurel; the conveying cylinders are also laurel. It is
set in motion by two horses; the drum with six beaters
makes 180 revolutions per minute, which are insufficient,
as I noted from experience; it can thresh up to 700 large
sheaves in 10 hours; but with the help of 4-5 men and 4
horses (·wh.ich are replaced every two hours) it threshes
from 350 to 550 sheaves per day ...
It is impossible, of course, to avoid defects with the
first construction of this important and rather complex
machine. Next surmner [1837] I intend to correct the
mistakes noted in my mg§hine, and I shall try to build
another wooden [one].3
Chernykh further attempted to improve agricultural production by introducing new grains to the site, principally English Oats and Himal,:_:·afan
rye.

Both yielded well. In addition, a final ranch was founded--the

Chernykh Ranch--in 1836, somewhere on the Khlebnikov Plain.

It had

two hotbeds, an estimated 50 acres of cultivated land, and a floor
for winnowing. 364

l . . . ... ". ... ' .
~
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The Company's Decision to Abandon Fort Ross.

The abject fail-

ure of agriculture in this final period destroyed any hope that
Fort Ross' agricultural mission could ever succeed.

Chernykh's

commendable efforts, in the face of California's first recorded
crop failures, did not convince the Company of the possiblity of
transfroming Fort Ross into the colonies'

11

granary.

Fort Ross had

11

rarely been able to satisfy more than a modicum of Novo-Arkhangel'sk's
needs; in fact, there were years in which Fort Ross could not produce for itself.

It is difficult to determine precisely how much

grain was needed annually to feed the Alaskan colonies.

Yet the

amount produced at Fort Ross, 800 puds per year, was a quantity
far short of satisfying the colonies' needs•! 365 Khlebnikov esti11

mated that "from 12,000 to l5,000 puds" annually would meet provisionment needs of the colonies, apparently those of Alaska and Irkutsk. 366
The agreement made between the Russian-American Company and the
Hudson's Bay Company in 1839 provided the colonies with 14,000 puds
of grain annually, inferably the least amount required to feed
Alaska.
Thus, the Hudson's Bay Company was willing to provide the Russians
with the provisions necessary to maintain their Alaskan possessions,
a quantity far above that ever produced at Fort Ross.

The

Ross Counter never sent more than 5000 puds to Novo-Arkhangel 'sk in a
given year, and the average figure was much less--1650 puds per year
from 1826 to 1840. 367 Even the amount of grain exported from Fort
Ross, combined with the amount of grain that could be purchased from
Spanish California, never approached the figure needed to sustain
the Company colonies.

From 1826 to 1833, the combined amount of grain

l . .. . -· . -. -· . .
~
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(wheat and barley) destined for

Novo~Arkhangel'sk

exceeded 12,000 puds

perhaps once, in 1832, when an estimated 12,185 puds were exported.·
The average shipment during those years, however, was much less:-8455
puds--only 60% of the quantity guaranteed by the Hudson's Bay Company
agreement.

This agreement, consequently served the final blow to the

existence of Fort Ross as an agricultural settlement.

That purpose

could be served better through other means, with less inconvenience
and political complication.

Fort Ross was abandoned in 1841 and this

signified an imporatnt retreat of Russian political involvement in
North America.
GARDENING, ORCHARD ING, AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
Gardening at Fort Ross
11

Gardening was i'nitiated by Kuskov who 1 ikeq to garden.
He planted
melons, squash, and pumpkins. 368 In "a good year 800 melons [were]
11

harvested. 369

11

Khlebnikov reported' that Kuskov:

Always had a surplus of beets, cabbage, turnips~
radishes, lettuce, peas and beans, Radishes and
turnips grow unusually large, but they are not
flavorful, He supplied all the ships that put in
here with vegetables, and he frequently pickled
beets a9d cabbage and sent a large amount to
Sitka.3 0
The cultivation of fruits and vegetables at Fort Ross was conducted on a
small-scale, relative to grain production.

Wrangel noted this in his

1833 report:
I do not mention gardening and orcharding at Ross
because neither one nor the other brings the Company profits and should remain pursuits of private
persons only.371
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That fruit and vegetable crops did not return a profit was not due
to any inability to produce in the 1820s; the Russians produced these
crops abundantly.
The land [of Ross] produc~many plants in great
abundance. In his kitchen gardens, Mr. Kuskov
grows cabbage, lettuce, pumpkins, radishes, carrots, turnips, beets, onions, and potatoes. Even
the watermelons, melons and grapes that he introduced recently, ripen in the open air. The vegetables are very tasty and sometimes reach extraordinary size ... 372
Kotzebue commented in a similar vein:
... plants of the warmest climates prosper surprisingly. Cucumbers of fifty pounds' weight,
gourds of sixty-five and other fruit7 in proportion, are produced in [gardens].3 3
Potatoes yielded especially well at the Ross settlement.

Golovnin

reported that ''in Fort Ross the usual yield is a hundred to one, and in
Port Rumiantsev 180 to 200 to one, and they are planted twice a year .. 11374
Kotzebue believed that the potato would serve as an effectual security
against famine, 11 especially since two crops could be planted each year,
one in March and one in October. 375 The production of such crops, how11

ever, declined as the Russians concentrated on grain production.

Khleb-

nikov, who toured California in 1825 and 1829, reported that the harvest
of potatoes was no more than 6 or occasionally eight-fold. 11376
11

Gardening at Fort Ross was conducted almost entirely in the immediate vicinity of the settlement.

Within 3500 feet of the fort there was

a hotbed and apparently the only permanent Company vegetable garden in
Russian California; it was 490 by 140 feet. 377 There was little gardening at the ranches, although land at the Chernykh and Khlebnikov ranches
was "suitable" for growing vegetables and the Chernykh Ranch had one

1
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hotbed in 1840.378
Orcharding at Fort Ross
Orcharding at Fort Ross was quite extensive.

Near the fort itself,
379
there were two orchards, the larger was 385 by 133 feet.
There was
a third orchard (and vineyard) at the Chernykh Ranch. 380 The Fort Ross
orchard was started during the Kuskov administration, in 1814, when fruit
.

trees were brought from San Francisco aboard the sloop

~01

Chirikov,~u

From 1817 to 1829, vines were introduced from Lima, peach trees from
Monterey, and the Company shipped 100 cuttings of apples, pears,
cherries, peaches, and bergamots. 11382
11

By the time the Russians departed from California, the ochards and
vineyards had grown considerably.

The larger Fort Ross orchard con-

tained 534 fruit trees, including apple, peach, pear, quince, and
cherry trees and 11 some 11 vines. 383 The smaller orchard had 11 20 fruit
trees, and also some vines.

;1384

In 1841, at the Chernykh Ranch, the
vineyard boasted some 2000 plants in addition to some fruit trees. 385
It appears that the Russians were quite capable of producing vegetables

and fruits in California.

But, as this production was not as essential

as grain cultivation, Company officials, such as Wrangel, preferred
that expansion of orcharding and gardening be undertaken only by
private individuals or, in other words, not at Company· expense.
Animal Husbandry at Fort Ross
Animal husbandry at Fort Ross shared several characteristics of
the settlement's agricultural development.

It suffered from the

proximity to the ocean, enjoyed a heightened significance beginning in
1821, showed a steady rate of improvement throughout the 1820s, and

-

I
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produced an output insufficient for supply of the northern c~lonies. 386
Yet the information available on the operations of animal husbandry at
Fort Ross is relatively small.

Hence it is difficult to determine if

stock-breeding had years of dramatic failure as did agriculture.
Judging from the on-hand information and the nature of stock-breeding1
generally, it seems that animal h.usbandry at Fort Ross enjoyed a
gradu& and continual appreciation, in terms of the number of head of
cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs tended (see Figure 15).
I

·-

The Russians'

initial attempts at stock-breeding were more promising than those of
grain cultivation, which ''did not live up to expectations. 11387
ovni n •:s

Gol ..

comments attested to the high expectations for stock-breeding

at Fort Ross:
.~.[Kuskov] also raises cattle, and there is no
doubt about success here, for abundant pastureland,
water, and year-round grazing make it possible to
maintain large herds with a small number of people.
At present he has 10 horses, 80 heard of cattle,
up to 200 sheep and over 50 gigs. All these animals
are in very good condition.388

Factors Hindering the Development of Animal Husbandry:
Land for Grazing,

Limited

There was little land in the immediate vicinity

of Fort Ross for grazing, as "not one piece of suitable land near
the settlement was left uncultivated. 11389 The land of Fort Ross
is pasture and actually better suited to grazing than the production
of grain. 390 But the emphasis on grain production made stock~breeding
difficult during Fort Ross' early years when husbandry occurred only
near the fort.

As Wrangel noted in his 1833 report:

The mountainous site and the forest pose an insurmountable obstacle to the considerable propagation of cattle in the vicinity of the settlement. From July to November or December the
cattle are scattered 20 versta [13~ miles] on
)
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all sides, seeking grass that in summer fades
from the sun and is plucked by the cattle in
the vicinity of the settlement.391
The lack of grazing lands forced livestock to wander far from Fort Ross
in search of pasture and thus supervision was difficult:

11

•••

it is

impossible to carefully tend the cattle and, being driven twice a day
from distant places to the barn for mi1king, the cows tire and give ...
little milk. 11392 The animals were also vulnerable to predators--natives,
bears, and wildcats.
of pasture. 393

Other fell from cliffs while wandering in search

Insufficient Labor to Supervise Herds.

The undersupply of labor

intensified the problem of supervising the dispersed herds.

Khlebnikov

reported that only "two Russians, Aleuts or Indians looked after the
livestock. 11394 In his view, these circumstances made animal husbandry
unprofitable and unworthy of development during the Kuskov administration.

But the progress made during Kuskov s managership should not be
1

overlooked.

Kuskov initiated animal husbandry in 1813 when he received

"several horses and horned cattle form the mission and from the inhabitants of San Francisco. 11395 The animals were brought to Fort Ross by
11

officers of the presidia of San Francisco who, as Kuskov testified,
thought that the Russians did not know how to milk cows, sat down under
them and showed how it was done, 11396 From September 1817 until October
1821 the number of head of stock at Fort Ross increased nearly five
times, to 1037 head of cattle, horses, and sheep. 397
The Development of Animal Husbandry after 1821.

Animal husbandry

exhibited a significant change in 1821, concurrent with the Russian's
resolution to develop agriculture substantially.

From the time of the

Schmidt administration through 1841, livestock showed a steady growth
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rate, resulting from the natural propagation of herds coupled with the
addition of grazing lands within Russian California,

In the immediate

vicinity of Fort Ross (within 3500 feet of the fort) there was one corral
(196 feet x 140 feet) and two cattle barns of "thick planks" (140 feet x
24.5 feet). 398 A French traveler, La Place, came to Fort Ross in 1839
and remarked! " ... In every respect Ross can be called the livestock farm
of the barren Russian colonies in the Pacific. 11399

In 1833, the

Kostromitinov and Khlebnikov Ranches were founded and each is listed as
having a corral, but there is no reference to the type or size of herds.
Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan noted, .. however, of the
Vozhensenksii sketch of the Chernykh Ranch, "the entire front of the
picture is given over to fenced-in stockades for cattle ... It is possible
that cultivated land is shown in the slope behind ... " (see Figure 11). 400
The Inability to Supply Novo-Arkhangel 'sk
Fort Ross was better able to -produce meat than grain for Russian
Alaska, although the quantiti,Ies of meat were still short of those
needed to completely satisfy colonial requirements.

Novo-Arkhangel 'sk

annually required 500 puds (or 28,900 lbs.) of salted beef to feed
Company employees. 401 Fort Ross required another 300 to 400 puds
(or as much as 14,445 lbs.). 402 In Wrangel's estimation, 2,250 head
of horned cattle could satisfy the needs of Fort Ross and Novo-Arkhangel 'sk without depleting the herd, ''but because of the

smallnes~

of the

place, up to 2,000 head altogether should not be allowed ... 11403 Herds
grew tremendously during Fort Ross' last decade (82% from 1833 to 1841),
largely due to the addition of ranches with pasture and facilities
for stock-breeding.

Yet even with such improvements, there were still
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only 1700 head of cattle at Fort Ross at the time of its sale. 404
So, while Fort Ross did supply Novo-Arkhangel 'sk with much-needed
beef, the quantities were inadequate.
provided 48,893 pounds

Through 1822, the Ross settlement
of meat to the northern colonies. 405 This

averaged to 4,889 annually, or 2,000 pounds less than _the quantity
needed.

Tikhmenev recorded that, in the last 15 years that the

Russians held Fort Ross, approximately 6,000 puds of beef were exported to Alaska. 406 This averages to 400 puds (or 14,444 lbs.)
annually, 100 puds less than the settlement required.
In conclusion, the Ross settlement showed considerably more
success in stock-breeding than in producing grain.

Fort Ross could

meet its own needs and still provide one-half of Alaska's beef provisions.

However, the Hudson's Bay Company could offer the Russians a

greater supply of meat than was ever produced at Fort Ross or purchased in California.

Just as it had guaranteed the Russians more

grain than they could produce in California or provide through circumnavigation and traditional transport methods (via Kamchatka), the
1839 agreement promised the delviery of 922 puds (33,293 lbs.) of
beef per year and an additional 92 puds (3,322 lbs.) of ham. 407 This
quantity of meat was sufficient to supply Alaska's needs of 28,900
pounds per year, but not the additional needs bf Fort Ross.

Since

Russian California was able to provide for its own needs, in terms of
meat and grain, Fort Ross could have been rnaintained--as a self-sufficient entity--had the fort and its surrounding ranches been deemed
valuable for reasons other than offering a source of supply for the
northern colonies.

Once relieved of the responsibility to provide
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for those colonies, the Russians were not interested in determining
if Fort Ross could have operated without loss, as there was no
attempt to hold the territory.

With the guarantee of provisions for

Alaska, the Company without hesitation rid itself of the burdensome
settlement.

Negotiations for the 1839 agreement were held between

Wrangel and Sir George Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Company in
Hamburg in 1837. 408 By the spring of 1838, the Main Office petitioned
409
That
Nicholas I for permission to withdraw from California.
April, the Emperor approved the Company's request.
There was no doubt as to the priority of the Hudson's Bay Company's
promised provisionment over the retainment of Fort Ross.

The imminent

abandonment of Fort Ross was made more certain when John A. Sutter,
who purchased the Russian settlement in 1840, agreed to make payment
in drafts to the Hudson's Bay Company for the cost of foods for Russian
Alaska. 410 Through negotiations ···with the British and a Swiss colonizer, the Russians succeeded in providing a dual safeguard against starvation in the northern colonies.

Since the Russians own attempts to

produce food met with only marginal success, there was little purpose
in maintaing a settlement.

The food cultivated at Fort Ross, in

addition to the dwindling foodstuffs obtainable in California, was not
sufficient to meet the needs of Russia's northern colonies.

These

failures, to purchase and produce, resulted in increasing financial
losses.

But the failures were more concomitant to than cause of the

Russian's decision to abandon Fort Ross.

The change in California's

political direction under Mexico and the subsequent disintegration
of her agricultural productivity, left little for California to offer
!

1
I
I

l
I

~

i,

the Russians, other than political imbroglio.

And this changing
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political structure, which was the cause of California's decreased
agricultural productivity, was the deducible reason for the end of
Alta California as a Russian colonial possession.
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CHAPTER VI
THE RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM CALIFORNIA AND THE SALE OF FORT ROSS
The Russian Withdrawal from California
The viability of the Russian annexation of Alta California was
a serious consideration for some Russians despite the Counter's continuous financial losses and its inability to provision Alaska.

It

was the intention of some Russians to retain a foothold in California
and expand that possession if the political circumstances permitted.
Two individuals, in particular, advocated such a position, expounding
the advantages that the California region could offer the Russian
Empire.

They were Lieutenant Dmitrii Zavalishin (1804-1892), a nine-

teen-year-old Russian naval officer, and Ferdinand P. Wrangel, sixth
Chief Manager of the Company colonies.

The plans proposed by these

men came at different times in the history of Russian California, but
both were contigent to the political climate of California and its
relation to the Russian Empire.
Zavalishin's Proposed Russian Annexation of California, 1824.
Dmitrii

Irinavkhovi~h

Zavalishin participated in the Russian voyage of

the Kreiser (1822-1825), under the command of Mikhail Petrovich
Lazarev, which wintered in California in 1823-24. 411

At that time,

Zavalishin witnessed the gross political instability of California,
as the Mexican party, composed of off1cials based in the town, clashed
with the pro-Spanish supporters of the missions.

He realized the
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consequent ease w;th which Russia could annex, "by force of arms,"
California and the "magnificient port of San Francisco Bay, the
favorable climate, and the rich soil--all eternal and immutable
conditions. 11412

But because the forceful conquest of California

could lead to retaliation from both Great Britain and the United
States, Zavalishin devised a peaceful scheme for the Russian take. 413
over o f Ca 11'forn1a.

The Order of Restoration.

The focal point of Zavalishin's

plan for annexation was an independent California that could be easily
manipulated by the Russians.

To that end, Zavalishin created the

"Order of Restoration" which would supposedly "spread enlightenment,
support human rights, and purge troubled minds of Europe."

In

actuality, it would support a California independent of Mexico under
the guise of Russian intention to restore California to Spain, so
that Russia could itself expand into California.

Initially,

Zavalishin approached the Mexican faction with his idea, but quickly
found rejection.

He then proceeded to contact the pro-Spanish

missionaries, advising them to secede from Mexico with the &mperor's
414
Zavalishin
backing as head of the Order of Restoration.
succeeded in persuading Father Jose Altamira of the San Francisco
Mission to accept the plan, but failed to win the essential support of
Governor Arguello.

Consequently, ArgUello was toppled from power,

with the assistance of Altamira, and replaced by Governor Noreiga,
a missionary supporter.
At this critical juncture, Zavalishin was recalled to St.
Petersburg where, in November 1824, he presented his proposal for
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annexation and the Order of Restoration to Aleksandr I.

The proposal

was handed over to a conservative committee which rejected it on the
grounds of impracticality.

Zavalishin, however, was determined and

submitted his scheme to the Directors of the Russian-American Company.
Company officials were more enthusiastic about the plan, because the
Company could make considerable gains from its imple~entation.

415

Zavalishin was then asked by the Company to facilitate Company expansion in California as the Manager of Fort Ross and possibly Chief
Manager of the colonies.

This suited

Zavalishin~

In case our government did not agree to annexing this province, there still remained a way of defending itself against
encroachment of the United States. For this there had only
to be an expansion of the territory of the Russian-American
Company's colony of Ross so as to place it between California
and the boundary of the United States.416
But Aleksandr intervened, realizing that Zavalishin's overzealous
ambitions could lead to political complications with Great Britain
and the United States.

Zavalishin remained bitter about the Emperor's

refusal to release him from naval service, stating in the 1840s,
~the

Russian-American Company did not demand any [governmental] assist-

ance.

Its sole request was to release me for its service; twice it
made an urgent representation about this. 11417
Zavalishin remained dedicated to the Russian annexation of
California.

In 1826, after the death of Aleksandr the previous year,

he wrote the new Smperor, Nicholas I.
California annexed by Russia and settled by Russians, would
forever remain in its control. The acquisition of harbors
and the cheapness of upkeep would permit the maintenance
there of an observation fleet which would give Russia command
of the Pacific Ocean and the China trade ..• 418
This final plea went unnoticed, because Zavalishin had fallen from
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official favor in 1825 for his association with the famed
an

Decembris~,

organization committed to the destruction of autocracy and

serfdom.

Nicholas I rounded up the Decembrists for staging a revolt

in December 1825.

They were tried in St. Petersburg and Zavalishin

was initially sentenced to death.

Later his sentence was commuted to

life and then to thirteen years hard labor in Siberia.

Upon his re-

lease from hard labor in 1839, Zavalishin remained to study and write
about Siberia.

It was during this time that he wrote his account of

419
. Russ1an
.
Amer1ca.
.
. a dven t ure 1n
h1s

Wrangel's Negotiations with Mexico, 1836.

A decade after

Zavalishin's failure to install permanently Russia in California,
Wrangel attempted a similar result.

The ex-Chief Manager of the

Company colonies feared, as did Zavalishin, the growing strength of
the'United States in California.

Upon completion of his term as

·Manager, Wrangel was well aware of the problems thwarting Russian
success in California.

He viewed agriculture as the primary

functi~n

of Fort Ross and knew it could only succeed if the Company expanded to
more fertile lands.

He suggested to the Main Office that the
Ross Co-unter extend 58 miles east and 35 miles south. 420

Realizing that the Company could not independently undertake such an
expansion, Wrangel hoped that Emperor Nicholas I would open a dialogue
between the Russian and Mexican governments.

But Nicholas refused

even to recognize the rebellious Mexican Republic.

He did, however,

grant Wrangel permission to visit Mexico during his return trip to
Russia, although he was not

give~

from the Russian government. 421

official letters of introduction
Wrangel was entrusted, by Nicholas,
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with ''the complete power to negotiate with the Mexican Government .•.
the right to make terms with the Mexican Government in relation
to our Ross settlement." 422 On behalf of the Company, Wrangel was
further instructed to negotiate the following five points:

(1) The

right to unrestricted call on ports in California and establishment
of warehouses maintained by local authorities; (2) The right to hunt
sea otter off the California coast; (3) The right to unrestricted
call on ports of the Mexican Republic for commercial purposes;
(4) Permission for Mexican vessels to frequent Novo-Arkhangel'sk
for commercial purposes; and (5) Permission to educate Mexican subjects in the Alaskan colonies. 423
At the end of 1835, Wrangel left for Monterey to obtain a
letter of introduction from Governor Jose Figeuroa, as he had not
received one from his own government.

The Governor had asked Wrangel,

in 1834, to negotiate a commercial settlement between the RussianAmerican Company and the Mexican government.

By the time Wrangel

arrived in California, however, the Governor had been two months
dead.424

Wrangel continued on to Mexico, but the negotiation pro-

cess proceeded poorly.

He tried "to carry out his orders," but

having no documentation to prove that his visit was in fact
officially sanctioned, "Senor Karro, the newly elected Vice President, was completely opposed to entering into so delicate a relationship as that of receiving a military officer from Russia, who
has no credentials to present from his government. 11425 Wrangel
had been provided with only his instructions (in Russian) and a
passport signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Karl
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Nesselrode.

The passport however was not signed by a Mexican agent

in Russia, as was required for legal travel through Mexico.
therefore, was only permitted to

travel~

Wrangel,

because he had been granted

a valid passport through the English and Prussian consulates in
Mexico City.
The entirety of Wrangel's stay in Mexico proved discouraging
and unproductive.

The Russian's insufficient credentials, in

addition to the fact that Russia officially opposed the Mexican
Confederacy, made it difficult for Wrangel to even obtain an audience
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose M. Ortiz Monasterio.
Although that meeting finally took place, the results were negligible.
The Mexicans failed significantly.to respond to the Company's proposals and would assure only that California officials would not
act inhospitably toward Russian commerical vessels in California. 426
Wrangel's failure to negotiate successfully with the Mexican government was a pivotal event in regard to Fort Ross in that it left
little alternative other than the Russian evacuation of California.
Upon completion of these uneventful talks in Mexico, Wrangel proceeded to Russia via New York, Le Havre, and Hamburg where he resumed negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company.

These talks

resulted, in 1839, in an agreement for that company to provision
the Russian-American colonies, for a period of ten years, in exchange
for the lease of a valuable strip of Alaskan coastline.
The Sale of Fort Ross
Wrangel's Agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company.

In 1839,

Baron von Wrangel of the Russian-American Company and Sir George

l
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Simpson of the Hudson's Bay Company completed two years of
negotiations regarding a disputed strip of sea coast on the
Stakhina River at 54° 40', the site of the Russian St. Dionysius

R~doubt. 427 The resulting agreement not only solved that territorial dispute, but also served to remedy the Russians' longstanding problem of provisioning the northern colonies.

The

Wrangel-Simpson contract stipulated that the disputed land was to
be leased to the Hudson's Bay Company by the Russian-American
Company for a period of ten years.

The price of the lease was

2,000 otter furs (their estimated worth, 118,000 rubles) and an
obligation to sell the Russians 5,000 pelts annually.

More impor-

tant to the Russians' concern, the agreement obliged the Hudson's
Bay Company to provide the Russian-American colonies with a predetermined quantity of foodstuffs at a contracted price. 428
Article six of the Wrangel-Simpson accord stated that the
Hudson's Bay Company was to deliver the following goods annually for
429
the length of the renewable contract.
TABLE IV
PROVISIONS PROPOSED IN THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY/
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMPANY AGREEMENT
1839

Provision

Amount

vJheat •....•.••••.•••.••.. 14,000
Wheat flour •.••.•....•...
498
Peas • •••••••.••••••••••••
404
Groats ••....•..•••.•••.••
404
Corned beef •...••.•••....
922
Butter .....•..••..•.•.•.•
498
12
Ham • •••••••••••••••.•••••

Price
puds @ 3r.
puds @ 6r.
puds@ 4r.
puds @ 4r.
p~ds @ 3r.
puds @20r.
puds @59r.

25k. per pud
32k. per pud
~Ok. per.pud
90k. per pud
78k. per pud
20k. per pud
per· lbs. [sic]
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As noted in Chapter V, "Husbandry at Fort Ross," the quantity of
provisions provided through this agreement surpassed that which the
Russians could produce independently in California or purchase from
the Californians (see pp. 171 -72 ).

Consequently, the Russians

were able to relinquish their hold on the California settlements
as their intented purpose had been fulfilled through another means.
As Simpson, then head of the Hudson's Bay Company reported:
... the Russians lately entered into an agreement with the
Hudson's Bay Company for obtaining the requisite supply of
grain and other provisions at a moderate price; and they have
accordingly, within a few weeks, transferred their stock to a
Swiss adventurer of the name of Sutter, and are now engaged
in withdrawing all their people from the country.430
The 1839 agreement was scheduled to take force on June l, 1840.

By

April 1840, Fort Ross,the real estate and movable property, was up
for sale.

An entry from Sir James Douglas' Journal of April reads:

[The Russians] wish to sell Bodega for $30,000. with a
stock of 1500 Sheep at $lt, 2000 neats and 1000 Horses &
mules at 40/. ea with improved land fenced in with Barns.
threshing floor &c sufficfent to raise 3000 fanega's of
wheat They of course can not sell the soil but merely
the improvements; which we can hold only through a
native.431
Bidders for the Fort Ross Property
An Agreement Reached with the Mexican Commander-General,
Vallejo.

The Hudson's Bay Company's interest in purchasing Fort Ross

was less than Sir Douglas indicated.

John A. Sutter, a naturalized

citizen of Mexico, and Mariano G. Vallejo, Commander-General of the
Sonoma Presidio, were the most important bidders for the Fort Ross
property.

Vallejo initially corresponded with Petr Kostromitinov in

February 1841 and stated that he had "no objection to accepting the
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the proposal" made by the Russian for the purchase of Fort Ross at
a price of $30,000. 432 One-half of the price was to be paid in
agricultural goods from California and one-half in warrants to
the Hudson's Bay Company.

To insure the propriety of Kostromitinov's

offer, to pay partially for Fort Ross in drafts, Vallejo contacted
the leader of the Columbia River colony.

He informed Kostromitinov

that a response was expected in July or August, at which time the
sale of Fort Ross could be finalized. 433
Kostromitinov, "having made preliminary arrangements,'' proceeded to draft an official offer of sale to Vallejo, with the
approval of the Chief Manager of the Russian-American Company
colonies, Adolf K. Etholen (1840-1845).

In the 12-point agreement,

The Russian-American Company, evacuating Ross with the
approval of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, cedes
;'ts rights to Mr. M. G. Vallejo over all settlements and
farms on the coast of New Albion at the port of Bodega, and
to the North at the presidio of Ross according to the inventory arranged and signed by both individuals entering
into the treaty.434
A detailed list of the provisions to be provided was incorporated,
as well as an extensive inventory of the properties, fixed and movable, in Russian California. 435 Kostromitinov, eager to unload the
settlement, drafted the document at his ranch near Rumiantsev Bay
and submitted it to Vallejo for approval.

The document was completed

and tentatively approved between March and June 1841.

On July 17,

Kostromitinov received Vallejo at Port Rumiantsev on the Elena and a
436

contract was ostensibly finalized between the long-standing rivals.

Kostromitinov informed Rotchev at Fort Ross of the settlement's
sale and charged him to notify Sutter of that decision.
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[The decision] •.• has not been in your favor, since you
have not the intention of buying the real estate, as well
as the personal property belonging to Ross, but merely the
cattle, whilst the agent of the Company, Mr. Kostromitinov,
has found wholesale purchasers, that is to say, for the
houses, the ranches, and the cattle. The making known to
you these measures, you can no longer count upon purchasing the properties enumerated, for the said reasons.437
From New Helvetia, Sutter responded to the notification of Fort
Ross' sale to Vallejo with indignation.

In an August 10th letter to

Antoine Sunol, Sutter complained of the situation:
The Russian gentlemen have found buyers for all of their
houses and ranches, a fact which pleases me not at all. In
the meanwhile, you can get insight into the character of
the Russians. They spoke very loud of preferring to burn
all the houses before selling them to a local man, especially
to Mr. Vallejo who had insulted the Russian flag, etc., etc.,
and now, just to get a few thousands of piasters more, they
are not ashamed to make arrangements like this one. Nobody
but a Russian would act like that
I would much rather they
had not made any deals with me.43 8
To Sutter's advantage, what appeared to be a certain sale between the Russian-American Company and Vallejo crumbled within a
matter of weeks.

By mid-August, Vallejo had reneged on the contract,

as he became aware of the impropriety of his actions and feared
government reprisals.

The Mexicans, like the Spaniards before them,

viewed the Russian's establishment of Fort Ross as an illegal seizure
of previously claimed territory.
ready a Mexican possession.

In their mind, Fort Ross was al-

In a letter dated July 19th, Vallejo

was informed by California Governor Jose B. Alvarado, 1 ~hat purchasing the property [ especi a 11 y the real estate] of Ross •.. ·cannot
be done on account of the [Mexican] government nor is it proper
for you or me ••. to take this step, that is, speaking of our private
11439
interests.
Vallejo realized the impossi~ility of his purchase
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of Fort Ross, because the contract required official approval that
had not and would not be granted. 440 He immediately informed
Kostromitinov that he was not able to carry through with the purchase without government authorization.

With this

bre~ch,

the

short-lived cordiality between Kostromitinov and Vallejo ended.
Kostromitinov, incensed by the revocation, sailed for Monterey to
confer directly with Alvarado "to clear up doubts which he retains
concerning the ... incontestable right the Government had [to Fort ·
11441
Ross ] .
Vallejo sent a letter to Alvarado in advance, warning the
Governor of the Russian's arrival and clarifying his own position on
the matter.
[Kos~romitinov,] not being satisfied with the reasons
which I alleged for not entering into a trade for the
houses of Ross and its dependencies. Principal among my
motives was that those buildings belong by right to the
government, on account of having bee~ constructed on national ground and that without an express order from the
the Superior Government I could not make any innovation
in this respect for that would be transgressing the
laws and my powers, insisting always upon the incontestable
right that the Government had to the aforesaid buildings.442

In closing, Vallejo stated his conviction "that the Mexican nation
could not, without loss to its dignity, buy what already unquestionably belongs to it. 11443 Alvarado, however, was not as resolute in
his view; he wished to attain the properties of Russian California
and justified such an action.

While agreeing that purchasing

Mexican-claimed territory would be less than dignified, Alvarado
wrote: '' ••. on the other hand I see that in spite of the justice of
this view the buildings may be destroyed or burned by [the Russians].
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This conduct would be reprehensible to the whole civilized
world. 11444 Alvarado devised a plan that would legitimize the purchase of Fort Ross for Mexican officials.

The plan included the

formation of a private company and the placing of a bid for the
Russian properties, on behalf of that company •
•.• I have thought of the great advantages that would result from the purchase of a brigatine in the United States.
For this undertaking I count upon Cooper and my Uncle
Jose de Jesus, who has indicated to me that you would take
part in this. I would desire that, for it is necessary to
have some partners ca§able of forming a company and a
sufficient capital.44
Kostromitinov, inspired by his meeting with Alvarado, again approached Vallejo, hoping to conclude the sale of Fort.Ross.

In an attempt

to force Vallejo to meet the terms of their contract, Kostromitinov
threatened to prolong the Russians' stay in California. 446 In
response, Vallejo agreed to purchase farm equipment and livestock
for $9,000, but not the houses of Fort Ross.
[The government's position creates] the impossibility in
which I find myself of accepting the proposals which you
made to me, or any other relative to the purchase of the
houses; and I only insist upon those which I made to you
regardinR ;he movable property, in case you should agree
to them. 4
Renewed Negotiations with Sutter.

The conditions proposed by

the Californians were unacceptable to the Russian-American Company
and the negotiations between Kostromitinov and Vallejo, which had
lasted from February through August 1841, were finally terminated.
On September 1, 1841, Sutter reported, again to Antoine Sunol:
It seems that the Russian gentlemen cannot come to an
agreement with Mr. Vallejo; they are renewing negotiations
with me, but I shall be a little more exacting now.448
Negotiations between Sutter and the Russians formally commenced on
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September 4th when Rotchev approached Sutter at the Swiss' colony
on tre Scramento River.

Sutter recounted in his Persona 1

Reminiscences:
•.. a Russian schooner, with Governor. [Manager] Rotcheff on
board, arrived from Fort Ross and offered to sell me the
place [of Ross] .•. 449
According to Sutter, Rotchev informed him that Vallejo and Jacob
Leese were standing ready to purchase, but that Chief Manager
Etholen, "having greater confidence in Sutter, said that he would
have the preference. 11450 Sutter had been on good terms with the
Russians in both Novo Arkhangel'sk, where he spent a month in 1838,
and in California,where he befriended Rotchev early in that same
year, when he visited Fort Ross en route from Monterey to the
Sacramento River Valley.

In his Personal Reminiscences, Sutter re-

counted that Rotchev, once "learning of my intentions to settle in
the Sacramento Valley •.. asked me to call on him if he could be of
any service. 11451 In the initial stages of settling, Sutter was a
natural prospect to buy Fort Ross, as he could instantly gain the
livestock and appurtenances the Russians had spent years accruing.
To negotiate the sale, Sutter agreed to accompany Rotchev to
Port Rumiantsev.

They sailed down the Sacramento, landing at

San Rafael, "where we found horses with Russian servants, ready to
452
carry us to Bodega."
Once arriving at Port Rumiantsev, Sutter
and Rotchev quickly came to terms and continued on to Fort Ross so
that Sutter could inspect the property.

After this inspection,

Sutter, Rotchev, and Kostromitinov returned to Port Rumiantsev and
had a "grand dinner on board the ElenQ_.

Champagne flowed freely;
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the Emperor's health was toasted and the health of the new owner
of Ross and Bodega. 11453
After dinner, a formal offer to sell Fort Ross was presented
by Kostromitinov, on behalf of the Russian-American Company.
agreed price was

$32,000~

The

"two thousand dollars cash included the

schooner that Rotcheff went up to Sutter's Fort in, then lying at
11454 The remaining $30,000 was
San Rafael, and the stores at Ross.
for the real estate of Russian California from Port Rumiantsev
north to Fort Ross and the houses, farms, livestock, and farm impleSutter was to pay this sum in produce, "chiefly in wheat at

ments.

$2 the fanega .•• The Russians were to send down every year their
11455
vessel and take whatever wheat I could give them .•.
The Sale Finalized.

Although Sutter had planned to be "a

little more exacting," the bill of sale (which was not actually
signed and sealed until December 13th), drawn between himself and
Kostromitinov, was hardly indistinguishableft.omthe offer made to
Vallejo.

Sutter was granted four years to complete payment, one more

year than specified in the Vallejo contract.

The price itself

remained identical--$30,000 for the property--but the terms of payment differed slightly. 456 Whereas Vallejo was to pay one-half in
drafts on the Hudson's Bay Company and one-half in California produce, Sutter was to pay two-thirds in produce and one-third in
457
coin.
The terms of guarantee were similar, although Sutter's
collateral was significantly greater:

Vallejo agreed to the reoccu-

pation of Fort Ross and Port Rurniantsev by the Russians upon failure
of payment, while Sutter offered New Helvetia, Fort Ross,

-:I
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Port Rumiantsev, and the Khlebnikov and Chernykh ranches as
collaterai. 458 On September 19, 1841, Sutter informed Vallejo of
his purchase .
..• I have bought all the movable and fixed property of
the settlement of the Honorable Russian-American Company at
Ross and ••• I am going to send a party of men by land to
that place for the embarking of the above mentioned funiture
&c. Please be kind enough to allow them to pass .•• 459
During the final week in September, Sutter began to remove all livestock from Fort Ross to New Helvetia.
I dispatched a number of my men and a clerk by 1 and to
Bodega, to receive the Cattle, Horses, Mules & Sheep, to
bring them up to Sutter's fort, called then New Helvetia, by
crossing the Sacramento the[y] lost me from about 2000 head
about a 100, which drowned ~n the River, but of most of them
we could save the hides ... 4 0
Through December Sutter recommenced removing property from Fort Ross
to Port Rumiantsev.

According to the terms of their contract, the

Russians assisted Sutter by moving some property to Port Rumaintsev
where it could be more easily· transported to the Sacramento River
colony. 461 Sutter had no intention of occupying the lands of Fort
Ross or Port Rumiantsev.

Instead, the livestock, except for a few

hundred head, was driven overland to New Helvetia while other
property was transported on the Konstantin.
dismantled~

Even the buildings were

''lumber, windows and doors were taken to the settlement

and used in finishing up of the fort and buildings [of New
b462

Helvetia].

By December 1841, most Company employees had been relocated
to Novo-Arkhangel'sk.
Russian departure.

Rotchev remained behind to finalize the

Some Russians did remain in California,

particularly those who lived and worked on the outlying ranches and
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continued to farm as employees under Sutter. 463

Despite these few

human and physical remnants, Russian California ceased to exist
on December 13th, 1841 when the deed to the Russian properties was
signed by John A. Sutter and Petr S. Kostromitinov in San
Francisco. 464 On the 19th of December, Kostromitinov notified
Vallejo of the Russian withdrawal .
••• I have the honor to state to you that the employees
and inhabitants of the settlement of Ross embarked on
board the Russian-American Company's brigantine
Constantin fer Sitka.465
Vallejo surveyed the abandol19:lpost and reported to the Minister of
War, Ignacio Mora Y. Villamil:

" ••• although barren, Fort Ross
11466
continues to keep the character of a Russian possession .••
In January 1842, Sutter dispatched John Bidwell, a 23-year-old
colonist, to Fort Ross to oversee the transport of property to New
Helvetia.

Bidwell recalled in his memoirs:

[Sutter] engaged me in January, 1842, to go to Bodega and
Fort Ross and to stay there until he could finish removing
the property which he had bought from the Russians. At that
time the Russians had an orchard of two or three acres of
peaches and apples at Fort Ross, I dried the peaches and some
of the apples and made cider of the remainder. A small vineyard of white grapes had also been planted .•. ! remained at
Bodega and Fgrt Ross fourteen months until everything was
remove d ••• 46/
In 1845, Sutter leased the land and any remaining material to a
former employee, William Benitz, who later paid Sutter $6,000 for
the property.
Payment for Fort Ross.

The contracted time of four years for

Sutter to complete payment to the Russians was necessarily liberal
as Sutter, already deeply in debt, had no capital except his
leagues of unchartered land.

Sutter was aware of Fort Ross'
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inability to produce profitably (in agriculture or in other activities) when he assumed the obligation, having stated that Fort Ross
"did not prove a good wheat country, furs were getting scarce and
the expenses were greater than the income.

11468

Yet Sutter felt the

advantages of purchasing the Russians' livestock, equipment, and
land outweighed the disadvantage of delaying the development of his
own colony.

Hubert Howe Bancroft's appraisal of Sutter's intention

when purchasing Fort Ross is apt:
In purchasing the Ross property Sutter had not deliberately intended to swindle the sellers. He had, as was usual
with him, assumed a heavy obligation without considering his
prospective ability to meet it. That he could make ·no payments within the time assigned to paying the whole sum did
not seem to him an alarming state of affairs.469
The Russians found it difficult to make demands for Sutter's payment,
because his economic situation only worsened after the purchase of
Fort Ross.

Payments to the Russian-American Company were delayed due

to crop failures and poor harvests of pelts--occurrences all too
familiar to the Russians.
Sutter's first and only installment was made after the fouryear expiration date.

With the discovery of gold, Sutter's commer-

cial activities prospered and the Russians expected payment.
Although additional extensions were refused, Sutter continued to delay payment.

In 1848, the Russians threatened to levy an attach-

ment to Sutter's property unless the remaining $19,000 balance was
paid.

To block the levy of an attachment, Sutter began to transfer

his proterty to his son, John A. Sutter, Jr.

The Russian Company

initiated legal proceedings, through its San Francisco agent,
William A. Leidesforv, to prevent Sutter from disposing of any
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property.

But Sutter prevailed, avoiding payment by transferring

property, including that removed from Fort Ross.

John Sutter, Jr.

wrote in 1856:
I know very well that, if the country had been in a
settled state .•• , this transfer would have been of no avail
whatever, an attachment on the proP.erty having been levied
before the deeds were [executed]. 11 ~70
It is questionable whether the Russian-American Company ever received
full payment for Fort Ross, although Sutter stated in his Personal
Reminiscences:
When the gold-discovery broke out I yet owed them a
balance and the miner's destroyin9 my crop, I was obliged
to pay them the balance in gold.4 l
Representative of the Russian-American Company, P.N. Golovin, however, summarized the affair differently:
Parts of this sum [the original price of Fort Ross] were
paid by Sutter at various times, but there remained unpaid
$15,000, the recovery of which was undertaken by the
Company, under instructions from the Russian Ambassador to
the United States, Bodisco, through the Russian Counsel at
San Francisco, An American, Stewart, absconded and stole
the money received from Sutter and this, with the expenses
attending the several efforts to recover the money from
Sutter, the Company was at a loss in their accounts with
the Ross settlement to the amount of 37,484 rubles)45
kopeks.472
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CHAPTER VII
THE NATIVE CALIFORNIANS OF FORT ROSS
During their occupation of Fort Ross, the Russians established
crucial economic and even political ties with the Natives of Alta
California, (see pp. 93-4).

The Russian-American Company owed what

success it did achieved in California,as well as in Siberia and
Alaska, to the efforts of native laborers. 473 In view of the importance of the role played by Native Californians in Russia California, a brief consideration of these people--their culture and
the nature of their relationship with nineteenth-century imperialists-is added, as an essential part of the study of Fort Ross.
The Southwestern Pomo and Coast Miwok
The Southwestern Pomo and the Coast Miwok were the principal indigenovs
peoples with whom the Russians associated during their occupation of
Fort Ross. 474 Other Indian groups, however, were also known to the
Russians and lived around Fort Ross.

These peoples were classified, by
nineteenth-century observers, into Steppe and Marginal Indians. 475
Steppe and Marginal Indians probably constituted several peoples, such
as the Southern and Central Pomo, who lived in Russian territory and
had seasonal or occasional contact with the Russians.

The Russians knew

cGmparatively little about these remote peoples who spoke ''many dialects
I\

or languages, whose character and relationships [were] not yet
11476
known.
The Russians established permanent relations--primarily labor-
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oriented--with the Coast Miwok, but especially with the Southwestern
Pomo on whose land Fort Ross was situated.

The documentary evidence

of contact between the Russians and these two tribes is therefore
substantial, relative to inrormation available on the Marginal and
Steppe Indians, whose tribal distinctions were not well delineated.
Hence, it is with the Pomo and Coast Miwok tribes only that this
section deals.
Native Territories
Pomo,

The Pomo was a large Indian designation, in

nineteenth~

century California, whose people occupied 3200 square miles of the
Northern Coast Range in present-day Mendicino and Sonoma Counties
(Figures 16 and 17).

The homeland of the Pomo bordered approximately

100 miles of the Pacific coastline between 38° and 39° North and ineluded the drainage of two major rivers--the Gualala a.nd the Russian
Rivers,

~nd

three environmental regtons--coastal, mountainous, and

riparian. 477 Pomo territory was situated just north of the Spanish
limit of complete missionizatton, but its southernmost portion was
incorporated within the boundary of partial missionization (see
Figure 18).

While spared the direct incursion of Spanish theocracy,

which had distended to their southern border, the Pomo Natives were
still displaced by the Catholics.

The Mission Registers of San
Francisco show that 600 Pomo we-re baptised there before 1799. 478

The increasing proximity of the Spanish civilizing effort, which had
obtruded drastic change upon neighboring Native Americans since 1769,
was a frightening reminder to the Pomo of the intention of this foreign
encroachment.
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The Pomo Indian classification is divided into seven dialect
groups:

Northern, Eastern (or Clear Lake), Southeastern (or Lower

Lake) Northeastern (or Salt), Central, Southern (or Gallinomero),

and Southwestern (or Gualala). The Northeastern, Southern, and
Southwestern are relatively unknown to modern anthropologists.
And it is the Southwestern Pomo with whom the Russians initally
associated at Fort Ross.

Hence, the written evidence left by

nineteenth-century Russian observers provides invaluable source
material.
The Southwestern Pomo were the poorest of the Pomo peoples,
inhabiting the inhospitable mountainous regions which front
Pacific Ocean.

the

The coastal plain was rugged and narrow and broke

into sheer cliffs, offering only a difficult existence.

This was)

thinly-occupied region, claiming an estimated pre-Russian
population of 550. 479 There were nine Southwestern Pomo communities--

th~refore)a

five coastal and five riparian, and it was adjacent to the coastal
village of Meteni (or Madshuinui) that the Russians built Fort
Ross.
Meteni was the village which Kuskov purchased from the Pomo with
"hoes, axes, breeches, blankets, and glass [trading] beads. 11480
It was located directly ·northea'st (inland) of fort Ross and included ten to 15 . houses and one dance house. 481

The size of Meteni

reveals that it supported a population of 70 to 105 people.

These

figures are comparable to the known Indian (excluding Aleut and
Creole)

population of 125. at Fort Ross in 1833~ 482

This population

was largely, but perhaps not entirely,Southwestern Pomo.

The Pomo

continued to usethe Metini site less than a year after the Russians

220
arrived in California.

483

It would have been impossible for
living at the old village of Metini
the Fort Ross, as the north wall of
through a portion of the aboriginal

[the Pomo] to continue
after construction of
the stockadP. cuts
settlement.484

Once the Pomo received compensation for their village site, they
abandoned it and moved to a new 1ocation 11 some distance to the
north. 11485 The new Meteni was a lesser site, 680 feet northeast
of old Meteni, on the western edge of Fort Ross Creek. 486 With only
this slight displacement, the Pomo continued contact with the
Russians and worked as menial laborers at Fort Ross.
Miwok.

The Coast Miwok Indians occupied the coastal lowland

immediately south of Pomo territory; Salmon Creek formed their common
border.

Coast Miwok territory was relatively small, comprising only

800 square miles {50 miles bordering the Pacific}, but the natural
features of this region
pean maritime powers.

w~re

numerousaoo proved appealing to

Euro~

Miwok territory bordered San Francisco Bay

on the south and included Drakes Bay, Point de los Reyes and
Rumiantsev Bay.

The Spaniards established two missions in Coast

Miwok territory, the San Rafael in 1817 and San Francisco Solano
in 1823.

San Francisco Solano was to be the northermost settle-

ment of the Spanish missionizing effort,
The Miwok Indian group has two primary

divisions~-Lake

and

Coast--but it was primarily with the Coast or Bod.ega Miwok that
the Russians associated. Russian contact with the Coast Miwok

pre~

ceded that with the Southwestern Pomo, as the Russians first settled
at Bodega Bay, within Miwokan territory.

Yet this associatfon was

soon altered, because the settlement was relocated after several

221
months of occupation.

It was moved 18 miles further north into Pomo

territory to its permanent site 90 miles north of San Francisco.

Native Californians: Appearance and Lifestyle in Nineteenth-century
Sources
Nineteenth~century

recordings of Native Californians, in regards

to appearance, language, custom, and lifestyle, are generous and offer
the optimal tool for addressing the
peoples.

Russian~

understanding of these

The works come from varying perspectives and periods:

a

government official, G.I. von Langsdorff (1803-1807); the navigators-P.I. Kruzenstern

(1803-1806), F.P. Lutke (1815-1817), V.M. Golovnin

(1817-1819), Otto von Kotzebue (1823-1826), and Dmitrii Zavalishin
(1822-1825); and Russian-American Company employees--K.T. Khlebnikov
(1823-1826), F.P. Wrangel (1830-1835), and P.S. Kostromitinov (18301836).

The recordings of Company employees offer the more specific

information:

Havi.ng spent many years in Russian Amertca and Fort

Ross, they had an intimate

understand~ng

of its operation compared

to seamen whose call at Fort Ross was generally of short duration,
perhaps several months.
Appearance.

In descriptions of appearance, Russian travelers,

whose association with Russian California was limited, tended not to
delineate much distinction between various California Natives.

For

instance, Golovnin described the appearance of the Indian as
a whole:
The Californian natives, in general, are small of stature
appear to have a weak and flabby build; they are dark
skinned, have a somewhat flat facial structure, with straight,
very black, coarse hair, and regular white teeth; many have
bea~ds, although some pluck out their facial hair in youth

a~d
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by means 9f bivalve shells and thus appear beardless by
nature.48
Kruzenstern also used such an encompassing description, stating the
California Natives "in their general appearance resemble each other
except for 1a.nguages which are tad ica 11 y different."

He contributed

a physiognomous analysis, bordering on indignation:
They have all a very savage look, and are of a very
dark colour. Their flat, broad countenance, with
large staring ey4sa is shaded by black, thick, lo.ng
and smooth hair.
Lutke more specifically described the physical appearance of the Californians who lived near Fort Ross,
These Indians are dark copper color; their hair is
very black and all have ckokuchenie, they are somewhat
less than medium height and awkward physique, Their
eyes, however, are full of life. In regard to the women, in addition to this, one may say that they are not
bad looking. Their round full faces, are fairly well
proportioned, with a small mouth, not over large nose
and sparkling eyes have a not unpleasing appearance.
The color of their skin they receive it seems from
filth in which they live with nature------from the
nature itself and they assured us that ~f they should
wash, then they would be quite white.48
Recordings of Company employees, such as Wrangel and Kostromitinov,
whose tenures at Fort Ross and in Russian America were relatively long,
are of greater

eth~ographic

association with Fort

~oss

value.

Kostromitinov had a seven-year

and offered greater specificity in his de-

scription of the California Natives who frequented the fort.
The Indians are of medium stature, but one also finds
tall individuals among them; they are rather well-proportioned, the. color of their skin is brownish, but this
color is caused by the sun rather than being innate; eyes
and hair are black, the latter ts straigh~ .•. Both sexes
are of robust build; one rarely finds crippled people among
them; but as a result of the climate and their mode of
life they do not reach old age. The women age very rapidly, and consequently one always sees more old and aged
women than young ones. The physiognomy of the Indians

223

in general bears and expression o~ good nature rather
than savagery and one often encounters charmfng faces,
among males as well as females. They are gentle and
peaceful and very clever ... 490

Wrangel inspected Fort Ross in 1832 and further described the physical
appearance of these people.
The unusual distribution of the workload is probably
the reason for the fact that the women here in general
have a much stronger physique than do men who, although
tall and well-proportioned, yet seem to be weaker than
the women.491
The only descriptive distinction found between ttre·Southwestern Pomo
and the Coast Miwok, in

nineteenth·~entury

Russian sources, was ren-

dered by Kostromitinov.
The Bodega [Miwok] Indians have no artificial coloration
on their body; the Northeners [Pomo], on the other hand,
tattoo their faces, breasts and hands with various figures,
and apply an herbal extract to their bodies,.whic~ ~ives
their skin a dark blue color, which is permanent. 9
Language.

The Miwok and Pomo Americans are presently classified

into the Hukon language family.

But the Russians knew little of these

languages, as they rarely learned to speak native tongues.

Languages

were mentioned only briefly in journals, because the Russians' understanding was so poor.

There were usually only references to the lang-

ages' unusual sounds.

Lutke commented that the "Pomo language is quite

pleasing to the ear, and that is all that can be said about it.

It

has not rough or heavy sounds on the ear and they speak very rapidly. 11493
Wrangel described in more detail the Pomo language:
Their language and the melodious quality of their voice
and song make a pleasant impression on the sense of hearing, and bear no resemblance to the lugubrious monotony
and hard-to-utter, impure, guttural sounds that strike one
so unpleasantly in speech and sound of the seashore inhabitants such as the Kolash, Aleuts as well as of the
494
northern Americans IAlaskan Natives] and Tchuktc~ generally.
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Most observers did rec.ognize the Pomo'!'Miwok language distinction.
495
Golovnin remarked that there were some 11 minor 11 differences.
Kruzenstern wrote that these northern Indians, who tatoo their
bodies [the Pomo] and rarely come into the missions,

11

all speak

the same languages, 11496 But Kostromitinov observed that:

"The

Bodega Indians do not understand the Northerners, their language
as well as their pronunciation is different. 11497 The perceptive
Wrangel warned against giying blind credence" to the alleged
11

disparity between these languages; "on closer study one may

dis~

cover a relationship, and they may appear only as daughters of a
root language, as well as the different tribes as the branches of a
great race. 11498
As stated earlier, the Russians rarely.learned the language of
those peoples indigenous to Russian California.

A practice

estab~

lished early in Russia's eastward movement was the utilization of
natives, already subjects of the empire, as interpreters when new
peoples were encountered.

This practice, Lutke

s~ggests,

was due

to the similarities of the Indian language groups. 499 Nevertheless,
this was the circumstance of Russian California.

Aleut hunters,

brought from Alaska to serve as hunters at the Ross Counter, functioned
in the additional capacity of interpreter fqr the Russians and newlysubjagated Pomo and Miwok Natives.
Diet.

The Natives of Fort Ross were semi-nomadic, seasonally

attracted to locales which provided their sustenance.
tained a single

11

They main-

permanent 11 vi"llage, the new Meteni village in the

case of the Fort Ross Pomo.

Kostromitinov described the Pomo's
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tri-seasonal

~igrations

in search of food:

In spring they live in the vicinity of the rivers and
in locatfons that abound in water, so that they may catch
fish and collect roots and herbs, while they spend the
summer in woods and plains, where they collect berries
and seeds of wild plants; in autumn they 1ay in store
of acorns, wild chestnuts, and som5 ~mes nuts, hunt
bison and goats with their arrows. 0
The Native Californians' diet consisted of a large variety of food due
to northern California's productivity.
cribed their diet to indescretion:

Russian observers though, as-

"They are not too particular in

their choice of food; without the least repugnance they consume the
flesh of any animal they come across, any type of shellfish or fish,
and even reptiles, except poisionous snakes. 11501
mented,

11

Kostromitinov com-

Themenu of the indians encompasses anything they can ac ...

quire, large and small land and marine animals, fish, crayfish, roots,
herbs, berries and other products of the soil, even insects and
worms. 11502

It is true that the Southwestern Pomo di'et contained great

variety, but fish was probably the main staple consumed in the winter
and spring months.

They were known to eat matash (sea trout), gaka

(perch), and tsaka (eels) which were cooked in earthern ovens, 503
Blue cod fish were ca.ught from the rocks of the coast whi 1e shin ..
abototo (bullhead) were caught with hook and line.

Shinabototo

was dried uncooked and stored for the winter months. 504 The Pomo
did not construct boats, thus deep-sea fish were unknown in their
diet.sos Aleut fisherman, employed at Fort Ross, introduced hayhsa
(cod} and ushati (flounder) to the Pomo diet. 506
In the early summer months, the Pomo camped at river sites to
take advantage of the foods offered there.
were a summer delicacy to the Pomo.

Kauwina (river turtles}

Preparati'on consisted of placi.ng

·~
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the live turtle in a slight depression, covering it with hot ashes
and allowing it to bake for many hours.

Staples in the Pomo's

mer diet included the staka (grasshopper), preferablr

sum~

immature,~

(slugs), served roasted, and nokoh (mussel) which were collected from
October to May with the rains.

Ishuwa (Varied Thrush) and sawala

(Crested Jay) were the only birds known to be consumed by the Fort
Ross Pomo.
The main staple of the Pomo's autumn diet, while living at the
Meten i vi 11 age, was the acorn.

These were co 11 ected from the barks

of trees where they had been stored by woodpeckers and prepared by
drying and water flushing in order to remove the bitterness. 507 The
acorns were then either boiled for immediate consumption (as "gruel"
by Lutke's description) or ground to a pulp which served as a flour
for bread and cakes. 508 This corn mixture was at times flavored with
katalo (the grubs of yellow jackets). 509 The Fort Ross Pomo also conducted some rather unsophisticated agricultural endeavors, growing rye,
oats, and a copious plant which was described thus:
The plant reaches a height of 1~ to 2'feet, several sprouts
start from the roots, the leaves are narrow-oblong and covered
with a delicate down, have a peculiar aroma, and stick to the
fingers, the flowers are yellow and gr~~ in potnted tuft$ ~nd
the small black seeds resemble Latuk.5
The Pomo method of farming was, to the European temperament, a very
simple; "although rather curious, method 11 which increased fertility and
facilitated the harvest. 511
[The Indians] set fire to the entire field; the.grass
and stalks, being very dry, burn very fast, while grain
is not consumed by the fire but only scorched. Then the
Indians collect the ST~rched grain and eat it without any
further preparation.

I
I
I
i
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It is difficult to determine the extent to which the diet of
California Natives and Russians mixed.

The cultural unappeal of the

native diet is recorded by some Russians, such as Lutke, who noted
of the acorn concoction:

11

this form of eating is not appetizing to

others. 11513 Lutke, however, tasted the mixture in the name of
observation.

As the Russians at Fort Ross were able to maintain

themselves through traditional diets, it is doubtful that they
adopted Native dishes.

Instead, it appears that the Californians

were introduced to several foods consumed by Russians.

It has been

mentioned that flounder, cod, and sea trout were introduced in
Russian times by Aleut hunters.

Sea lion meat and sea birds brought

from the Farallon Artel were also introduced into the Pomo diet.
(The skins of sea mammals were also introduced as clothing. ) 514
Thus it seems that dietary alteration was one-sided--the Pomo added
measurability to their diet thro.ugh Russian-Aleut contact, while
evidence of Russian acceptance of Porno foods in non-existence.

Arch-

. aeologist _ Janice C. Smith speculated about the extent of RussianPomo cultural intercha.nge and wrote:

"in North American contact

sites, Native subsistence methods usually gave way rapidly to EuroAmerican methods ... 11515
Shelter.

The Fort Ross

Pomo spent the winter months in their

main village norhteast of the Russian settlement.

Their homes gen-

erally consisted of simple thatched huts as "there was no shortage
of stick and dry grass for making dwellings. 11516 Lutke irreverently
described these homes.
Their living quarters resemble more beehives or anthills
than human dwellings. They are built out of twigs stuck in
the ground in a semi-circle raised up above the ground about
one and one-half arshins, these are join~d together and cov~

l
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ered with dry grass or coniferous twigs. These
dwellings protect them neither from rain nor generally foul weather ... 517
In contrast, Wrangel displayed his typical romantic appreciation of
the homes of these "friends."
... these temporary dwellings, made of the flexible
shafts of sand-willow and other willows, which can be
pushed into the ground quite easily, in such an extraordinary tasteful manner, that I was most pleasantly
surprised by the sight. The colorful shading and the
variety of sizes of the willow-leaves ... lent a quite
special, rustic aspect to the open huts; the sides
opening, which serves as a door, is decorated with
foliage with special care; several of the huts also
communicate with each other by means of internal
openings.518

l

I

II
l
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Kostromitinov provided greater specificity, offering insight to the

!

!

r

l
I
I
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seasonal component of native dwellings.
During the summer, [natives] find shelter in bushes,
which are thinned below, and tied together above; in
winter, however, they construct barabaras. A pit is
dug, some vertical fixed poles are driven into the
ground with their pointed ends first and covered with
wood bark, twigs, and grass; and opening is left on
top and on the side, the former to let the smoke escape, the i9tter to serve as the entrance into the
barabara. 5
The simplicity of these homes served a dual practicality:

(1) the homes

were easily constructed--an important consideration as they were ternporary homes; and (2) the homes held little value. and this afforded the
1

hygenic practice. which relied on destruction of the site by fire.
practice hindered

This

contamination and spread of infectious diseases such

as "fever, colic, and syphillic maladies" which were common to the
Pomo. 520
Arts and Crafts.

To the ni neteenth":'century Russ tan observer, the

art of the Pomo appeared poorly developed.

Lutke commented that their

crafts were "still in a state of absolute infancy, or to state it

I
I
I
I

l -
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better, there is none. 11521

And his assessment is not without some

merit as the Pomo, adapted to habitual migration, maintained a
paucity of material culture.

Crafts were limited to a few items of

convenience--particularly woven basketry.
Pomo attained an unusually

~igh

But in this skill, the

level of sophistication.

Pomo

basketry and wickerwork is highly regarded by anthropologists for
the great number of materials anc techniques utilized. 522 The
PoMo employed ten materials in five full-twined weaving techniques,
as compared to two techniques found in comparable societies.
The absence of crafts, other than basketry, often led to the
description of primitiveness.

As has been mentioned, the Pomo did

not construct boats for ocean travel despite their coastal habitat.
Zavalishin noted his surprise that a coastal people lacked the
skill to construct sea-worthy vessels. 523 However, Golovnin astutely
surmised that this is not because the Pomo are "extremely stupid
or lazy, 11 but rather they 11 spend their lives constantly roaming from
place to place. 11524
[Natives] seldom travel by water, that they do not
use anything from the sea in their diet other than
shell food picked up on the beaches at low tide, and
that moving from place to place on land, through forests and over mountains, they would not carry along
wooden boats that they would be obliged to discard
after spending so much time and labor on them. Hence,
the invention of grass rafts that are used only occasionally, can be made up in a few hours, and can be
left behind ~5 the coast, should not be regarded disdainfully. 5
Similarly, Russian observers recorded an absence of native art, but this
stems from a difference in interpretation.

For the Fort Ross Native,

art was confined to adornment of the body and in this regard, they had
an extensive art.
I

I
I

\

Jewelry and elaborate costumes were mentioned by many

l
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observers. Tattooing was a prevalent form of physical adornment
practiced by the Pomo who etched figures on their faces, chests,
and hands.
Some of the men had tattoos on their chest, with
straight lines and zigzags, which were extended
from shoulder to shoulder; likewise they had pierced
ears, and in the openings they had small pieg~5 of
feathers stuck. Women had no ornamentation.
In addition, tinting the skin with a permanent dye was considered attractive by the Pomo. 527 Head ornaments, belts and hats were among items
528
artistically constructed of feathers and neuals.
Bone and shell
nose sticks were commonplace decoration, as were

hairpin~

although

hair cutting became fashionable after the Russians introduced
scissors. 529 Wrangel wrote that the Native Californians' art forms
betrayed "not only their inventiveness, but also a certain penchant
for beauty."

530

Russian chronicles of

nineteenth~century

California often rever-

berate notions of primitiveness in regard to Indian lifestyles, clothing, shelter, and arts.

To the European mind, Native Americans live
11

in complete idleness" or "they lead a pitiful life, which provides
them it seems with no satisfaction except the same as animals.

11531

Interpretation is limited, however, due to the judgment of the
chroniclers and, perhaps, these sources provide a better tool for
analyzing European ethnocentricity than native ethnography.

A Reconsideration of Russian-Pomo Relations in Nineteenth-century Californi a
.,.It is difficult, I believe, to find a people who
attain a lesser political comprehension than those
Indians.
Lutke, 1818

!
\
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The Native as Child.

Especially striking in nineteenth-cen-

tury descriptions of California is the redundancy of the metaphorical
11

child 11 interpretation of Native Americans.

A parent-child signi-

fication was firmly entrenched in the colonial mentality.

532 The

native childhood had increasingly been viewed as less a stage than
a state, soliciting permanent tutelage. 533 Such a consciousness
forced the colonizers-missionaries to accept paternal responsibility
to care for and civilize the abjectly dependent native.

The child

image was the prevalent conveyance in Russian descriptions of Native
Californians.

Kruzenstern, in oblique reference to this metaphor,

stated, "The savage is inconsiderate and inconstant, like a child. 11534
Both Lutke and Kostromitinov saw a childness in the Native Californians'
disinterest in material possessions.
absolute infancy~· 535

Lutke called this a "state of

Kostromitinov spoke of these "true children

of nature" as yet developing the knowledge-required to understand the
536 Kruzenstern described the unfortunate place
.
va 1ue of possessions.
of the nineteenth-century California Native vis 'a vis Spanish missionThe native who 11 unthinkingly 11 enters the mission and

I

izing power:

I

her children, and exercises this right with vigor. 11537

l

.I
l

so "belongs to the church ..•

The church has an inalienable right to

The metaphorical child, so prevalent in European descriptive endeavors, had manifold implications.

The cause, perhaps, was that

chroniclers rarely knew the California Natives as anything but a
people culturally and socially altered by European imperailism-previously defeated and violated, continually exploited and subjected
to deprivation.

It has been suggested that this i·s the true reason

for the chronicled docility and indolence of native peoples: "Their
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uncomplaining acceptance of acute poverty, physical hardship, and above
all their seeming lack of interest in material things," which so often
were attributed to innate qualities.~~ 38 Such was the ascription of
Russian observers.

Langsdorff attributed native docility,

In a great degree to the extreme simplicity of these
poor creatures, who in stature no less than in mind are
certainly of a very inferior race of human beings ••. 539
Zavalishin wrote that "California In~dians
were a meek tribe. 11540
.....,
And Kostromitinov reported that

their~indifference

and inattention go

very far~ 541 Even the provident Golovnin remarked that the Pomo living
near Fort Ross are "like all unlightened races" and "lead an idle
existence. 11542 The consensus of Russian observation is perhaps extractable from Golovnin's conclusion:
The ease with which the Spaniards conquered them and
now hold all the best lands with very small forces, which
the natives could overcome in one night if they were to
form a conspiracy, is proof of their peaceable nature,
while their gentlecharacter is demonstrated by the fact
that they have never organized an uprising or conspirac~
against the Spanish to protest their cruel treatment.54~
In contrast to these descriptions, the writings of several Russian
authors echoed sentiments in condemnation of European treatment of Native
Californians.

Yet these descriptions intended, in part, to emphasize

the dissimilarity between Russians- and Spanish-Native relations.

Con-

sensually, the Russians at Fort Ross and their native subjects lived in
an easy harmony while the Spaniards could claim only a volitile coexistence with the missionary Indians.

Kruzenstern, addressing the

Spaniard's attitude toward Indians wrote:

I
I

t.

"The contempt which the

missionaries have· for th.e peop1e, to whom they are sent, seems to us,
considering their pious occupation~ a very unfortunate circumstance. 11544
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Unlike missionary Indians who live in the "most abject subservience"
under Spanish rule, Fort Ross Natives preferred to live under Russian
domination.

Kostromitinov expressed a sentiment commonly found in

Russian sources.

"[The natives] emigrated to Ross" to avoid removal

to the missions. 545 Kostromitinov even suspected that native stupidity
was illusory and that the Californian, given "some not too difficult
or complex task, .. are immediately able to imitate it. 11546 Golovnin,
who visited California in 1818, re-acknowledged the Indians' capability
and

his own defiance of traditional attitudes:
... I am justified in daring to express a different opinion
from the famous voyager mentioned above [La Perouse] concerning
the native abilities 6f the Californian Indians. My opinion is confirmed by the Indians living in the missions; many
of them soon learn various trades from the missionaries. For
example, th stone church at the San Carlos Mission was built
by the Indians, the carpentry and joiner's work was also done
by them, and they even did wood carving and plastered and decorated the walls .. It is their mentors, the Missionary
Fathers, are not the best of artist? either; if they could be
taught by good craftsmen, they probably would be the equal
of Europeans.547
The different type of relationship experienced by the Spaniards and

Russians with their native subjects, in the early 1800s, stemmed not
from any racial tolerance on the part of the Russians, but from the
constrasting stages of colonial economic development in "Spanish" versus
"Russian" California.

From the inception of Fort Ross until 1818, the

Russians' primary task in California was harvesting sea otter pelts
(see Chapter IV, Part I).

The Russians did not actually hunt them-

selves, .but employed Native (Aleut) laborers, as they had done throughI

\I

~

out their expansion across Siberia to America.

When the Russians moved

to California, a sufficient number of Aleut hunters were transferred
to Fort Ross.

Consequently, there was little demand for laborers from
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among the Native Californians.

The economic ties that were initially

established, between the Russians and the Natives, were voluntary and
unstrained.

'tI

When hunting operations di·minished and the Russians directed their

l
'~

attention to transforming Fort Ross to an agricultural settlement, in
the 1820s, the Russianst relationship with the California natives
changed dramatically.

The Russians lacked the necessary agricultural

laborers, not having qualified individuals to transfer from the northern colonies.

This void of farm workers was filled by the Pomo

Indians--and not necessarily by the choice of the Indians.

The labor,

once offer3·ed freely by the P.omo, was now demanded by the Russians.
In this manner, the Russians eventually implemented a forced labor
system and thus their treatment of Native Californian populations more
closely resembled that of the Spanish missionaries.
Russian-Pomo Treaty, 1817
A majority of the above-cited authors, who stress such contrasts
between Russian and Spanish treatment of Native Californians, maintained
Russian loyalties and sought to legitimize the Russian-American Company's
claim that the Pomo had invited the Russian presence to serve as a buffer
I

i
~
~

against Spanish intrusion.

However, the relationships warrant con-

sideration inasmuch as determination of the veracity of the Russian
rationale is to understand any consequences of the disparity between
imperial (Russian versus Spanish) methods of christianizing and civiliz-.
ing.
In September 1817, the Russians and the Southwestern Pomo executed
a treaty in which the Americans. granted land, ex post.facto, for Russian
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occupation (See Figure 19).

Its intent was to formalize a transaction

completed in 1812 between Kuskov and the Native Californians of Meteni.
At that time of initial encroachment, Kuskov purchased the Pomo village
for an equitable (to the Pomo frame of reference) number of trading
beads.

The Russians' interest in executing a written contract, five

years after the fact, was merely an attempt to legitimize this agreement
)

I
j

..

I

\'

vis

a vis

other European colonial powers; the verbal accord between
Kuskov and the Meteni elders held firm. 548
As for the Americans' interest in restating such a treaty, the

Russians cited the familiar contrast of Spanish disdain in contrast
to Russian protectiveness toward the California natives. ·Kirill
Khlebnikov, signator of the treaty, later explained:

\

On this occasion [the founding of Fort Ross], the
well-behaved Indians of that area were completely
free, and had no protection whatsoever from their
Spanish neighbors. On the contrary, they were oppressed by attacks of savagesunder the control of
Spaniards, and had a hostile attitude toward them.
Because of this, the local Indians not only did
object to the presence of the Russians on the
shores of New Albion, but expressed the desire to
see them there in greater numbers, in order to
make certain that they received protection from
their hostile neighbors. One of the chief elders
or toions, named Chu-Chu-Oan, who had owned the ~
land which was taken to build the fort, voluntarily gave it up to the Russians in exchange for
certain appropriate gifts. The Indians informed
, Captain Golovnin, who was then in the port of
Rumiantsev aboard the sloop Kamchatka, that
they were independent of the Spaniards, that they
hated them, and that they wished the Russians to
settle and live in their vicinity. One elder,
Valenila, asked Golovnin to give him a Russian
flag so he could show it as evidence of friendship and good will toward the Russians. 548
Historians and participants of Russian expansion have scoffed at what
they considered the Russians' ludicrous attempt to deceive and ridicule
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Tra11slati(lu cf 11sr TreJI)' u•itli thr Kasl1D)'O Pomet
.~uep1i11g 1lir i111'itati(l11, 1hr Indian Cl1i~(! THm-Gu~Au,

Aman- Torr, Gtm-Lr-Lr and othtrs arri11ed at fC1rt Rciu 011
SrptC'mbtr 22, 1817.
On behalf of 1he Russian American Com pan)', Lieurrnam-Captaiu [Lcomii] Hagtmtisttr cxtmdcd thanks to
tlicm f"' Joudriua tCI tlir Company tliar land lo(al/)' called
.".1ad-Zhi-J\'i which bt1"11gtd to Tchu-Cu-An,forcons1ruction of the Fc-rt and adminima1ivt and strvitt buildings. Hr [Hagemeisitr] also s:a:td thot he liopcd rl1er (rltt
Jncians Ju1ould ntJ1er liavt reason 10 regret ha11ing Russians
12.< 1htir nt•ighbors .•~fter litaring tht translation, Tchu-CuAu, as wtll as Aman-Tan, u1hose l12nd.c wtrt not far a14•ay,
rrplitd 1l1a1 "Tliey are vtry pltastd to stt Russians occup)'
1l1is laud, for the)' now livt in saftty from otl1tr Jt:tlians
wlu1 used "' a11ack thtm frcm1 time rci time .t This st"4rity
brgan
.fr·"m tht time of Russian stttlemtnt."
•ifier this pleasant reply, tlzc Indians u•ere presrnrtd u•ith
g~fr.c and Cl1icf Tchu-Gu-.-'\11 u1as a1Nrded a sil11cr medal
dc&orated u·ith 1l1c Russian Imperial emblem and u•itl1 au
ins,·riprion [rrading] ".-1/lies of Russia."
It u1as dulortd that this medal givts tht Indian Chitf tht

""'>'

right to rtsptct from Rus.<ians. Btcau$t ".f tliis, it uias uM
ad11iscablrfM ltim ro '""'r to tlie F"rt u•itl1l'ut it. Jr (ilu
medal] also obliged ludians to be fo}'al and rmdn- l1dp "'
thr R1mia11s should the C1aasio11 arisr.
In repl}' to this, Tchu-Gu-A11 aud rite Mhers cxpmscd
tl1eir rtadirzess r.o rrnder assista11et and txrtnded their
grat itudt for tht rueptiCtn.
After the dinnrr, during the departure of the Chiefs_ti·om
tht Forr, a one-gun salute uias sounded.
Wt, tht undersigned, ~rtb)' u1imtss that tht rtpl}' ".f
the main ltidian Clii~fs iu Ctur prestucc u1as exactl}' as
stattd abovt.
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their audience.

And, undeniably, the specifics of the situation were

generated by Russian sources.

Succinctly, the Pomo invitation to

cede land to the Russians was an invention of Russian convenience.
Diane Spencer-Hancock recently. (1981) entered an eloquent rendition
of this argument:
The Kashaya [Fort Ross Pomo] were thus used as a two-edged
diplomatic sword for the Russian empire: their existence was
initially denied to validate Russian right to colonize, yet
their status as a separate nation was recognized by the
Russians in an effort to thwart Spanish claims.
The document between the Russians and the Kashaya Pomo,
while unique in form, content and intent, clearly utilized
the Kashaya as a pawn in the game of international politics.
Knowledge of Russia's considerable hope of dramatically
extending her Pacific colonial empire suggests that this
document was but another step in the process by which the
Russians hoped to solidify their tenuous California claims,
However, one cannot help but admire the audacity of the
masterfully Machiavellian Russians in openly espousing
both sides of the Kashaya paradox. Under slightly different
circumstances they might well have suceeded in their efforts to
gain international recognition and sanc~~Bn of their
colonization attempt tn Alta California.
The potential of Native Californian "political" manipulation,
i.e., their desire to settle an advantageous contractual agreement
with Europeans remains unconsidered.

Their purported invitation is

termed an invention of imperialists seeking to justify a debated
claim to a piece of salubrious California. 551 This interpretation
of the event involves the overt acceptance of a major premise:

that

the Russians were imperialists, expansionists, "masterfully Machiavellian."

While historically not an indefensible position, does it not

involve, on a more subtle level, the acceptance of the child-like
state of Native Americans?

It is not a case of the maleficent Russian

imperialists, in a struggle for colonial domination, deceiving the
unsuspecting or nonresistant natfve, deprived of a political awareness?
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The easy assimilation of such an

~rgument

is caused by interpretative

bias, but more by the complete lack of Native Californian source material.
Initially, it should be clear that Russian manipulation of Native
Californians in their colonizi.ng effort is not disclaimed, but fully
accepted.

Inexorably, the Russians produced their claim to Pomo

territory after the fact--Fort Ross was settled in 1812, the treaty
signed in 1817.

It was surely a means of reinforcing a previous and

tenuous acquistion of territory.

A reconsideration of the Pomo-Russian

treaty should instead be functional in that it focuses more heavily
on the critical circumstances of the

nineteenth~century

Pomo and defines

the political awareness of those people.
The traditional lifestyle of Native Californians was in jeopardy
with the intrusion of Spanish peoples into Alta Californfa in the
eighteenth century.

The Natives saw the

organization of Alta California in 1769.

~eginni.ngs

of the Spanish re-

The coastal region, was

arranged spacially in the pattern familiar to Spanish expansion in
which missions, intending to civilize, violated the Native Californians'
cultural existence.

Additfonally, mission life decreased the population

of native peoples significantly through disease.

Wrangel served as a

sympathetic observer of the native plight in missionary California as
well as apologizer of Indian vengance,
A powerful enemy, such as the Europeans seem when they
first appeared must of necessi"ty inspired these harmless
tribes with great fear; but'when, on knowing them better,
they realized that their dreaded enemies were humans just
as they were themselves, only more unfeeling and unjust,
hot vtndicttveness ignited in their hearti. They ravaged
the herds of thetr oppressors, they stole their horses,
ambushed thei'r missfons and allowed them to be despoiled,
but only killed those Europeans that had made themselves
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most hated through their cruelty, for example, some evil
padre. But this thrust for vengenace never allows them
to go beyond the dictates of a certain feeling of compassion, it never reached ~g~ degree of brutal cruelty as
in the case of the Kolash.
The Spanish missionization effort, which began in the

southern

extremity of Alta California with the founding of the San Diego Mission,
steadily expanded, territorily and numerically.

Missionization pro-

ceeded northward, incorporating an increasing percentage of the American
population (see Figure 20).

Early in the course of mission expansion,

the Pomo were aware of the intended foreign intrusion into their
territory; In 1770, the District of San Francisco was established and,
with the founding of the San Francisco Mission and Presidio, a number
of Southwestern Pomo were interned.

San Francisco was the northernmost

district of Spanish California and it was adjacent to the southern
boundary of the Pomo homeland.

In 1777, the Mission of Santa Clara

and the San Jose Pueblo were founded also within the District of San
Francisco.

Before the turn of the century, a minimum of 600 Pomo were
known to have been baptised in San Francisco's district missions. 553
The percentage of Southwestern Pomo included in this figure is not known,
but it is know that the southern groups of Pomo were more significantly
affected than northern tribes.

Hence, it seems clear that a number of

Southwestern and probably Meteni Pomo were displaced as (1) Pomo territory was adjacent to the San Francisco District, and (2) the Russians
had not yet settled at Fort Ross and thus there was little protection
from the "attacks of sav.ages under the control of the Spaniards ... 11554
After the founding of Santa Clara and San Jose, Spantsh expansion
subsided and missfonization was not resumed for 20 years; at that time,
the San Jose Mission was constructed.

Then again there was a 20-year
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abeyance, interupted only in 1817 by the construction of the San
Rafael Mission, fifty miles north of San Francisco.

This too was

the year of the renegotiation and signing of the treaty between the
Russian-American Company and the Meteni-Pomo Americans.
Although Spanish and Russian colontal powers (as opposed to
British) shared a like attitude regarding the value, economically
and religiously, of native peoples, the methods of realizing these
attitudes differed substantially.

Both the Spanish and Russians'

conquests of natives peoples was in part a conquest of native labor
and souls.

(Whereas, P.ngl o... Ameri can preference constituted· 1erad i 555
cation through displacement, segregation, or extermination.)
Albeit the Spanish, in their quest for converts, were notoriously
harsher, ·native labor was as vital to Spanish agricultural production
as it was to Russian hunting, manufacturing, and husbandry.

To this

economic end, both Russians and Spaniards sought to incorporate
Native Californians into their social structure.

Racial interbreeding

and marriage were tolerated among the Russians. "creoles" were accepted
J

as imperial subjects, needless to say,subordinate in position to
pure-breeds. 556
Contemporaneous criticism of the violence of the Spanish missions
and its inefficacy in matters of conversion are not uncommon.
Institutionally, punishment was a part of the Spanish missionaries'
process of Native American transformation.

The Spanidards deemed

punishment necessary for their neophytes of civilization and gained
justification through the paternal metaphor.

Outsiders viewed it

an unjusti'fted violence but were blinded regarding the unhumartfless
their own practices.

Ni'neteenth-century observers described missionary
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Indians as receiving treatment like that of children, animals or
prisoners--depending on the

observe&~

For example, Wrangel 's

respectful description condemning the Spanish missionary

process~

Dazzled by the great advantages of the Europeans, who,
armed with firearms and riding their swift horses slay the
fleet deer, they appear timid; this timidity expresses itself in a certain dullness, which contrasts completely with
the acuteness with which the christian Padres drive those
unhappy people together in herds into their mtssions, and
treat them as beings unworthy of being called men, This
is generally the case; there are exceptions to this. One
would commit a great injustice if one were to call those
Indians dull; nature had provided their spirit and heart
with great gifts; in the missions they rapidly assume the
ranks of their teachers; they easily learn diverse arts
and crafts; they become daring and nimble horsemen, and
are accomplished in speaking the Spanish language. Since
they observe nothing on these first steps to civilization,
which could compensate for their lost freedom, they seize
every opportunity to retire back to their woods.557
While Kotzebue does not display a similar regard for the humanness
of the Native Californians, like Wrangel, he lambasted the Spaniards
for their punitive technique of conversion:
The Indians of Ross are so much like those of the missions,
that they may well be supposed to be1~ng to the same race,
however different their language. The appear indeed by no
means so stupid, and are much more cheerful and contented
than at the missions, where a deep melancholy always clouds
their faces, and their eyes are constantly fixed upon the
ground; by this difference is only the natural result of the
different treatment they experience.558
Zavalishin re-emphasized the discrepancy in colonizing methods, apologizing for the difference between Russian and Spanish treatment of Californians, consigning it to an inherent quality of tolerance among Russian
peoples!
... regarding the Indians I shall say a few words about their
relations with the Russians. Whoever has studted the Russian
national character knows very well that Russians, if they have
not been aroused by some special external ci'rcumstance, are
very good-natured and well-disposed to everyone, despite differences in religion, nationality, and social status. A Russian
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disdains neither a savage not a heterodox.,.Thus did
the Russians also treat the nomadic, half-savage, and
savage tribes. "It means such according to their faith"
or 11 Such is their custom," a sailor would say, and without disdain or mockery he would watch the strangest
things and perhaps sometimes merely add "wonderful people,
really wonderful~
No wonder the [Californian]
Indians liked the good-natured Russian sailors, SSpecially the generous and affectionate officers. 9
11

••••

Institutionally, Spanish means for civilizing Native /\mericans-Spaniardizing

them~-were

more developed and formalized than the early

integrating methods of the Russian-American Company.

The Russians sep-

arated themselves socially and physically from the Californians, but
to a lesser degree than did the Spaniards.

Fort Ross, representing

the Russians' colonizing structure, in an abbreviated form, allowed
areas for the Aleuts and California Natives, to establish themselves
traditionally, "At night .. ,usually remaining outside the pall isade,

560
11

The Aleut settlement was located to the south downhill from the fort,
near a workshop· and barracks.

At the time the Aleuts departed Fort

Ross, in 1838, there were 24 buildings (Russian style pine log dwellings) in their settlement, where the hunters had lived iwth their
. 561
f am1· 11es.
Spanish segregation of Californians was more severe.

The missions

isolated Indians completely from military and civilian structures of
the colonies.

Within these

missions~

Californians were to undergo

cultural and religious transformations that wou1d prepare them to live
in Spanish society.

Ostensibly the transformation would occur in a

determinable time inasmuch as missions, in theory, were to be

dis~

banned after a decade, allowi.ng new ones to emerge, extending the
frontter.

The disbanned mission sites were then to be parceled out

amoung the neophyte Spaniards who would continued to produce, but
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withoutSttpervision.

Secularization, however, was never accomplished

in ten-year's time; some missions were in existence for more than a
century.
In consideration of the above-described circumstances, it is not
unreasonable that Pomo Cheifs Tchu-Gu-An,

Aman~Tan,

and Gem-Le-Le were

willing to donate land for the already constructed Russian settlement.
Nor is it unreasonable that these people were "very pleased to see
Russians occupy this land for they now live in

s~fety

dians who used to attack them from time to time.

from other In-

This security began

only from the time of Russian settlement. 11562 That the Americans
sought contractual agreement from the Russians at Fort Ross, for these
considerations, is eloquently argued by Tikhmenev:
The desire of the natives to benefit by the Russian
presence strongly justified the occupation of the shores
near Rumiantsev Bay, especially since the Spaniards, who
had been close to these places for a very long time, had
shown no wish to enter into relations with the inhabitants.
Rumors of the oppression by the Californians of their
native subjects, particularly when compared to Kuskov's
behavior toward ~is neighbors, compelled the inhabitants of
Rumiantsev Bay to fear falling under the authority of the
Spanish presidios and Catholic monks, who had turned everything to their own advantage. The bonds between the Russians
and the natives were soon strenthened by family ties between the latter and many of the newly arrived Aleuts, ·so
that many of the natives did not confine themselves to
ordinary visits with their new relat~~3s, but came voluntarily to help them in their work ...
At the time the treaty was signed, the Pomo had already experienced five
years of relatively equitable treatment from the Russians, although this
relationship would eventually deteriorate.
decades of Spanish
the

advanci~g

~ggression:

This was in contrast to

Native Californtans were cognizant of

frontier of Spanish missionizatton, the Spaniard's

intention to displace free Indians to the missions, and also the
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violent nature of Spanish converts.

As Zavalishin proclaimed in 1824,

illustrating well the Russian position, "I have the full right to say
11564
that the Indians expected the best from the Russians.
And the
circumstances of Russtan California in 1817 offer no opposition to
this position.

Even at the ttme of the Russian'·s departure, the physical

design of the settlement "testifies to the peaceful relations between
the Russians and the local Indian population," as there were 50 Indian
buildings which stood outside the pallisade. 565 A decade after the
abandonment of Fort Ross, in 1851, there was intact a population of 500
Southwestern Pomo and Coast Miwok along the coast from Fort Ross to
San Francisco Bay. 566
The question of which party initiated the agreement is a moot point.
The 1817 treaty made by the Russian-American Company and the Pomo nation
appeared to satisfy needs of both parties.

It was a d.ocument that de-

livered to both nations promises of great value.

It offered and provided

the Natives an opportunity to maintain a semblance of their cultural
life in the face of Spanish destruction, which had been advancing at a
rapacious rate for fifty years.

To the Russian-American Company the

treaty offered, but could not deliver, the right to a strip of land
which would provision their northern colonies.
Was the Russian-Pomo treaty invalid, as Lutke suggested in 1818?
"The agreement with an illiterate individual who has no written language
or the slightest understanding of what a treaty means, may serve only
as leverage, .• and not as a ·fundamental right; and obviously will serve
no purpose. 11567 But apparently, the treaty did serve tts function between the Russians and the Meteni Pomo.

The Russians received their
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land and the Pomo apparently did not
site.

~egret

leaving Metini for a new

That the Spaniards did not recognize the treaty, and thus the

Russians' right to Alta California, lessened the treaty's value to the
Russians, not to the Pomo.
Perhaps the Russian Company employees did display Machavellian
techniques in an effort to sanction their right to colonial lands
which, in name, were within Spanish borders.

But thts does not

exclude the concomitant possiblity that the treaty was executed for
alt~~istic

purposes.

The Russians could protect the California Natives

from "attacks of savages under control of the Spaniards" without added
difficulty or cost to the Company.

Th~

compound at Fort Ross alone

served as a formidable deterent to native [or Spanish] hostility.

And,

as it has been documented, many Russian observers were sympathetic to
the plight of Native Californians.
Futhermore, the Russian-Pomo treaty served a very pragmatic purpose if Russian alt'P"4ism is yet unacceptable.
was

encount~red,

If Spanish resistance

as had been threatened, the treaty "obliged Indians

to be loyal and render help to the Russians should the occasion arise."
The treaty, in the least, provided security for the Russians as it
increased their numbers in case
violence.

Spanish~Russian

emnity turned to

There was another practical motive for the Russians to offer

the Pomo sanctuary--the economic factor.

Fort Ross, as had been true

for the entire Russian expansive enterprise, heavily depended on
native

skills and assistance,

The Aleut employee's skill and

interest were circumscribed by the demands of otter hunting.

The Meteni

Pomo, despite their technical ignorance, provtded the labor for husbandry
and manufacturing.

~
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,A'consideration that manipulation was two-fold is undeniably an

apology of the Pomo's strategy for coping with the contravening, everconsumi.ng Spanish forces in their homeland.

It is not intended as

either a denial of Russian expansionist tendencies or is it intended
in deference to the presently acceptable view of Native Americans.
Rather it is a critique, of the historicity of past interpretations,
only insofar as blind acceptance of the Russian's imperialism (to the
exclusion of Native Californian cognizance of foreign encroachment,
exploitation, and an awareness of the essential differences between
Spanish and Russian intruders) may well be little more than a continuation of the metaphorical child interpretation of the American
Natives.
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Petr
Kapiton

Petr.
A.:fi.ton
Ei;ci}J.:in

Petr

Sv. Ioarm

1743-44

1745

1745-46

1745-47

1747-48

1747-48

Simeon I
Ioann

Vessel

Nakv~sin

G. Chudinov

Sannikov

Dnftrf 1

Htkhailo NevodchiKov

E. Sannikov,
Basov

Basov

Sgt. Emel'ian Basov

Captain

-------------------

Date

1748

--

TABLE V

----~·--·

~·

-~·---.

Owner

Trapeznikov (Irkutsk)

Trapeznikov,
Ivan Rybinskii

Trapeznikov,
Fedor Kholodilov (Tot'ma),
Balin (Irkut'sk),
Zhutov (Iaroslav)

Basov,
Trapeznikov,
Andreian Tolstykh (Selengin'sk)

Afanasil Chebaevskii (Lal'sk)
Trapezntkov

Ni~ifor

Basov,

Basov,
A. Serebrenikov

Sgt. Emel' ian Basov

-·-

--·~·-·-

4010

1481

unk

320

7680

Continued

62,590

23,042

50,020

19,200

112 ,220

unk

64,000

unk
unk

Value in
Rubles

~

No. of
pelts

----·-

RUSSIAN FUR-GATHERING EXPEDITIONS, 1743 to 1800

-~--- ~-~~-- · - - - - - - .

~· ~ ~·---. . ••••

- ·

- - - - -

-~-

44

.....

Basov,
Trapeznikov
Trapezn1kov

F. Kholodflov,
Trapeznikov
Basov,
Trapeznfkov
Rybinskff,
Trapeznikov
Trapeznfkov

S11a Sheyrin,
Bu tin
E. Sannfkov
Basov

Aleksef Yorob'ev

unk

Nikolai,
Boris I
Cleb
Ioann
Petr

Simeon I
Ioanr.

Nikolai

1749-50

1749-52

1750-52

1750-52

1750-53

1749-50

Dm1trf 1 Nakvas in

Perk"'., I
ZaP?at

1748-49

Petr

lo::.m:

1747-49

3510

10,430

unk

unk

1965

766

unk

pelt~

No. of

·--~·- ~ ~------ ...............

Shilkin (Sol'vyechodsk)
Ivan Bakhov.
•
Nikita Shalavrov.
Nov1kov (lrkut'sk)

Owner

---- ----

unk

Captain

.-

Andrei Vsevidov

Vessel

-~~~----

unk

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

L.__

-

105,730

61,520

Conti'nued

wrecked

95,960

3127

39,376

4780

5990

Value in
Rubles

N

w
""'

-~- ~

~ .j

V. Obukhov

Andrian Tolstykn

R. Ournev
unk

Joann
Joann

Nikolai
Fish

1753··55

1755

1756-57

1757

1753-55

P. Bashmakov

?

Jsrenri.ia

1755

Gleb

unk

Alekset Oruzh1nin

Boris I

1752-55

But in

Boris I

1751-52
Gleb

G. ruzovtsev

Joann

1750-54

Captain

Vessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

S. Krasfl'nikov

Trapeznikov

Trapeznikov.
Balin

Kho 1odil ov,
Traperni kov

Rybtnski i.
Serebrenni kov

Kholodilov

Trapezni kov

Trapezni kov

E. lugov

Owner

.................................................... _ _ _.,.......,....

-

....

...

2318

5938

3069

urak

2080

1600

1,495

unk

10.721

pelts

No. of

.......... _.... .................................. ""'...

_

.a:. ........

Continued

14, 380

189.262

95,690

109.355

65.~60

80,000

3,473

11.650

65.429

Value in
Rubles

....... ~ .......................................

N

..i:-

.......

•• · - · - · - - - ·

~
• --- •

-J

17,330

150,270

532

4356

Sol'vychegodsk,
Ivan Zhikin
Rybtnslctf,
Serebrenni kov

St. Kozhevnikov

Bashmakov,
A. Serebrenntlcov

Kapiton

Petr I
E'®•:?l

1757-61

175'.l-61

Continued

37,541

10,975

Balin,
Zhukov,
Trapeznilcov

A. Tolstykh

Andreian I
Na!at 'ia

1756-59

50,365

1530

Rybfnskif,
Serebrennf kov

Value in
Rubles

Bashmalcov

Petr I
Pcvel

1756-58

pelts

No. of

14,438

Owner

2318

r:.111i

175•1-58

Cap ta In

............... ~---"""""" .............................

S. Krasil 'nikov

unk

Vessel

~~---

Oate

CONTINUED

TABLE V

...... _____ ..........

0'1

........i

N

... ..........................

___
.._

.........

_

............._ _..

... ........,,..

.............................. ~..........-.

P. Verkhoturow,
R. Ournev
unk
Cherepanov

Ioann
E'l'edtecha
Adrian

Zakharii

1758-63

1762

1759-62

Cavriil
G. Pushkarev

Nasedktn

Nikolai

1758.63

1760-62

Dn1trt1 Pankov

Vladinrir

1753-63

ief~iza-

Stephan Glotov

Iu!!.1rr

Cap ta in

.-...~......._..............,.....,

1758-62

--- .........

Vessel

_______

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

.._

... ...

....

Iv. Bechivin (Irkutsk)

Posinkov (Shutsk)
Kul 'kov (Vologda)
Kras i1' nikov

Chebavsk11

A. Chebavsk11.
Trapezntkov

Trapeznikov

Kras i1' ni kov,
Trapeznikov

Iv. Hikiforov (MoscQ,.,)
Snigivew (Tobil'sk)
Tra pezn i kov

Owner

.... ........ .._._ .................................. ........_... ........... . .

...
..-.

....... . .

1794

2280

unk

2476

1891

2312

4372

Ho. of
pelts

........................... ~~

Continued

52 ,570

101,430

unk

104,218

58.170

78,340

130,540

Vdlue in
Rubles

......... .........

...
...

....................

°'

"

N

...

...................................

--

-...-:.-

---~---

............

______

.._

....._-....

......

..........._

--

Andrei -:m I

1763
?

Ioann

1761-63

Pavel

Petr I

Natal "i.a

1762-63

1760-64

unk

lakov Protasov,

Popov

Iv. lapin

D. Medvedev

Kholodilov,
Tolstykh

T. Chebavskii,
Vas. Popov

Iv. Bakhov,
N. Shalavrov

Owner

--~-----~----~~-

Rybinskii,
Se rebrenn i kov

... .................

Bashmakov

To ls tykh

Al. Vorobiev

Ioami
Ustiu::h-

. 1760-63

skii

Iv. Rakhov

Captain

Vera,
Nr.J.Jezhda.
Liubou'

Vessel

............................... ~~..._- ............... _......,_.......... .-..... ......

1759-65

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

...

913

unk

464

5838

unk

31.817

unk

17,040

170,000

5409

Value in
Rubles

Continued

Exploration

No. of
pelts

N

.......
.......

·~

'

Value in
Rubles

unk

unk

42,280

10,524

1697

341

Grigorii,
Peter Panov

Trapeznilcov

lv. Solov'ev,
E. Delarov

unit

Petr I
Pavel

Nikolai

1964-66

1766

Conti"nued

unit
unit

Trapezniltov

L. Nasedltin

Nikolai.

68,r>OO

unlc

Popov,
Popov,
Chebaevsltoi

Glotov

Adreian I
Natat'ia

1762-66

1963

unit

unit

pelts

Ho. of

Trapezni ltov

Fedor !<ol ikov,
Vasi 1i f Kol H:ov

Owner

Korovin

P. Druzhinin

Captain

Troitaa

veta

I Eli::a-

Zak h::wi i

Vessel

1762-63

1762-63

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

N

.........
00

-----·-

-

.

Petr I
Pavsl

Vladimir

Pavel

1765-69

1766-70

Ustiuzhskii

Ioann

?

Vessel

1764-68

1764-68

1766

Oate

CONTINUED

TABLE V

--~--.

37 ,547

83,387

68,520

5832

5370

2695

Trapeznilcov

Kras11 'nfkov

Af. Orelchov.

V. Sof'fn

Al. Sapozhn1kov

Af. Ocheredfn

Continued

98,804

2962

Popov,
Chebaevskii

V. Shoshin

Shilov

132,806

3822

Value in
Rubles

No. of
pelts

Popov

Owner

unk

Captain

\0

N
........,

Popov.
Peloponisov

unk

Orekhov.
Zasypkin,
Mulch in
Protod' faltonov.
Okonnfshnikov

St. Cherepanov
Solov'ev

unk

baidarka

Nilwlai

Prokopii

1772

1773

1773

Novfkov

Popov

unit

Ioann
Ustiuzhskii
Sv. Ioann
Predtecha

1772

unit

G. Peloponisov.
Popov.
Lapin

l. Vtorushin

Adrian
'4dreian I
Natal'ia)

1767-72

1772

Panov Bros.

Iv. Korovin

P.?tr I
Pavel

1770

Owner

Cap ta in

Vessel

Date

CONHNUED

TABLE V

640

5205

503

7724

4386

4470

10.367

No. of
pelts

Conttnued

20, 130

---

140,670

15,000

18.747

111,889

109,943

284.868

Value in
Rubles

N

CX>
0

511. Alek-

177~·74

Pavel

Petr I
Pavel

Mikhail
Nikolai

Nikolai
Prokopii

Vladimir

1770-75

1776

1777

1777

1778

1778

1779

sandr
Nevski.i

baidarka

Vessel

1774

Oat~

CONTINUED

TABLE V

Bocharov

Zaikov

[)n.

unk

Petushkov

Polutov

Korovin

Solov'ev

Pankov

unk

Captain

Shilov.
Lapin.
Orekhov,
Pelopontsov

Pro tod ' 1a konov.
Okonnishnikov,
Fedor Shubin

Pro tod' iakonov,
Okonnishnikov

Lebedev,
Shelekhov

Kholodil ov

Panov

I

Orekhov,
Shit ov
Lapin

Serebrennikov.
Aleksi Arkashev,
An. Shaposhnikov

tlovikov

Owner

13.066

40,SGO

405

890

7236

unk

6104

6024

40

Ho. of
pelts

Continued

300 ,416

qa.a110

6922

15,600

166,056

6915

137 .455

136.050

1660

Value in
Rubles

~---~-----~ ·----~--

....

- _

N

00
t-a

Aleksandr
Nevskii
Va:rfolomei
I Val"iava

Zostiru I

1781

1781

1781

1781

Pavel

1781

I::osim I
Sawatii

Savatii

Pavel or
Petr I
Pavel

Nevskii

eartdJ'

Alek-

Petr I
Pavel

Eupl

Vessel

1779

1779

1779

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

Do1zhantov

tint·

Koreltn,
Cherepanov

Shi en,
Sosnin

G. tzmailov

Sapozhrlkov,
Tret' lakov

S~shin

Delarov,

F. Putintsev

Sapozhnikov

Captain

...

Owner

..............................

Kleselev Bros.

Protasov

Shelf khov,
Savel 'ev,
Pcinov Bros.

Panov

Orekhov,
Shilov,
Lapin

Shelfkhov,
Luka A11n

Panov

P. Osoktn,
Mikhai 1 Shvetov

F. Buren in

. ·--......._ ........ _...
........ .........................

_.................
,..._

unk

10.156

13,991

unk

18,679

37,296

unk

wrecked

4512

No. of
pelts

_.... ................

___ ._......._.......... ...................... _ ..................................

40,215

49.215

57,860

41,948

172,020

74,240

unk

52,520

Value in
Rubles

..........

Continued

-·~--

...

N

00
N

Paikov,
Polutov
Ocheredin,
Polutov
Danilo Shlroltof,
A. Sapozhnf kov

Nikolai

K!irrae11t

Ioa1111

1785

1185

1785

1786

1786

1786

1785

Pe tushkov

Androei

1784

Zhuravle,
Krivorotov
Orekhov,
Shil OV.

Hukhoplev
Tiutrfn,
Menshikov
Bacharov
Po tap Za f kov

Mfkhail
Ioann
Ryl'skii
Prokop II

Pavel

Lapin

Shelfkhov

r.holodilov

Pankov,
Ko rel in

Panov Bros.

Gol lkov,
Shelf khov

Panov Bros.

Panov Bros

Golikov,
Shelfkhov

Shelfkhov

Owner

Eupl

Pre eke ha

Bocharov

Captain

Nat:zliia

Vessel

1782

!late

CONTINUED

TABLE V

;

8452

wrecked

20,976

unk

5142

2836

4147

6635

6SlS

810

No. of
pelts

Conti-nued

35,219

93,827

unk

11. 746

63,417

89, 160

. 127 ,834

133,lSO

100,9SO

Value fo
Rubles

N

co
w

Georgii
Pobedonose ta
Izosim I

1789

1791

Petr I
Pavel

Tri

1787

1786
SIJiatitelia

Vamatia I
Varfolomel

1791

Savvatii

Georgii

Zosinr: I
Sarutii

NeviJkii.

1787

1786

A!e~-

1786
sar...tr

!.lekst!i

Vessel

1786

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

G. lzmatl av

T. Sapozhnt kov

Mukhoplev,
Korel in

P. Savel'ev

G. Pribylov

unk

unk

P. Zaikov

Delarov

Captain

Gol ikov,
Shelfkhov

l. Alfn

Shelikhov,
Savel 'ev,
Panov Bros.

Protasov,
Kiselev

lebedev,
Shel ikhov

Panov Bros.

Protasov

Orekhov,
Shilov,
lapin

Panov Bros.

Owner

unk

unk

unk

53,209

44,436

1571

26,854

45,401

6155

No. of
pelts

Continued

56,000

35,2?9

109,733

171,914

285,081

40,300

86,97~

238,700

63,367

Value ;n
Rubles

N

00

~

-.:;

.'likh.1il

Pavel

Simeon

Georgii
Nikolai
Joann
Predtecha
NikhaiZ

Phoeni.r

Aleksandr

1790

1793

1793

1795

1790

1792

1795

1795

Vessel

1789

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE V

lzmail ov

Shields

Delarov

D. Shf rokf kh

Sosh in

Balakirew

lzmafl ov

Zaikov

Bocharov

Cap ta in

Golikov,
Shelf khov

Golf kov,
Sheti khov

Gol fkov,
Shelf khov

Golikov,
She11 khov

Kozf tsyn

Panov BN>s.

Golikov,
Shelf khov

lebedev,
lastochkin

Gol ikov,
Shelfkhov

Owner

77,745

13,031

14 ,583

wrecked

unk

33,266

unk

unk

unk

No. of
pelts

Continued

276,500

321.131)

376,000

unk

73.0!lO

128,000

102, 108

300,'lOO

Value in
Rut.. I es

t:x>
,_,,

N

SiMSon I
Anna
IzosiM I

1797

1797

1800

Orel

1797

Ioann

Savvatii

Ceo1•;11'.i

Vessel

1797

Date

CONTlNUED

TABLE V

Shiroktkh

Zailcov

Olnitrti Bocharov

~.

Taltn

Gr. Konova 1ov

Captain

lebedev-lashtochkin

Khelev

Golikov,
Shel ikhov

Golikov,
Shelikhov

lebedev-Lashtochkin

Owner

unk

11,998

unk

822

73,956

No. of
pelts

unk

38,860

51,01)0

21,912

183,200

Value in
Rubles

N
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Fi·gure 21. Number of merchants participating in Russian fur t'rade, . 1743-1803~·- ......B~~·~d on
data listed in TABLE V.
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stabilit~

number of individual merchants ?.Jho
were willing and able to invest in
voyages ~hich wel'e of gl'eater duration and l'equired sturdier vessels,
more provisions, etc. In other wonis,
the cost of these voyages had become
a prohibitive factor for many merchants.

C. A constant dol.JmJCU'd tl'end in the

increased and showed greater
throughout the period.

B. The ruunber of individual companies

Figure 22. Number of merchants participating in Russian fur trade, 1743-1802 {ten-year
moving averages). Based on data given in TABLE V.
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A. Period of fur gathering initiated
by Emel'ian Basov in 1?43. Basov's
ventures came in response to the
valuable cargo (900 sea otter pelts)
brought back by ChiPikov in 1741.
The nwr:ber of individual merchants
paPticipating in the tPade steadily
increased follOlJing the success of
Basov's voyages.
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given in TABLE V.
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figure 27. Value (in rubles) of fur catch, 1747-1796 (three-year moving averages).
data given in TABLE V.
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TABLE VI
PARTICIPANTS IN

RUSSIAi~

FUR-GATHERING EXPEDITIONS

1743-1803

Owner
Ali n
Arkashev
Bakhov
Balin
Basov
Bechevin
Buren in
Chebaev ski i
Go 1 i kov
Iugov
Kiselev (Bros.)
Kholidilov A.
Kholidilov, F.
Krasil'nikov
Krivirtov
Kul i kov
Lapin
Lebedev-Lastochkin
Mu khi n
Niki forov
Nikonov
Okonnishikov
Orekhov
Osok in
Panov (Bros.)
Peloponisov
Popov
Posnikov
Pro ta sov
Protod' i ankonov
Ry bins kii
Savel 'ev
Serebrenikov
Shalaurov
Shaposhni~ov

Shelikhov
Shil ov
Shubin

No. of

Years of

Vo~es

Vo~es

1

6
2
4

1776-1779
l 77C- l 774
1748-1765
1747-1759
1743-1750
1760-1762
1773-1779
1745-1768
1777-17 97
1750-1754
1777-1803
1749-1786
1747-1755
1754-1769

1

1780-wrecked

1
2
4
5
1

1
6
12
1
3

2
10

1759-1763
17 61-1791

7

1777-1800

1
1
2

1768-1773
1758-1762
1770-1774
1771-1778
1776-1791

3

7
1

1774-wrecked

13
1

1764-1793

8
1
4

1760-1772
1759-1762
1761-1791
1771-1778
1747-1763
1771-1791
1745-1774
1748-1765

3

6
2
6

2
1
21

7
1

unk.-1772

1770-1774
1774-1799
1766-1791
1774-1778

Success of
Expeditions
(in Rub 1 es)
74,240 r.
136,050 r.
4,780 r.
295,567 r.
265,616 r.
52,570 r.
52,520 r.
295,567 r.
l_,727,167 r.
65,429 r.
259, 989 r.
808,642 r.
103, 024 r.
277,559r.

0 r.
101,430 r.
1,130,263
862,316
140,670
130,450
16,660
125 ,892
952,320

r.
r.
r.
r.
r.

r.

r.

0 r.
1. ,009,016 r.
18,747 r.
577 ,356 r.

101,430 r.
308,099
125 ,8 92

369,835

r.
r.
r.
r.
r.
r.
r.
r.
r.

167, 598
418,775
4,780
136,050
2,538,930
952,320
98,840 r.

Continued
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TABLE VI
CONTINUED

Owner

No. of
Voyages

Shvetsov
Sibiriakov
Snigirev
Tolstykh

1
1
1

Trapezni kov

23

Tyrin
Vsevidov
Za sypki n
Zhil kin
Zhukov
Zhuravlev

2

Years of
Voyages
1774-wrecked
1779-1785
1758-1762
1745-1764
1745-1768

Success of
Expeditions

--

0
63,417
130,450
170,020
1.596.273

r.
r.
r.
r.
r.

6

17 4 7 - ·1 I 6 -~

1

1747--1749

)69 J:35 ,.
5,990 r.

1

1768-1773
1748-1757
1756-1759
1780-wrec keel

140,670
22,110
317,541
0

2

1
1

r.
r.
r.
r.
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Fi9ure 30. Voyage of the Rurik, 1815-1818.- Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian
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r.))

AMERICA (

SOUTH

l---.1~-'-.

~£:::;:>

r/

.}

.....' -·

/\._~

(

----- --- - ----

~------ ~

N
\.0
\.0

I

'\

--J

,

r

1

~~~~

j

1-/ '. . '.

)~57

( allao
j_

. .,. .. ..

ATLANTIC\'

'l._. '

( \

!;

.·,

·'

··~--/-1

AFRICA

OCf:AN

~~y

........ :

,

~

1n1••

.

.

,. ... ,... \\]

~'"~"''

l<.I\\

OCEAN

\\.H•jon'~

I" I.

-~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

OCEAN

ASIA

,,l.

\l• . ii_

....

\_ .· '

(I I
,(:/

l ,_, ·- \

0
Y·-·"
"'--1

'

z

,,

"· "" ""'

.....,,.,411, ::.

•

.,,, .

..........

.-~-

',
"I

~
... ,_._-~-\

~\

·

I.

(

J

.'

• , .. •\

t:.LJ ROPI71<;.
I
,,
"'" I ,.
J -·,,1- '·;JI

~·

(() \
t.·

/--

.. '"

!:'- -

t,

' .. , .. .. ..

I

( c L

..

·~ ~

Figure 31. Voyage of the Kamchatka, 1817-1819. Reprinted from A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Round-the-World Voyagesg 1803-1849, trans. Glynn Barratt (Kingston, Ontario: The
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TABLE VII
PARTICIPANTS IN RUSSIAN CIRCUMNAVIGATIONS,
1803 to 1833
Ship

~adezhda (180~·06)

Com~andcr,

Capt.·Lt. Ivan
Fedorovich Kru:henshtcrn

Lt. Makar

Ratm~nov

Lt. Fedor Romberg
Lt. Petr Colovachev

Lt. Ermolai Levenshtcrn
·Midshipman Faddci Bcllingshauscn
(Bellingsgau:cn)
NavigJtor Filipp Kamen'shchikov
Assistant S3vigator Vasilii
Spolokhov
Dr. Karl Espcnbcrg
Sub-physician Ivan Sidgam
Astronomer Horner
Naturalist Tilesius
Naturalist Langsdorf
Naval Cadet Otto Kot:cbuc

SC\"3

d.
d.

\\'cnt ahroaJ.
Went abroad.
d. 185 :! •
d. in retirement :i:-;
Capt. (1st r:rnk 1.

d.

Saval Cadet Merit: Kot:ebue
Envoy to the Court of J3pan,
Actual Counsellor of State,
Nikolai Petrovich Re:3nov
Major Ermolai Frideritsi
Cuards Lieutenant Count Fedor
Tolstoi
Court Counsellor Fedor Foss
Artist Stepan ~urliandtscv
Dr. Brinkcn (Brykin)
R.·Amer. Comp3ny Agent Fedor
Shcmclin
Lower ranks: 51'
.Ship

d. lS~b; aJ~iral;
attached to Iii~
Imperial ~bjcsty's
suite.
d. 1833; vi,c·aJrn.;
duty gencr:i l.
Died in the scrvicc
ns a captain.
Shot self in 1806
on St. Hcl~na Island.
J.
d.

d. 1807 in t\ra~n01Jr:o;K,
on return j ourn1.•y i1·or.1

t\nmch:itkn.

d.
(1803-06)

CommanJcr, Capt. Lt. lurii
fcJorovich Lisianskii
Lt. Pavel Arbu:ov
Lt. Petr Povalishin

Midshipm:in Fedor Kovcdiaev
Midshipman Vasilii BcrLh

d. 1837; in n.•tirrr.!e11t

sinct-

l8U~:

Capt.

(1st r:rnk).
d. 1837 in rd.

d. in the
C:ipt.
d.

183~;

scrvi~c

3~

Colon~l;

section h..:aJ in llyJro-

graphy Depot.

Dr. Merit: Lab3nd
Navi&ator Danilo Kalinin

Perished in the wrec~
of the ~· 1813.

Assistant Navigator Fedor
Mal'tsov
·
Assistant Surgeon Aleksei Mutovkin
Hicromonk Cedeon
Clerk Nikolai Korobitsyn
Lower ranks: 42

Continued
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TABLE VII
CONTINUED
Ship

~

(1806-07)

Commlnder, Lt. Leontii Vasil'evich

GJgemeistcr

d. 1833 as Capt. Cl1't ·

rank).

(Hagemeist~r)

Lt • l-lo r i tz Bc r k h

d.

Lt. Aleksandr Ko:lianinov

Na\'. Ivan Vasil'ev

d. in the service.
d. 1832, Captain in
charge of the Instr~
ments Bureau, Hydro
graphy Depot.

Assistant Nav. Efim Klochkov

Karl Nordgorst
Agent Rodion Zakharov
Lower ranks: 36

Sur~eon

Co~pany

. Ship Suvorov (1813-16)
Commander, Lt. Mikhailo Petrovich

d.

La:arev

Lt. Semen Unkovskii
Lt. Pavel Povalo·Shveikovskii
Navigator Maksim Samsonov.

d. in ret.

Navigator (hired) Aleksei
Rossiiskii
Navigator (hired) Iosif
Dcsil'e
Dr. f.gor Sheffer (Georg Anton

Jumped ship in l'ort
Jackson.
Subsequently Bra:ilian
F.nvoy at one of the
German Courts.

Schaeffer)
Supercargo German Molvo

Clerl Fedor Krasil'nikov
Loaer ranks: ~6
Hunters:

Hri~ ~~

7

1\SlS-181

Com111:111lkr, l.t. Otto I:vst;if'ell•"h

Kot
Lt.

zebu~

Gl~h

~1

.

f

;i

IS~{)

Hl

yQ?'t,..

pt. . ( I ~ 1 t'3 n ~ \ .

(I. I s.~5, l~Lt c adn· .•
rn111m:1nd 1 ;.e, .1 C11.i rc:S

Shishmnr~v

~q11ipag~.

Ivan Zakh:irin
,\pp n.· n t i et· !\a v i g :i t o r \'a...;. i I i i
Kh romc hl' 11 ko
:\ppn•nt icl..' !\avigator \'l:lll1111i r
l.t.

Pc: t

TO\'

Apprentice Navigator Mikl1aill1

nr.

l\oJ"('llC\'
l\':111 [schscholts

~.:ituralist

1'llallh•rt Chami:--~ll

~atural i!'t Vor111:d.l'l '1l ll\\)n11:-;h1i1'.dl
:\rti:H C:horis (to Sitkh:1I
Lo~cr

ranks:

d.

I" I'),

ret.1

reci

I 111,I r:111I: 1.
,\. 1 n 'tlJ£. S~rv

ft·.

'°'' ca.Sent: ct:

1

(apt:.

<..e.-.

in

. A111tri

lven t ati r~o.,.d .
11et1 t. ab tcad.

21

Ship ~utu:o~ (18lb·l9)

CommanJer, Capt. Lt. Lcontii
Vasil'evich Hngcm~i~tcr
Lt. Aleksandr Selivanov

d. tK.i9. rc-~r-aJm.,
ml•mbcr o t' G~n.
Committee of ~.:i\·al

Intend.

Continued
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TABLE VII
CONTINUED
Lt. ~il' ~ropotov
Resc r\'e MiJsh i pman Otto Jc Roberti
S3vig. Efim Klochko\'
Nav. Jv:in ~isl:lkov$kii
HircJ navig. Pro~opii Tumanin
(to Ross)
Staff Surgeon Lavrcntii Kerner
(to colonies)
Supercargo Kiril Khlcbnikov
(to Sitkha)

d. 1827, C~pt.·Lt.
d. 1Sl7 at Sitkh~.

d.

J. in Comp:111v

~en ii."('.

d. 1830, Comm1.:rl." ia l
:rnJ Con:p:111y

Counsellor
Director.

Clerk Aleksandr Meshchovskii
Lo'"er ranks: 49
Hunters: .a

Ship Suvorov (1816-18)
d. 1830, Lt. -Col.
t nspec tor of Scho·,;
of Navigators.
d. Capt. (1st rant>
in ret. ~ Lt.

Commander, Lt. Zakhar Jv3novich
Ponafidin
Semen Ianovskii (to Sitkha)
Lt. Valeriian Novosil'tsov
Nav. Oionisii Zarcmho
N:ivig. Andrei Doma!'hnc\"
Agent Fedor Krasil'nikov
Clerk Iona Sukhanov
Surgeon Vasilii Bervi
Surgeon Lavrcntii Kerner (frorn

Lt.

colonies)
Lower ranks:

d.

30

Sloop

Kamchatk~

(1817-19)

Commander, Capt., 2d R:ink, V3silii
~ikhailovich Golovnin
Lt. M:itvcy Murav'e\'

Lt. Nikandr Fil:itov
Lt. Fedor Kutygin
Midshipman Fedor Litke (LUtke)
Midshipman Baron Ferdinand
\'rangcl' ('frangt'll)
Naval Cadet Ardalion Lutkovskii
Nav3l Cadet Step3n Artiukov

Naval Cadet Feopt'mt Lutkovskii
~aval Cadet Vikcntii T3bulcvich
Collegiate Secretary ~3tiushkin
Navigator Crigorii Nikiforov
Assist. Nav. Prokopii ~o:min
Assist. N3\'. Iv3n Afan3s'ev
Nav. apprentice Petr Il'in
Staff Surgeon Anton Novitskii
Artist Mikhailo Tikhanov
Lo"'er ranks: 119

d. 133 ~. M:ij·or ·Gen. 1'01Tl.
mt'rnher of Uchctn.

d.

Admiral. GeneralAdjutant.

d. 1821 in Holl~r.
on Aiaks.
d. OnTcn-ice '-'it
Black Se:i Fleet.

See No. 1 S.
d.
d.

d • in 0 k ho t s k , Lt C.o l .
inspector of navi
d.

Continued
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.Ship Borodino (1819-21)
Commander, Lt. Zakhar' Ivanovich
Ponafidin
Lt. Vsevolod Ponafidin
Lt. Petr Chisti3kov
Lt. Dmitrii Nikol'skii
Navigator Dionisii Zarembo
Navigator Mikhailo Prokof 'ev
(to Sitkha)
Navigator Aleksandr Kil'khen
(to Sitkha)
Hired Navigator Petr Resukhin
Surgeon Karl Shpigel'berg
Supercargo Fedor Krasil'nikov
Lower ranks: 80
Hunter&: 27

d. in ret.
d.
d. 1833. Capt. 2nd Ra"(
d. 1833, Lt., in

Company serdce.

d. during the voyage.

Ship Kutu:ov (1820·22)
Commander, Lt. Pavel Afanas'evich
Dokhturov
Lt. Valeriian Novosil'tsov
(to Sitkha)
Lt. Vladimir Romanov
Lt. Pavel Naumov
Navigator Ivan La:arev
Nav~gator

Omitrii Iakovlev

d. ·18Ji in ret., Actuci~
Counsellor of State.

d.
dro•ned in 1834, at
Lovisa, as Lt.
d. in the service,
as Capt.

Dr .. Vasilii Bervi (to Sitkha)
Dr. Va$ilii Volkov (on return
voyage)
Agent Sergei Chernyshev
Clerk Stepan Kitaev
Lo'Wcr ranks: 45
Hunters: · 26

Brig

~

Commander, Navigator 12th Class,
Efim Alckseevich Klochkov·
Assist. Navig. Maksim Samsonov
Assist. Navig. Vasilii Nabokov
Assist. Nav. Ivan Vasil'ev
Lower ranks: 22
Hunters: 6

(1821)

d. in the ~~rvicc, Capt.
d. in the service, Lt.

Conttnued
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TABLE. VII
CONTINUED
Ship

~V..£.!i!.

Commander, Navigator 14th Clas~,
lvJn Mikhailovich Kislakovskii
.Assist. Navig. Mikhailo No:ikov

( 1S21)
d. 1833, Lt., at
Okhotsk.

Assist. Nav g. Sikolai Antonov
Assist. Nav g. Mikhailo Pashinnikov
Lo~er ranks
17
Hunters: 14

<l. in the

~cn·i,e.

Frifate Kreiser (1822·25)
Co:nmander, Capt. 2nd Rank Mikhz.ilo
Petrovich la:arev
Lt. Ivan Kad'ian
Lt. Mikhailo Annenkov
Lt. Ivan Kupreianov
Lt. Fedor Vishnevskii
Lt. Dmitrii Nikol'skii (to Sitkha)
Midshipman Pavel Nakhimov
Midshipman Dmitrii Zavalishin
Micshipman Ivan Butenev
Midshipman Pavel Murav'ev
Midshipman Efim Putiatin ·
Midshipman Aleksandr Domashenko
Dr. Petr Aleman

Navigator Pantelei Kononov
Navigator Vasilii Klopotov
Assist. Nav. Trifanov
Lower ranks:

dismissed in 18!6.
(later adminl)
(exiled to Siberia)
d. 1826, fligcl'·
ad'iutant, Capt. 2nd r.
d. 1848, State Counsell~r
and Director of the
Mercantile Marine School
Adjutant-General,
Count.
dro~ned off Sicily,
Sept. 18:?i.
d. 18~7. Actual State
Counsellor and senior
surgeon with the Black
Sea Fleet.
d. in ret.
d. 1849 as Capt. See
No. 31.
d. Staff-Capt., Keeper
of Maga:ines.

162
Ship Elena

(J8~4·~6)

Com~ander,

Lt. Petr Egorovich
Chistiakov (to Sitkha)
Captain 2nd Rank Matvei lvanovich
Murav'ev (on ret. voyage)
Lt. Zakhar' Salk
Lt. Nikolai Shishmarev
Lt. Aleksandr Stadol'skii
N3vigator Nikolai Rodionov
Ass~st. Navig. Dmitrii Iakovlcv
Sea=.an Adol'f Kristiern
Surgeon Ivan Sakharov
Agent Ivan Severin
Lower ranks: 41

d. in the service

Continued
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TABLE VII
CONTINUED
.

~

(1828-30)

Commander, Capt.·Lt. Vasilii
Step3novich Khromchenko
Lt. Baron Lavrentii Levendal'
(Loewendal)
Lt. Petr Dmitriev
Company Navigator Aleksandr
Kashevarov
Pilot Otto Greil
Dr. Vebel'
tompany Agent Arakelov
Clerk Vasilii Kashevarov
Passenger, Captain 1st Rank Pavel
Kuzmishchev

d.

d. 1850 as Re3r-Adm;,
Port Captain 3t
Arkhangel 'sk.

Passenger, Titular Counsellor Til'
Lower ranks: 38

Naval transport Amerika (1831-33)
Commander, Capt.-Lt. Vasilii
Stepanovich Khromchenko
Lt. Egor' Tsebrikov
Lt. Fedor Bodisko
Cadet Andrei Freigang
Sub-Lt., Navigator's School
Aleksandr Kashevarov
Sub·Lt., Navigator's School
Kristian Klet
Sub-Lt., Navigator's School
Vasilii Zhivodarov
Pilot Aleksandr Khalezov
Botanist Lushnat (to Rio and back)
Staff ·Surgeon Averkii Skrypchinskii
Lower ranks: 54
Ship

El~na

Lt.-Col.
Went abroad.

(1835)

Commander, Lt. Mikhailo Dmitricvich
Tchcn'kov
Lt. Rostislav Mashin
Company Pilot AlcksanJr l\halcz.ov
Pilot Mikhailo Murashcv
CaJct Konstantin Timkovskii
Surgeon Nikolai VolynskiJ

Agent Aleksandr Rotchrv
I.owe r ranks:

26

Ship Nikolni (1837-39)

Commander, Capt.-Lt.
AnJrcevich Berens

Evgcnii

Lt. Vasilii Zavoiko

Conti.nued

309

TABLE VII

CONTINUED
Sh i p

~i

ko 1a i ( l!B9 - ·11)

C0!1l"l:'lndcr, ·on the \'0::~1g1.• tr> <iit~.ha,
C: :'I j? t . :: n cl =~an}· :in <l ~n.e1igelf
~c~igna~c qf the Co~pan~-colonics
:\dol' f Karlovich Etol in CEtholcn}

Cor.manc.lcr of the \"C'S5el, Lt.
~ikolai

Lt.

Kondrat'cvich Kadnikov

c.lro...-ned in the Comr:iny'··

service in 1842.

lv;1n R.'.lrtram

Savigator, Staff-Capt.
\':irlaam Sergc.'CV
Phv5ician ~lck5andr Romanovskii
· (on return voyage from Si tkha)
Comm:inJcr on the voyage fro~ Sitkha
Compa~r

Can.t •. 1.:-t Rank and form('r

Manager of the colonies

r·: .l\.·l\t1preianov
Commander of the vessel, Capt.-Lt.
Stepan Vasil'evich Voevodskii
Lt. Ho5tislav Mashin
Navigator's School Ensign
Aleksandr Khalezov
Staff-Surgeon Eduard Rlashke
(Blaschke)
Company official Kostromitinov
tower ranks: 40

Vice-Adm.

Ship Naslednik Aleksandr (1840)

Commander, Capt.·L~. Dionisii
Fcdorovich Zarembo
Lt. Arkadii Voevodskii
Lt. Egor Ogil'vi
Navigators School Sub-Lt.
Aleksandr Gavrilov
Dr. Aleksandr Frankcngeizer
(Frankcnhciser)
Agent Valerian Bazhcnov
Lower ranks: 30

Vice-Adm.

Adapted from listing in A. A. Ivashintsov, Russian Roundthe-World Voyagesj 1803-1849 (Kfnston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1980 , pp. 136-150.
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Figure 34. Fort Ross, 1826. Drawing by Wassurts; inscription reads, "Ross
The Russian Colonial Installment and Fort in California, 1826." Reprinted
from E. 0. Essig, ''The Russi an Settlement at Ross, 11 •. _Quarter 1y of the Cal i forn i a
Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 190.
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Fi_gure 35. Fort Ross, 1828. Drawing origianally published in Duhaut-Cilly's Voyag__e
Autour du Monde (Paris, 1835), as "Bodega.
Inscription reads, "View of the estab1ishment at Bodega and the coast of New Albion, 1828. 11 Reprinted from E. 0. Essig, "The
Russian
Settlement at Ross, 11 Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12,
No. 3 (1933), p. 202.
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Figure 36. Fort Ross, undated. Reprinted from Clarence Dufour, Russian Withdrawal from
California, Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 248.
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Figure 37. View of the landing at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, "Russian Withdrawal from California, 11 Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12,
No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 216.
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Ir &. A. Tbompeoa, Santa Rosa, 1896.)

Figure 38. View of the landing at Fort Ross,
1890s. Reprinted from Clarence Du Four, "Russian Withdrawal from California," Quarterly
of the California Historical Society, 12, No.
3 {1933), p. 241.
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V1aw or FoaT Ro.a"'°"
(Fnm "In. Redwood

TKa LANDl!'fG

Loams Canq," h, Emett lncenoll; H.,.'"·, JI..-,
Vol. 66, No. 393,

Jaa. 1113.)

Figure 39. View of Fort Ross from the landing. .
Reprinted from Adele Ogden, "Russian Sea Otter and
Seal Hunting off the California Coast, 11 Q.uarterly
of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3
(1933)' fol. p. 236.
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The site
of
. Fort Ross

.\ marine terr;wc
IJt"l\\t'1·11

thl'

11101111tai11s

and the

~··a

Figure 40. The site of Fort Ross. Reprinted from James R.
Gibson, "Russia in California, 1833: The Report of Governor Wrangel, Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969),
p. 209.

Figure 41. Photograph of Fort Ross site. Courtesy of the Oregon Historical
Society, Portl~nd, Oregon, Negative no. 63432.
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"Ross Scttlcwicnt," by I.G. Voznescnskil, about lRilO. Th<' rnlisadcd fort
encloses chnpcl, administrative offices, harracks anti officers' quarters
as well ns kitchen and stOT<'houscs. The hnthhousc and stnhlrs arc
outside the fort, to the left. On the rii:ht arc workshops nnil sma II
llwcllinr.s for Aleut trappc-r:i;, who h;11l giv<>n llJI thr.ir traclitional iurts
in favor of Hussian-style Jog cahins. '11ais Jrawinr. was intcnd<'J hy the
artist ns a gift for the Jnst aanngcr of Ross, A. G. Rotchcv. (Archiv<.>

Figure 42. Fort Ross, 1840. Reprinted from Kirill T. Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian America,
1817-1832, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan {Portland: Oregon
Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.
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Figure 43. Fort Ross, 1840. Reprinted fromKirill T. Khlebnikov, Colonial Russian America,
1817-1832, trans. and ed. Basil Dmytryshyn and E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1976), fol. p. 106.

"Fort l<oss," au unfinishcJ sl.etch hy T.G. Vozncsenskii. '11le clearly
JcpictcJ hi)!h paJisaJcJ walls anJ oct~•j.!on.al shore bastions bear a
strong resemblance to the earlier traJitional Siberian ostrogs. The
01·thodox d1&1pl'l is vis iblc on the right. 'l11c structure col JapscJ in
the l9llh carthquakoJ was rebuilt in 1915 1 hurracc.l to the grounJ in
1970-1 !>71, aml was again faith fully reconstructed according to the
original plans. lt was tleJicated in the spring of 1976 by a devotcJ
historim1 1 llis Grace, 111c IHght Reverend Grigorii 1 l<ussian Orthodox
bishop of Sitka and Alaska. (Archive MAf AN SSSIL)
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Figure 44. Fort Ross, 1906. Reprinted from E. 0. Essig, "Russian's Settlement at Ross,"
Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), fol. p. 197.
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Figure 45. Barracks at Fort Ross, restored. Reprinted
from James R. Gibson, "Russian in California, 1833: The
Report of Governor Wrangel, Pacific Northwest Quarterly,
60, No. 4 (1969), p. 209.

01:.unaa AT Fou Ra.a 1H lQJZ
(eo-..y of Miu Hoe.ria T_,-.)

THE SoLD1t:a1'

Figure 46. Barracks at Fort Ross, 1912. Reprinted
from Adele Ogden, "California Sea Otter and Seal
Hunting off the California Coast, Quarterly of the
California Historical Society, 12, No-:-3 (1933~, fol.
11

p. 236.
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Figure 47. Basti6n at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Nellie Stow, The Russians
in California (San Francisco: The Nat~l
Society of Colonial Dames of America
in the State of California), p. 12.
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Figure 48. Bastion and landing at Fort Ross. Reprinted from Clarence DuFour, The Russian Withdrawal
from California, Quarterly of the California Historical Society, 12, No. 3 (1933), p. 276.
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Figure 49. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted
from James R. Gibson, "Two New Chernykh Letters, 11 The Pacific Historian, 12, No. 4 (1968), p. 59.
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Figure 50. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted
from Adele Ogden, 11 California Sea Otter and Seal Hunting
off the California Coast, 11 uarterl of the California
Historical Society, ,12, No. 3 1933 , p. 227.
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...!..

Figure 51. Russian Orthodox
Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted
from James R. Gibson, "Russia in
California, 1833: The Report of
Governor Wrangel, 11 Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 6G, No. 4 (1969),
p. 210.
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Figure 52~ Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from Adele Ogden, California Sea Otter and
Seal Hunting off the California Coast, 11 Quarterly of
the California Historical Society, 12,. No. 3 (1933),
fol . p. 236 ..
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Figure 53. Russian Orthodox Church, Fort Ross. Reprinted from Frederick
C. Cordes, trans. Letters of A. Rotchev: Last Commandant at Fort Ross,
Quarterly of the Cal ifornta Historical Society, 39, No. 2 (1960), p. 97.
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TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF HEADS OF RUSSIA/RAK COLONIES/FORT ROSS
TO HEADS OF SPAIN/MEXICO/CALIFORNI~
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0

15

Aleut

37

Native

5

0

0

Russian

*Kuskov arrived at Big Bodega Bay with twenty-five Russians and Aleuts in forty baidarkas.
**This figure, according to Golovnin, included both male and female Aleuts.

12

Hfol~LF.

Creole

63

0

26

Aleut

CHILDREN

Creole

293

300

378

unk

unk

TOTAL

11

Note. Based on infonnation found in Svetlana Fedorova, The Russian Population in Alaska and California, Late 18th Centyry to 1867, trans. and ed. Alton
S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press,
1973), p. 135; James R. Gibson, "Russian in California, 1833: Report of Governor
Wrangel," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, 60, No. 4 (1969), p. 210; and "Russian
America in 1833: The Survey of Kyrill Khlebnikov, Pacific Northwest Quarterly,
63, No. 1 (1972), p. 8;. P·.A.Tikhmenev, A Histor of the Russian-American Com any,
trans. and ed. Alton S. Donnelly and Richard A. Pierce Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1978), p. 161.

1833

10

27

1819

41

0

78**

0

27

1818

1832

0

80*

0

Russian

25

Native

1812

Aleut

Creole

Russian

Date
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POPULATION INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN CALIFORNIA

TABLE IX

w

w

01

~I

9£8t-£08I 'lNnH

~3110

\f3S

VIN~Qjl1VJ

.:I XION3dd\f

X

PeacocP.+

Eclipae+

O'Cain +

1806
-1807

1805
-1807

o•c,;ir:+

1803
-1805

1805
-1806

Vessel

Date

Captain

280 tons
16-30 crew
18 guns
100 Kad'iaks
50 baidarkas
?
Slobodchik

343 tons
18 guns
35 crew

Brig
108 tons
14-18 crew
8 guns

J.Winship,Jr.

J.O'Cain

O.Kfmball

280 tons
J. O'Cain
18 ouns
20 baidarkas
V.P. Tarakanov
? Shvetsov
40 Aleuts

Description•

Hunting Grounds

see above

J&T Perkins,
J.lloyd, of
Boston

Bos. mers,
Winship?

Trinidad Bay
{6/ 11-25/06)
Todos Santos Bay
San Quintin Ray
Cerros Island
(8/13/06)
Faral lon Is
(2/15/07)
San Quintin Bay
(5/31/07)

Todos Santos Bay
( 6/ 30- 7/8/1806)
San Quintin Bay
(7/8-7/10/1806)

Bodega Ray
(3/?-5/?/07)
San Quintin Bay
(6/?-7/?/07)

Boston mer .• San Quintin Bay
A. Winship,
(12/13-3/26/04)
B. Homer,
Todos Santos Bay
J.Winship,Jr.
(4/15-19/04)

Ch-mer

..

4,819

17

-··--·-····

unk

1,261

1,800

Otter pelts

---

l~/

lVOJ

1f;07

1807
514/07
10/8/07

10/?/05
3/?/06
4/1/06
10/12/06
unk
l l/~1A>6
2/15/07

1/26/06
unk
6/25/06
8/?/06
3-5/8/07
unk
9/?/07

9/14/05
2/12/06
4/20/06
4/21/06
10/25/06

10/26/03
12/4-8/03
6/?/04
1/2/05
7/1/05

Continued

Boston
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
Kad' iak
lead' iak
San Pedro
Santa Catalina
Santo Domingo
Novo Arkh.

Boston
Sandwich ls.
San Otego
Novo Arkh.
Canton
Kamchatka
wrecked

Boston
Sandwich ( s.
Carmen
Santo Tomas
Kad 1 iak Is.

Boston
Kad' iak
San Diego
Kad' iak
Canton
Boston

Ports of Ocparture/Call
dJte

VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CALIFORNIA SEA OTTER HUNT, 1803 to 1836

TABLE

x

Mercury+

Kad'ialc+

1808
-1809

1808
-1809

Nikol.ai

Derby+

1806
-1809

1807

Vessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE

145 tons.
18 crew
25 batdarkas
?Shvetsov

crew
130 Aleut
hunters
20 Aleut
women
I. Kuskov
~o

G. Eayrs

Petrov

unk

8. Swift

300 tons
50 Kad' iaks
25 baidarkas

Schooner

Captain

Description•

B.Lamb of
Boston

RAK**

Slobodchikov

Bos ton mer. ,
J. Perkins
G.Lyman
Wm.Sturgis

Owner

San Francisco Bay
{12/1-12/12/08)
Trdos Santos Bay
( 12117-12/21/08)
Trinidad Bay
Bodega Bay

Trinidad Bay
Bodec]a Bay
(12/28/08-8/18/09)

unk

unk

Hunting Grounds

2,117

2,350

unk

unk

Otter Pelts

10/15/08
10/4/09

uok
unk
8/22/07

9/5/06
unk
unk
3/23/09
8/18/09

Continued

Canton
1/?/08
!Cad' tak Is.
6/?/06
Qu.Charlotte Is.
unk
Columbia River
unk
tlflk
San Diego
San Pedro
?/?/09
San Juan Capistrano
4/26/09
unk
Columbia River

Novo Arkh.
Novo Arkh.

Califorllia
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.

Boston
N.W.toast
Cal ffornta
Canton
Boston

-

tidtC

Ports of Ol?pc'li"tu1·c/C.i 11

w

w
ex:>

.....

~~-

•

• I

x

1810
-1813

-1811

1810

-1811

lo'l:J

Date

Ieabell.1+

165 tons
22 crew
25 Kanakas

Albatross+

209 tons
48 ba fdarkas
V. Tarakanov

SO Kod' laks
30 baidarkas
? Lasseff

2RO tons
SO baidarkas

O'Cain+

.

Description

Vessel

CONTINUED

TABLE

Wm.Davis

N.Winship

.J. Winship

Captain

( 12/21/10)

San Quintin Bay

( 11/29/ 10.
5/11/ll)

OrJkr.'s ilay

Hunting Grounds

Boardman
&Pipe,
Sos ton

(2/?/11)

San Francisco Bay

( 11/29/10)

Bodega Bay
(9/?/10)
Drake's Bay

(7/30/10)

Farallon Is.

(1/24-3/3/ ll)

San Luis Obispo
(unk)
Drake's Say

(12/21-?/10)

Winship Fern- Farallon Is.
ily and B. (12/3-?/10,
. 5/4-?/ll.
llomer of
5/24-6/3/ ll)
Boston
San Quintin Bay

see 1806
listing

Owner

2,976

1,190

3,952

Otter Pelts

6/28/10
11-1/1/12
2/26-4/12
6/15/12
2/15/13
6/29/13

11/29/10
6/15/11
8/8/11
8/19-23/11'

Continued

Novo Arkh.
·sandwich Is.
Canton
Sandwich Is.
Canton
Sandwich Is.

Drake's Bay
San Benito Is.
Novo Arkh.
Point Wocdh~use

Boston
5/?/09
Sand\-1ich Is.
?
ifovo Arkh.
12/?/09
Qu. Charlotte ls.?
Novo Arkh.
8/26/10
Lower Ca. coast 4/1/11
Sand1-1ich Is.
11/20-1/11
?/26-4at/ll
Canton
Sandwich Is.
6/15-10/11

Ports of Departure/Call
date

w
w

l.D

1811
-1812

1811
-1812

Chirikov

Amethyst+

>:atne1•ine+

Chir·i.kov

181 l

1809
-1812

Vessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE X

Wm.Blanchard

T.rieek

145 tons
50 baidarlcas

270 tons
52 baidarlcas

ters

40 baidarkas
86 Aleut hun-

I. Kuskov

I. Kuskov

Schooner

Schooner

Captain

Description*

1.238

farallon Is.

unk
unk

San Quintin Bay
J.Oorr.
G.W.Eayrs, (6/?-7 /? /12)
8.Lamb of
Boston

unk

1,442

1.516

Otter pelts

Hunting Grounds

unk Boston San Quintin Bay
merchant
(6-7/12)

RAK**

Owner

unk
unk

9/?/12
lH/12.
8-9/12
l l/ 10/12

?

4/?/09

1/22/ 11
2/21.f/20/ll
7/28/11

Novo Arlch.
Bodega Bay

Continued

11/? / 11
?/ te12

9/?/11
Canton
ll/?-1/12
Novo Arkh.
unk
Novo Arkh.
(vessel sold to Russians)

Sandwich (s.
Canton
Boston

Boston
Sandwich Is.
Kaigani
Novo Arkh.

Nov·1 Arkh.
Bode9a Bay
tlovo Arkh.

Ports of Departure/Catt
date

w

~

a

1813
-1814

1813

1812

Forester

Her.:!1a-:1

HerctU"'J

Novo Arkh.
4/28/ 13
San Luts Obispo 5/2 5/13
Point Conception 6/1/13
1.603 sk tns
947 tails

Bodega Bay
(unk)

B. Lamb

Pacific
Fur Co.

G. Eayrs

J.Jennfngs

145 tons

Brfg

unk

(u11k}
Bodega Bay
(unk)

unk

Hovo Arkh.
San Luis Obisµ>
off Retugio
Santo Tomas
Cape San Lucas
Novo Arkh.

500

San Quintin Bay

Boston mer.
B. Lamb

G. Eayrs

unk
l/ 14/ 14
4/?/14
6/25/14

unk

11/9/13

Continued

New Holland
Sandwich Is.
Bode9a Bay
San Luis Obispo
Wash. coast
Novo Arkh.

unk
9/27112

1/ ?/12
2/?/12
2/3/ 12
4/12112

11/?/ll
?/1812
7/?/13

145 tons

( ?/?/1812)

Farallon ls.

Boston
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich ls.

1,792

(?/1812)

San Quintin Bay

P.Jacksrn,
Boston

l.Whitte1110re

Brig
283 tons

Clzaron+

1811
-1813

Ports of Oeparture/Cdll
date

-Otter pelts

lluntin9 Grounds

Owner

Cdptdln

Oescript ion•

Vessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE }(

w

..i:::.

......

1814

unk

Continued

unk
11/?/14
3/24/15
4/?/15
6/4/15
6-7/15
11/?/15
unk

California
near Loreto
San Diego
Point Conception
Bodega Bay
Novo Arkh.
Kamchatka

Pacific
Fur Co..

Wm.Pigot

Brig
10 guns

f'o1•est<:Jr•

Novo Arkh.
Bodega Bay
San Luis Obisix>
tiovo Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Canton
New York

1/8/14
212a4/2/14
6/?/14
unk
8/26/14
5,9/14
12/27·
1/9/15
2/?/16
10/?/ 16
Sandwich Is.
ColUlllbia River

unk

unk

Pacific
. Fur Co.

S.Northrop

Bdg
225 tons

PeJZer

l)Vasilli Petrovich Tarakanov and 11 men seized at San Pedro.
Z)Son of Alexander Baranov.

-!815

1814

-!816

unk
3/?/15
6/9/ 15
7 ,9/15
9;10/15
12/24/15
1/26/ 16

California
Sandwich Is.
Novo. Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Canton

l/?/14
unk
unk
unk
unk

Novo Arkh.
Bodega Bay
San Francisco
Santa Barbara
San Pedrol

--

Ports of Departure/Call
date

unk

392

Otter pelts

unk

P.oardl!lan
& Pope

Wm.Davis

209 tons

1815
-1816

ft1abellu

Farallon ls.
(8/?/14)

RAK**

? Wadsuorth

flm.tll

!SJ14

Brig
50 Aleuts and
creoles
25 baidarkas
V. Tarakar.ov
Antipatro 2

riunting Grounds

Captain

Vessel

Date

Description*

Owner

CONTINUED

TABLE X

w

N

~

X

Avon

Chirikov

1815
-1817

1817
Schooner
I.Padushkin
( cor.in. of
expedition)

unit

Schooner

Orig
Boris Tarasm
(cOITlll, of hunters)

Description*

C.Beuseman

I •Whit terore

H.Gyzelaar

?. Wadsworth

Ca:>tain

RAK**

unk

B.Wi lcocks

RAK**

Ch-mer

IJTarasov and 24 Aleuts seized by Spanish officials.
2 Seven on board, including John Elliot d'Castro, seized.
3)Vesse1 sold to King Kameh3meha I.

Lyc!-:'.<t

Ilmet1

Vessel

1815
-1816

1815
-1B16

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE

unit

uok

unk

Santa Barbara
Channel Is.

Hunting Grounds

unit

unit

unit

955

Otter pelts

2/?/17
unit
3/?/17
5/lZ/17
unk
6/?/17

2/?/17
11;.12/U

1815
10/?/15
11/?/16
l/20/17

7/12/15
9-12/15
unit
1/16/16
1-2116
3/9/16
9/?/16

6/?/15
7/?/ 15
8/?/9/18/15
9/21/15
unit
unit
unit
//1816

Continued

Novo Arkh.
Bodega Bay
San Francisco
Monterey
Santa Barbara
Novo Arkh.

Boston
Galapagos Is.
Novo Arkh.
San Pedro
Santa Barbara
Channel ls.
Sandwich Is.

Canton
Novo Arlth.
Fort Ross
Refugion
Santa Barbara
Monterey
3
Sandwich Is.

off Refug io2
Bodega Bay
Sandwich ls.
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich ls.

San Francisco
San Luis Obisin
San Pedro l

Ports of Departure/Call
date

................................................ ........-. ......................... _......,, ...

w

~

w

Bo1-..!t!lais

una

-1819

Kutusov

1817

Cossack

Colwr:!, i.t

1817

1815
-1817

Vessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE X

~e

Roquefeufl

L.Hagemeister

J .Kuskov

200 tons
30 crew

J.Brown

J.Jennings

Brig
185 tons
25 crew
10 guns

Brig

Captain

Description•

? Balguerie

RAK**

J.J.Astor

Northwest
Company

Owner

unk

unit

unk

unk

Hunt i119 Grounds

unk

unk

unk

unk

Otte.- pelts

4-5118
5-6/18
6- 7/18
9/5/18
9-10/18
11-12/18
1/12/19
3-4/19

unk
unk
10-11/17
11/20/17

5/?/15
11-12/15
9/?/16
11/?/16
unk
2/20/17
5/7/17

l/10/17
l-4/?/17
5/10/ 17
6-7117
7/24/17
7-8/17
8/9/17
8/10/17
8/20/17
8/23/17
10-11/17
12/6/ 17

·--

Continued

Novo Arkh.
Kad'hk
Novo Arkh.
Nootka
San Francisco
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Canton

Novo Arkh.
Bodega Bay
San Francisco
Novo Arkh.

Boston
Sandwich Is.
"orthwest coast
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich ls.
Canton
Sandwich ls.

Columbia River
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arlh.
(olu1:itia River
Trinid.id
Bodeqt Ray
faro 11 on Is .
Oral.e's Ray
Trinidad
Pt. St. George
Columbia River
Sandwich Is.

f'orts of Ucp.i1·turc/C.>ll
date

w

..,J:::i.
..,J:::i.

Eagle

Kutusou

Okhotsk

Ibnen

, Volga -

1818

1818

1820

1822

ClaM.on

Vessel

1816
-1820

1817
-1821

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE X

1

Brig
23 crew

Brig

P. Tamanin

IC .Khlebnikov

l.Hagemeister

unk

50 Aleuts

.in.

Davh

H.Gyzelaar

Captain

Schooner

Brig
17 crew
6 guns

Description*

unk

unk

RAK**

unk

RAK**

RAK**

Santa Cruz
(unk)

unk

Bo,.rdmen
& Pope

RAK**

unk

Hunting Ground!.

A.Winship

Owner

15

unk

unk

Novo Arkh.
San Francisco
Monterey
Novo Arkh.

Novo Arkh.
Monterey
Novo Arkh.

Novo Arkh.
Bodega Bay

Novo Arkh.
Monterey
Novo Arkh.

12/3/22
1a~~1122

unk

6/13/20
8/Z/20
unl

unk

5·10/17

10/3/18

9/?/18

7/2/18

12/2/16
1/?/17
Si;r. • 1a
6/?/18
3/25/20

8-9/18
10/6/18
10/14/U?
11/1/18
?/?/19
7/23/19
3/?/21

unk
unk

9/1/17

Continued

Boston
Rio de Janeiro
Sandwich Is.
Novo. Arkh.
Canton

unk

72

Boston
Cape of Good Hope
Tasmania
Sandwich Is.
Santa Barbara
San Diego
Sandwich ls.
Novo Arkh.
Sandwich Is.
Canton

Ports of Departure/Call
date

unk

Otter Pelts

w

~

01

VeS'iP.1

Buld.:kov

Mentol'

Hen tor

Ot.Jhyhee

Date

1823

1822
-1823

1824
-1825

1824

CONTINUED

TABLE X

G.Newel l

unlc

Brig
166 tons
22 crew

J.Kelly

G.Newell

K.Vikilman

Brig

unk

Captain

De-script ion•

Marsha 11
& Wildes

Bryant &
Sturgis

Bryant &
Sturgis

p.,\Y.**

()',.,ner

San Francisco

unlc

unk

Hunting Grounds
P~l

110

18

unk

46

Otter

ts

.....................................................

1\rkh.

unk

4/1/24
5/2/24
5/4/24
7/?/24
7/17/24

9/?/24
2/1/25

unk

6/15/24
7/7/24

unk

3-4/24

unk

10/11/23
11/1/23

unk

7/19/23

6/31/22
11-2/23

unk

Continued

Sandwich Is.
Bodega Bay
San Franci!i.C\l
San Pedro
f4azatlan

Sandwich ls.
Canton
Bodega Bay
Monterey
San Francisco
Santa Barbara
San Diego
Canton

Boston
Sandwich Is.
North111est coast
Sandwich ts.
Bodega Bay
Monterey
San Francisco

unk

9/22/23

8itii23

unk

date

Oeparture/C~ll

~

Scln Francisco
Santa Cruz
San Francisco
Novo f.rkh.

l~ovo

Ports of

.........................

_ ........................... ....

°'

w

~

X

Vessel

flashing to"

Rover

Nile

Tamaalrr:rzah

Date

1824

1824
-1825

1825

1825
·1826

CONTINUED

TABLE

S::llocne:"'

A.Forbes

? Heelc

Brig
15 crew

Brig
180 tons

83 tons

J.Rogers

J.Astor

Perkins
&Co.

unit

unk

unit

unk

Huntin9 Grounds

Govt. of
California

Harsha 11
& Ni Ides

? Stevens

Schooner

45 or 52 tons

Owner

Capta~n

Descdption•

unit

unk

444 slttns
263 tans

18

Otter Pelt!;

---

12/9/26

unit

1/l/5/26
3-4/26
8/24/26

unit

f./'!J/l.4
8-11/25

9/16/25
9/19/25
10/?/25
11/7/25

unit

9-10/24
10-12/24
12-1/ZS
l-3/25
4-5/25
7/7/25
8-9/25
9-10/25

9/3/24
9/12/24
10/10/24
10/29/24

unk
unk

7/21/24

Continued

Canton
S•ndwich Is.

lfma

New York
Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
San Francisco
Sandwich Is.

Sandwich Is.
Bodega Bay
San Francisco
Santd Barbara
Mazatlan

Monterey
Bodega Bay
San Francisco
Monterey
Sandwich Is.
Fanning Is.
Mani la
Canton

Sandwich Is.
Bo~eqa Bay
San r1·3ncisco
t-'.onterey
San Luis Obisi:o
San Diego
Sandwich Is.

?orts of Departure/Call
dJte

w
+::-

.........

A.Etol 1n

\h.Dana

C.Taylor

G.Wood

Brig
180 or 203 tons
12 Aleuts
6 baidarkas
Brig

Baikal'

Waverly

Volunteer

LouiDa

1828
-1829

1828
-1829

1829

1831
174 tons
16 crew

Bark

142 tons

K.Beuseman

Brig
180 or WJ tons

Ikiikc.:l'

1825
-1326

Captain

Description*

'Jessel

Date

CONTINUED

TABLE X

J.Jones of
the Sand-·
wich Is.

Bryant &
Sturgis

Govt. of
Sandwich Is.

RAK**

RAK**

Owner

unk

unk

unk

San Quint in Bay

unk

Hunting Grounds

400

unk

unk

63

468

Otter Pelts

unk

unk

unk

unk

7-8/31
9/14/31

unk

6/26/31

unk

4/14/31

8/31/29
9/30/29
10/18/29

2/13/29
3/11/29

11-12/28
12-1/29
2/?/29

8/23/28
10/?/28

12/10/28,
2/12/29

Continued

Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
Monterey
Santa Bclrbara
San Diego
Sandwich Is.
New York

Sandwich Is.
Novo Arkh.
Northwest coast
Novo Arkh.
San Francisco
Monterey

San Diego
Bodega Say
Santa Barbara
Monterey
Santa Barbara
Sandwich Is.

Novo Arkh.
Sdn Diego

11/17/25
1/4/26
'l./li!/26

unk

date

Oepurtu~e/Cail

Hovo Arkh.
San Diego
MonterE::1
San Oii:!go

Ports of

w

..i:::.
CX>

-

-~~-

.1

--~~~-·~~~---

-1836

1835

Date

unk

unk

Otter Pelts

**Russian-~merican

Company

*Description may included that of the vessel, crew, cargo, and passengers.

+These vessels hunted in conjunction with the Russians under the contract system. 1803-1812

French &
Co •• Sandwich ls.

? Carter

Brig
199 tons

Diana

Hunting Grounds

Owner

Captain

Description*

Vessel

CONTINUED

TABLE X

Canton
Sandwich ls.
Novo Arkh.
Monterey
Sandwich Is.
Canton

Ports of Departure

w

~

~

